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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis examines the efficacy of the provisions of Saudi Company Law 1965 in terms of protecting 
the rights of minority shareholders in joint stock companies (JSCs). The aim is to assess the 
effectiveness of the current form of SCL 1965 in this regard and to suggest a reform scheme. 
 
This research finds that SCL 1965 does not adequately provide minority shareholders with all the 
rights that they should enjoy. Accordingly, minority shareholders are often subject to the controlling 
influence of majority shareholders, who are generally in charge of the company’s management. As a 
result, minority shareholders either do not exercise or do not enjoy certain rights, and they therefore 
forfeit their natural and intended role under this law, which is to oversee and control the activities of 
the board of the company, and in so doing to defend their interests. Despite the Saudi government 
intentions to conduct a range of reforms, particularly in the field of trade, SCL 1965 has not been 
modified to any significant degree; it is still not sufficiently effective, and does not address many 
important points relating to shareholders’ rights in listed companies. Therefore, there are important 
decisions that need to be made on the part of the Saudi legislature in terms of improving the 
investment environment in KSA, including improving the level of protection for investors in JSCs; 
these decisions will help to attract more investors into the Saudi financial market. 
 
This thesis suggests ways in which to improve the level of protection for minority shareholders in 
Saudi listed companies against any encroachment on their interests within the company. In this respect, 
it suggests recasting the provisions relating to minority shareholders, especially SCL 1965. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Commercial companies in general are of great importance to society and to the economy of all 
countries around the world, as the profits they generate benefit both individuals and governments.  
Commercial companies can be divided into two main types: personal/private companies and 
capital/public companies.  The most well-known of the latter are joint stock companies (referred to as 
JSCs), which are often engaged by governments to implement important economic projects; thus, these 
companies play a significant role in the economic life of the state as well as in social and political life.  
JSCs are considered an effective tool for collecting funds (sometimes in huge quantities) through 
selling shares directly to the public; individuals who purchase these shares become partners (albeit 
unequal) in the company (to the extent of their ownership of the capital).  As well as receiving a 
proportion of the profits generated (dividends), each shareholder is responsible for the company’s debt, 
but only in relation to the number of shares s/he owns.  JSCs are treated with care by the states that 
regulate them (through the issuance of particular legislations) in order to satisfy their common 
interests, i.e. the interests of both the state and the shareholders (represented by the company), and 
accordingly, the rights of shareholders enjoy considerable protection.  
 
A JSC is a company with a legal personality represented by natural persons; there are two parties, 
namely the board of directors, and the general meeting (referred to as GM), which represents the 
company’s shareholders.  Each has specific terms of reference according to national law and the 
constitution of the company, which serve to regulate and organize their duties and achieve the 
objectives for which the company was established.  The board of directors guides the company in 
achieving its goals, while the GM supervises the performance of the company’s board, and ensures the 
correct functioning of the company as it was planned, as well as monitoring the company’s employees 
and the auditing process.  The GM resembles the state parliament and the board of directors the 
executive power within the state.  However, in reality, the board of the company may dominate the 
management of the company because the GM may be insufficiently equipped to fulfil its duties; the 
board of directors may then exceed the powers stipulated under company law or in the constitution of 
the company, and this may result in adverse consequences for the company and its shareholders. 
 
2 
 
 
In recent years, KSA has witnessed an increase in the number of JSCs, and the inclination of a large 
number of Saudis as well as foreign nationals to invest in them.  The number of JSCs rose to 150 by 
the end of 2011,
1
 and the total volume of subscriptions during 2011 reached about 3 billion Riyals, 
compared with 7.6 billion Riyals in 2010.
2
  Most of these JSCs are run by major shareholders; the role 
of minority shareholders is weak, despite the fact that Saudi legislators have enacted a set of rights for 
all JSC shareholders.  It is worth noting that shareholders do not always fully exercise their rights; this 
has been attributed to their poor culture of investment, and the fact that many of those rights need to be 
clarified, highlighted and analysed in order to enable shareholders to exercise their rights in a more 
effective and practical manner.  There may also be certain gaps in the Saudi Company Law (referred to 
as SCL 1965) or other relevant laws.  In any case, this research focuses on the financial and 
administrative rights of shareholders in JSCs in accordance with SCL 1965. 
Accordingly, a significant objective of this research is to enumerate the rights of shareholders in JSCs.  
Another objective is to highlight any points of weakness in SCL 1965 regarding the issue of 
shareholders’ rights.  More importantly, the research objective is to propose recommendations to 
rectify these defects or disadvantages in the provisions of SCL 1965, in order to keep pace with the 
current developments in company law worldwide and to provide a basic grounding to ensure equality 
among shareholders.  An additional objective is to promote and augment the investment culture of 
minority shareholders.  
1.2 Reasons of Choosing This Study 
The main motive behind the selection of this subject is explained in the light of the following: 
1- Most of the studies currently available in KSA deal only in general terms with the subject of 
companies; most of them focus on the various types of companies, their modes of 
establishment, and the importance of the board of directors.  Too little research has been 
conducted on examining the rights of shareholders in JSCs in particular.  Despite the 
importance of protecting the rights of JSC shareholders, the subject has received insufficient 
attention, and JSCs have not been discussed in a satisfactory manner by researchers; this in 
                                                          
1
 The Saudi Capital Market.  For more information see <www.Tdawal.com> accessed 7 December 2013. 
2
  The Annual Report of the fiscal year 2011 of Saudi Capital Authority. For more information see 
<www.cma.org.sa> accessed 7 December 2013. 
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contrast to the case of western countries, including the USA, France, and the UK.  Therefore, 
KSA could benefit from the experiences of developed countries in this matter, thereby avoiding 
the mistakes that they have made.  
 
2- There have been no legal studies on the rights of shareholders in JSCs in KSA within the 
western literature.  As this subject has not been covered, it needs a comprehensive study of the 
legal terms.  
 
3- The government of Saudi Arabia is working to attract foreign companies and international 
investors, which has led to increasing numbers of JSCs in KSA in recently years; therefore, 
there is a need for competent research studies that clarify the rights of shareholders in such 
companies inside the Saudi legal system.  
 
4- SCL has not been updated since its establishment in 1965, and there are many legal gaps; these 
need comprehensive and urgent reconsideration, and this study could assist in addressing any 
such gaps. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology  
This study employs the critical analysis method in assessing the provisions under SCL 1965 
(specifically, Part V- Corporations).  In order to examine the rights of shareholders in JSCs, other 
related regulations are also examined, such as the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations No. 
1/212/2006 (referred to as SCGRs), and legal texts and academic literatures relating to the issues under 
consideration. For the purpose of the research analysis, reference is made to UK Companies Act 2006 
and to the regulations of certain other countries in this respect as basis to assess and improve the 
provisions of SCL 1965 and to suggest possible reforms with regards to shareholders rights and their 
role in listed companies.   
4 
 
1.4 Choosing the UK for Comparison 
The reasons for choosing the United Kingdom in this study are due to several important factors, 
including the following:  
First of all, the UK ranks among the advanced countries in the field of company law, and it has had 
experience with commercial companies, particularly listed companies, for a long time, which have 
contributed to the growth and development of the state. Therefore, the UK CA 2006 is an old law, and 
it represents an important source for many countries, especially, developing countries.  It will be useful 
to take advantage of this UK legislation, as it could greatly assist developing the SCL 1965.  The latest 
UK CA 2006 was issued in 2006 and it is continuously updated
3
.   
The second factor is that the legal forms of companies in the UK and KSA are similar, and they can be 
categorized into the following types: corporations, cooperatives, partnerships, sole traders and limited 
liability companies.   
The third factor, the UK belongs to the ‘common law’ countries, and has three main sources for 
forming laws: legislation and case law as well as the laws issued by the European Union
4
.  The legal 
system in the UK is flexible and adapts to developments in the field without any undue complexity or 
having to pass through complicated procedures comparing to the KSA, which is classified as a 
developing country, and it is a ‘civil law’ country; it does not use juridical precedents as a source of 
law.  Therefore, the legislation is the primary source of law, which must be ratified by the King; the 
courts apply those codes and do not derogate from them.  For example, under SCL, a judge may not 
issue a judgment on his own initiative in order to cover any apparent gap in the law.  This is why the 
Saudi system is considered rigid and inflexible; issuing a new law requires a package of prolonged 
                                                          
3
 The UK is advanced in the field of research on world trade and business (unlike KSA); we find that there have 
been many researches and legal studies providing recommendations, in particular in the fields of commercial 
companies and shareholders’ rights; these have contributed to the development of company law and the 
strengthening of the position of shareholders.  Amongst these are: Shareholders, Remedies: A Consultative 
Document, 1998; Cadbury Committee, Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992; Hampel Committee, 
Final Report on Corporate Governance, 1998; Greenbury Committee, Report on Directors’ Remuneration, 1995; 
Combined Code, 1998; and Walker’ Review: A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other 
Financial Industry Entities, 2009.  
4
 For example, in the field of legislation for companies, there are three particular directives, which are: The 
Takeover Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC); The Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC); and The 
Directive on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies (Directive 2007/36/EC) 
(Shareholders’ Rights Directive).  
5 
 
measures. 
5
 The comparison between these two different judicial systems should greatly enrich this 
research, enabling the researcher to add a set of new ideas and to offer solutions to the legal problems 
in the current SCL 1965.   
The final factors, the majority of international companies that invest in KSA come from common law 
countries such as the UK and the USA; thus, in order to make KSA an attractive location for foreign 
investment, it is necessary to modify SCL 1965 (in line with the developments in company acts 
worldwide, including, for example, the protection of investing shareholders, whether local or foreign).  
1.5 Research questions and aims 
This research examines whether and to what extent the current form of Saudi Company Law 1965 is 
effective in protecting the minority shareholders’ rights and their role in listed companies from any 
oppressive practices on the part of the controlling shareholders. Therefore, the investigation of 
minority shareholders’ issues will include evaluating the Company Law and related regulations in 
KSA. Additionally, this research examines the main obstacles facing the minority shareholders in 
Saudi listed companies in order to develop and improve general shareholder practice. 
This research aims to shed light on two important aims, which are to: 
1 Ensure that the shareholders in JSCs enjoy effective rights, and that SCL 1965 provides them 
with full protection, on an equal footing in terms of rights and treatment. 
2 Highlight the weaknesses of SCL 1965 regarding the rights of shareholders in JSCs, and 
provide a range of different solutions to the problems concerning the rights of shareholders, so 
that there is a business environment characterized by justice and fairness for all shareholders in 
JSCs. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 For instance, the new SCL was completed in 2007 but it has not yet been adopted because it must pass through 
a long series of complex legal proceedings.  This is one of the reasons why making law in KSA is considered 
underdeveloped.   
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1.6 The Chapters 
In addressing the issues and questions raised above, this thesis is organized in a number of chapters; 
each chapter focuses on a particular area, and in doing so a number of further questions are raised. 
 
Chapter 1 has presented an overview of the contents of this study; it contains, as detailed above, the 
reasons why this topic was chosen, the research methodology, the research questions and aims, and 
now the thesis structure. In brief, the rights of shareholders are the main concern of this study, 
assessing the extent to which they are protected in KSA.  In order to reach this aim, it is necessary to 
fully comprehend the situation in KSA with regard to its legal system, the competencies of the state 
authorities, SCL 1965 and its history and development, plus other related matters.  All of these matters 
are addressed in Chapter 2, and a conclusion is presented at the end.   
 
In order to understand the position and role of shareholders in the JSC, we must more fully 
comprehend the context; in this regard, Chapter 3 concentrates on two aspects.  Firstly, the nature and 
meaning of the term company are reviewed, which is based on two main theories: contractual and 
institutional.  However, each theory places JSC shareholders in a different position.  Accordingly, a 
number of questions concerning JSCs and their shareholders must be addressed, such as:  
 Is the company founded by the state, or is it only a contract between people?   
 With respect to shareholders, where do they stand in these two situations?   
 Do shareholders actually own the company, or are they only contributors in the capital for the 
sake of obtaining profits?   
 How is power and authority distributed within the company?   
 Who are the most significant and influential persons within it?   
 Where does any permanent power lie?   
 What powers do shareholders have?  
 
In the second part of this chapter, having identified the position of shareholders in JSCs, additional 
matters relevant to this subject are addressed, which revolve around the meanings of share and 
shareholder, as well as the various types of shares and their characteristics; how a person becomes a 
shareholder in a JSC is also addressed, and what happens when they lose membership of the company. 
7 
 
Chapter 4 reviews shareholders’ rights, more particularly financial rights, which must be protected by 
both SCL 1965 and the company’s constitution. Therefore, the following questions are addressed in 
this chapter:  
 Among the rights to which a shareholder is entitled, what are the financial ones?  
 What obstacles face them in practicing such rights?  
 Are shareholders granted those rights by SCL 1965?  
The first of these is the right to transfer shares; the second right is known as the pre-emption rights; 
and the third significant right is the right of shareholders to receive profits at the end of each fiscal 
year. In additional, shareholders have a right to have the value of their shares reimbursed if or when 
their company goes into liquidation. All of these rights and other related topics under SCL 1965 are 
discussed in this chapter. 
In Chapter 5, the question of shareholders’ rights is discussed, more specifically in relation to 
shareholders’ meetings within the JSCs.  When shareholders own shares in a company, they contribute 
to its capital; this, in turn, affords them a set of rights at the GMs. Examples of such rights include the 
right to be called to attend the GM, which is considered the foremost right granted to shareholders (and 
shall be exercised); another is that it is acceptable that a shareholder can appoint a proxy to attend the 
GM if the former is unable to attend in person. When shareholders attend the GM, they can exercise a 
number of rights, such as the right to debate issues, vote, and enquire about any area or function of the 
company. Prior to discussing shareholders’ rights in meetings, it is important to clarify a number of 
points, such as the different types of GM, the resolutions taken at GMs and their validity, the 
requirements of GMs, reasons why shareholders fail to attend GMs, and suggestions for increasing 
shareholder participation in GMs.  
 
In Chapter 6, the main questions are:  
 What are the remedies and means available under the SCL 1965 to protect the minority 
shareholders from the board of directors or from the controlling shareholders (who look after 
their own personal benefits, regardless of the minority’s opinion)?  
 Are the statutory remedies and means of the Saudi system workable and effective?  
 Do they defend the rights of minority shareholders?  
 How can minority shareholders enforce their rights inside and outside the company?  
8 
 
 What are the shortcomings within SCL 1965?  
This chapter is divided into four main sections: the first concerns company action (which can be 
initiated by the company or by its shareholders), and covers company action and derivative action; the 
second section concerns personal suits; the third section concentrates on the statutory remedies 
available to shareholders that can be used without litigation; and the fourth section covers the penalties 
under the SCL 1965. The final section discusses the competence of the courts in shareholder litigation. 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, is the conclusion of the study and contains recommendations to fill the 
gaps in SCL 1965, aimed at improving the situation of shareholders in listed companies in Saudi 
Arabia.  
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Chapter 2: General Overview of KSA 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter gave an overview of the contents of this study; it contained the reasons why this 
topic was to chosen, the research methodology, the research questions and aims, and the thesis 
structure. In brief, the right of shareholders is the main concern of this study, assessing the extent to 
which they are protected in KSA.  In order to reach this aim, it is necessary to fully comprehend the 
situation in KSA with regard to its legal system, the competencies of the state authorities, Saudi 
Company Law and its history and development, and other related matters.  All of these matters are 
addressed in this chapter, and a conclusion is presented at the end.   
 
2.2 KSA legal System 
 
Life in the Arabian Peninsula used to be very simple; most of the inhabitants depended on agriculture 
and animal husbandry.  Commercial activities were present but they were very limited, and 
commensurate with the status of the population.  Large parts of the Arabian Peninsula then came under 
the sway of the Ottoman Empire, and all business activities within the region were subject to the 
articles of the Justice Magazine.
6
  The Justice Magazine is considered to be the first fully coded body 
of Islamic civil law because it was based on the official regulation of Islamic jurisprudence; it was 
formally issued through a decree in 1869.  In 1876, the Articles were applied mandatorily in the courts 
of all Islamic regions controlled by the Ottoman Empire.  The Magazine comprised 1,851 Articles, 
which were divided into 16 chapters; one of these was dedicated to companies, and it included the 
legal provisions for various civil transactions, such as sales, leases, guarantees, agencies and others, 
which tightly regulated the disparate doctrinal issues.
7
  Many Arab countries have built their law 
systems based on the provisions of the Magazine, such as Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and the Gulf states. 
As with the other Arab states in the Middle East region, KSA is a developing country.  The 
establishment of this country was based on the principles of Islam.  Since it was formally founded in 
                                                          
6
 Mohammad Albaga, Codification of the articles of the Justice Magazine, College of Sharia, Damascus 
University.2009. P: 746. 
7
 See <http://www.moj.ps/ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Itemid=19 > accessed 20 
January 2013   
10 
 
1932 by King Abdul-Aziz bin Saud (1881-1953), the legal system has been mainly derived from the 
rules of Islamic law; this is in addition to other legislations made by the relevant state authorities.
8
  
Islamic law
9
 depends on a variety of sources
10
; the most important one is the Holy Qur’an, which was 
revealed by Allah (God) to His Prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon Him).
11
  Islam has a noticeable 
impact on various aspects of life within the state, and this is confirmed in Article 8 of the Basic Law of 
Governance (hereafter BLG) in KSA.
12
  The influence of Islamic rules and principles is quite clear in 
areas such as family affairs, divorce and marriage issues and criminal law, whereas certain other fields 
are not fully covered by these Islamic provisions; these latter pertain to laws dealing with industry, 
business, commerce and administrative issues.
13
  
 
Riyadh is the capital city of KSA, and the official language of the country is Arabic; KSA follows the 
lunar calendar.  The regime of government is a monarchy; there is no history of democracy.
14
  The 
features of the legal system in KSA seem to be rather vague and complex (due to its structure); 
however, some of the contradictions are because the structure is a combination of traditional and 
modern legal theories.
15
 
 
It could be said that is not surprising that KSA is a religious state; the birthplace of Islam is the city of 
Mecca, as it was developed there by the Prophet Muhammad in the 7
th
 Century.  The two holiest 
                                                          
8
 Ana Echagüe & Edward Burke. Strong Foundations? The Imperative for Reform in Saudi Arabia. Working 
Paper. FRIDAY. 2009. p. 9. Available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/632/'strong-foundations'?:-the-
imperative-for-reform-in-saudi-arabia>  accessed 20 January 2013   
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mosques for Muslims are located in Mecca and in Medina;
16
 the first is the point of direction for 
Muslims at prayer and it is where pilgrimage is performed, and the second is visited to worship the 
Prophet Muhammad.  In this context, Al-Farsy asserted, “In unifying the Arab States into a cohesive 
nation, it is Islam, which, like a spinning wheel, weaves the various Arab peoples together into one 
strong fabric.  It was the tie of faith rather than anything else that enabled King Abdul-Aziz to found 
his Kingdom; if Arabs are ever destined to unite again in one nation or in a federation of nations it will 
be through their religion.”17 
 
KSA is the modern state, and it has been affected in its development (like others) by the civil laws 
applied in the region; most of the surrounding countries have been affected directly or indirectly by 
civil law even if they are based on religious grounds.  Since the establishment of KSA, there has been 
a dual legal system, as in other Muslim countries; its legal system can be divided into Islamic law and 
modern laws but they function in combination.
18
  However, it can be argued Islamic law is the 
dominant legal system in KSA, although it is affected by the civil laws of France and Egypt; one can 
find a great many articles derived from those foreign legal systems.  Egypt in particular played a 
significant role in establishing the laws of the Saudi state; this is due to its experience in the region, 
and if we examine SCL 1965, one could conclude that it is a near-copy of the Egyptian Companies 
Act, and one must acknowledge that French Company Law played a major role in the formulation of 
those provisions.
19
 
 
It could be argued that this history explains why the laws and regulations of KSA are so rigid and 
inflexible, and why there are problems within them; this is unlike the case of countries that follow the 
common law system, which is more flexible, and we find this fact in the comparative legal studies 
conducted between the legal systems of different countries.  For example, in the area of the subject of 
this research (the rights of shareholders and investors), in the countries that follow the common law, 
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 In this context, Menoret mentioned, “Islam is inseparable from Saudi consciousness and national pride, not 
only because Arabia houses the holy places of Mecca and Medina, but also because it was the centre of the first 
indigenous Arab-Muslim resistance to foreign domination. Even for the youngest Saudis, therefore, Islam is the 
key to their self-perception and their affirmation of national sentiments”.   
See: Pascal Ménoret. The Saudi Enigma: A History. London: Zed Books, 2005. p. 100  
17
 Fouad Al-Farsy, Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation. Kegan Paul International, London. 2009. p. 
21. 
18
 Frank E. Vogel. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Brill Academic Publishers. Boston. 
2000. p. 322 
19
 Maren Hanson. The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia. Arab Law 
Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 3.1987, Pg.:291 Statutory Derivative Action in Australia: An Empirical Review of 
12 
 
the protection of shareholders and investors is stronger and more durable when compared with 
countries that follow the civil law system.  This fact was clarified in the study carried out by La Porta 
and others, which describes the differences between the civil law system and the common law system. 
La Porta et al. said at the end of their study, “In this paper, we have examined law governing investor 
protection, the quality of enforcement of these laws, and ownership concentration in 49 countries 
around the world.  The analysis suggests three broad conclusions.  First … countries whose legal rules 
originate in the common law tradition tend to protect investors considerably more than the countries 
whose law originate in the civil law, and especially the French civil law tradition... Second, law 
enforcement is strong in common law countries as well, whereas it is the weakest in the French civil 
law countries.”20 
 
Having said that, the civil pattern played a significant role in formulating SCL 1965, the effects of 
which are still present; therefore, there should be no hindrance to reconsidering the provisions of SCL 
1965, particularly those that are related to the protection of shareholders and investors.  Indeed, it is 
necessary to assess the civil model in order to identify solutions to the problems and shortcomings 
inherent within the current KSA legislative law, and to take advantage of the laws of those developed 
countries that follow the common law system, such as in the United Kingdom,
21
 which has experience 
in developing legal provisions to cope with the current era. 
 
It should be noted that KSA is undergoing a wave of legal reforms in various areas, particularly with 
regard to the fields of economics and commerce,
22
 which started before its accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).
23
  Each member of the Organization makes commitments to develop its 
laws in order to make them more flexible and to comply with the laws of the other Member States.  
Thus, the world has become a small village, in which the transfer of funds between countries is eased, 
global markets are freed of restrictions, transnational companies are encouraged to grow, and the 
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movement of goods and services between countries is facilitated.
24
  All of this means that KSA has no 
option but to develop, adjust and change its laws; otherwise, KSA will rotate in a vicious circle of legal 
incompatibilities that will negatively affect its plans for the future.  
 
2.3 Basic Law of Governance (KSA Constitution) 
   
It is often argued that KSA does not have constitutional law as it is commonly understood on the 
grounds that the main source for its legislation is Islamic Law, which is derived from the Qur’an, and 
which must be interpreted only by scholar in Islam.
25
 However, it can be argued that the Basic Law of 
Governance (referred as to the BLG) serves a constitutional function. The BLG determines the main 
principles of the state and sets out the relationships among the various regional authorities; thus, it 
functions as constitutional law. It is generally agreed by commentators that the BLG should be more 
specific and is in need of some clarification. The BLG includes, like many constitutions, certain 
matters that are liable to interpretation, where rights are not clearly stated or reserved, and with no 
guarantee that they will be respected.
26
 
 
The BLG was issued in 1992; it is the first written constitution in the history of the Kingdom.  The 
BLG consists of 83 Articles divided into nine chapters: General Principles, Monarchy, Features of the 
Saudi Family, Economy, Rights and Duties, Authorities of the State, Financial Affairs and General 
Provisions.  The BLG is based on the premise of justice, consultation and equality in accordance with 
the Islamic Shari’ah.27  The enormous impact of Islamic Law is explicitly obvious throughout the BLG 
within Saudi legal system, and it is ranked second only to Shari’ah in regard of legislative importance; 
these are followed by The Consultative Council Law and The Regional Law.
28
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The first Article in the BLG underscores that the basis for all aspects of life in the state is Islam, which 
is the source of legislation (in particular, the Qur’an and the Sunnah).  These two scriptures are also 
considered the constitution of the state; “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab 
Islamic State.  Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah 
(Traditions) of His Messenger.”29  The Islamic religion, clearly, plays an essential role in all aspects of 
life in the Saudi state, and this is indicated in Article 7 of the BLG, which states that the Holy Quran 
and the Prophet’s Sunnah (Traditions) together underwrite the laws of the Kingdom.   
2.4 Authorities of the State 
 
As is the case in most countries, the authorities of the state are divided into three sections, namely the 
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.  The state constitution defines the mandate of each.  
However, it can be said that in KSA there is a fourth authority beside these three, which is the role of 
the King; the BLG defines them all, and determines their jurisdiction as well as any associations 
between them.
30
 
 
It can be noticed that even though those authorities are separated, there is a close correlation among 
them, and this is particularly so between the executive and legislative authorities.  The executive 
authority often assumes that one of its tasks is legislation; nevertheless, there is still a strong 
correlation between them, acting as if they are one authority.
31
  In fact, it is quite difficult to 
distinguish between the three authorities in Saudi government, i.e. between the executive, the 
legislative and judicial authorities.
32
 
 
2.4.1 Executive authority  
The King, the Council of Ministers, local governments and ministry subsidiaries, in addition to other 
public, independent and quasi-independent agencies, constitute the executive body in KSA.
33
  The 
Council of Ministers is the highest executive authority in the state, and therefore it is considered the 
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dominant authority over all executive powers.
34
  In addition to his executive authority, the King also 
has legislative power.  He is the head of the executive authority, and has absolute power over it; all 
state authorities report to him, and he is the reference point for all the authorities within the state.
35
 
 
The King holds certain particular responsibilities, such as guiding the policies of the country and 
supervising the performance of the ministries and governmental organizations, in addition to leading 
the Council of Ministers; he also provides guidance to various state agencies, and enhances the 
consistency, continuity and unity of the Council of Ministers.
36
 
 
In relation to the Council of Ministers, it has the power to determine domestic, foreign, financial, 
economic, educational and defence policies as well as all the public affairs of the state, and it 
supervises their implementation; it holds the executive branch, and it is the reference point for the 
financial and administrative affairs in other ministries and governmental bodies.
37
  Among the main 
tasks for the Council of Ministers, as a direct executive authority are:
38
 to control executive and 
administrative affairs, to follow up the implementation of laws, measures and decisions; to establish 
the necessary bodies and organizations required for public welfare, to supervise the implementation of 
development plans and projects in the country, and to establish bodies to revise the conducts of 
ministries and other governmental departments. 
 
2.4.2 Legislative Authority 
The legislative authority in KSA can be defined through the term Regulatory Authority;
39
 the 
legislative authority is divided between more than one party: the King, the Council of Ministers and 
the Shura Council, i.e. the consultative council or parliament.
40
  However, the role of the latter has 
recently become advisory,
41
 even though the core duty of the Shura Council is to enact laws and 
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regulations, like any other parliament in other countries.
42
  Actually, this is stipulated under Article 67 
of the BLG: “The regulatory authority shall have the jurisdiction of formulating laws and rules 
conducive to the realization of the well-being or warding off harm to State affairs in accordance with 
the principles of the Islamic Shari'ah.  It shall exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with this Law, and 
the Laws of the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council”. 
 
In fact, the foundation of KSA legislation is based on the principles of Islamic Shari’ah law, and no 
legislation may oppose it.  In general, the rules of Shari’ah regulate all aspects of life, such as trade, 
economy, crime, punishment and social areas.  According to Shari’ah law, the King is considered the 
father of the state; he is the top of the pyramid, and all three authorities defer to him.
43
  Therefore, the 
powers of the king are wide and unrestricted, including the enactment, amendment or repealing of 
laws, by Royal Order; in general, no legislation is enforceable unless it has been approved by the 
King.
44
  Therefore, the King is free to accept or reject any law proposed by the two legislative 
bodies.
45
  The king is only required to abide by Islamic Shari’ah; other than this, there are no 
limitations to the authority of the King provided in the BLG.
46
 
The Council of Ministers is entitled (besides its executive authority) to exercise legislative powers.
47
  
The other legislative branch is the Shura Council; it has the power to issue laws and regulations, to 
assess and revise them and then to take further decisions on them.
48
  This Shura Council was 
established in 1992 on the basis of a royal decree, and its members are nominated by the King; he also 
has the power to expel members and to prorogue the Council.
49
  
 
Certain factors need to be taken into account when the legislative authority seeks to enact new 
legislation; the legislature must be mindful of the fact that the Holy Quran and Sunnah are the main 
components of the KSA constitution, and that any legislation must not compromise or contradict them.  
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These two scriptures constitute the foundation of the country, and are the supreme sources of 
knowledge and law.  Thus, any the new legislation shall not contradict the provisions of the 
fundamental laws of the country.  Also, the legislative authority has the responsibility of establishing 
new legislations for the sake of developing the country and protecting its public welfare in a manner 
that is compatible with Islamic Law.
50
 
 
To summarize the above, the legislative powers in this country are correlated in a manner that seems 
unduly complex, being under the purview of bodies: the Council of Ministers, the King, the Supreme 
Judicial Council and the Shura Council (all of which take part in designing and enacting legislations).
51
  
The final enactment of any new legislation in KSA takes various forms, the most common of which 
are: 1) Royal Orders, 2) Royal Decrees, and 3) subsidiary resolutions,
52
 which are discussed below. 
2.4.2.1 Royal Orders  
This is a formal written document reflecting the direct and individual will of the King, and it is often 
issued according to a specific formula; it bears the signature of the King alone.  Here, we should be 
cognisant of the fact that a Royal Order is an expression of the will of the King as a monarch and not 
as the head of the Council of Ministers; this because the Chairman of the Council of Ministers is not 
necessarily the King.  Thus, the King’s will is direct and individual, i.e. not restricted by referring to 
any legislative authority, be it the Council of Ministers or any other official department of state.
53
 
 
The legal basis of a Royal Order is the King’s power of discretion as supreme head of the three 
authorities,
54
 and there is no specific timeframe involved in the issuance of Royal Orders, as with the 
other enactment formulae.  The Royal Order, with all these characteristics, is considered the most 
powerful organizational tool in KSA, and it is valid as soon as it is announced; it cannot be overturned 
by any means.  Thus, in the judgments considered by the Board of Grievances (Diwan AlMadhalim), 
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Royal Orders are considered as being of sovereign competence, i.e. not within its purview, based on 
the fact that the King has absolute power.
55
 
2.4.2.2  Royal Decrees 
A Royal Decree is an official document that reflects the will of the King in terms of approving a matter 
raised before him, i.e. it is an expression of royal approval.  The matter in question would have been 
previously presented to the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, and one or both of them would 
have taken a decision on it that then requires the approval of the King before it can be applied and 
officially enforced.  Most Royal Decrees are to approve the draft of some new system or law, or to 
approve international agreements.
56
  In fact, the Royal Decree has its origins in the Council of 
Ministers, and its importance arises from the fact that it second only to a Royal Order in legislation.  
Thus, a Royal Decree requires the King’s approval in order for the proposed legislation to become 
official and effective, and then to be published in the Official Gazette.
57
 
This characteristic distinguishes the Royal Order from the Royal Decree, as the former does not need 
the involvement of the Council of Ministers because, as stated above, the King is the head of the three 
authorities and has the power to issue any legislation without referring to the legislative authority.  The 
Royal Decree is nevertheless important because it draws its strength from the Council of Ministers and 
the Shura Council, which are the authorities responsible for the legislation and regulation of all areas 
pertaining to government: financial, commercial, social, judicial and others.
58
  Finally, all ministers, 
when seeking to issue legislations related to their ministries, must refer to the Council of Ministers for 
approval, and then their proposals are forwarded to the King for approval through Royal Decree.
59
 
2.4.2.3 Subsidiary Legislations (Regulations) 
These are defined as regulations that the executive authority enacts, often empowering the competent 
minister to issue a set of rules to assist in the implementation of some Royal Decrees governing the 
interests of the state; the Council of Ministers and any other appointed ministers or government 
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agencies have the power to enact such rules and regulations, in order to facilitate the implementation 
of Royal Orders and Decrees.  Examples of subsidiary legislations are: all executive regulations, lists, 
codes, ministerial rules and procedures, and ministerial decrees and decisions, in addition to 
memoranda, explanatory notes, ministerial documents and decisions. 
 
Subsidiary regulations are second only Royal Decrees and do not need to be ratified by the King or 
approved by the Council of Ministers; this is in contrast with Royal Orders and Decrees, which are 
subject to the power of the King.  However, sub-regulations can be issued by all executive, judicial or 
legislative authorities as long as they are given the jurisdiction to do so. 
 
As the goal of subsidiary regulations is to assist the various ministries and governmental bodies in 
implementing Royal Decrees and Orders, they are easier to issue and more flexible; they may be 
amended as and when necessary.  This is unlike the established laws, which need convoluted processes 
in their issuance or if they need to be amended; subsidiary regulations are more responsive to change, 
whether economic or otherwise, as they can be issued and modified easily.
60
  
 
2.4.3 Judicial Authority 
The Judicial Authority is the third element in the Authorities of the State;
61
 Article 46 of the BLG 
states that the Judiciary Authority is independent, and that judges are not subject to any authority 
except Shari’ah.  The right of litigation before the courts is equally guaranteed to all citizens and 
residents.
62
  In 2007, the judicial system was updated to replace the one issued in 1975;
63
 it is the latest 
judicial system in the Kingdom, and nearly two billion dollars was allocated for this reform process.      
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The Judicial system is divided to two main forms, Shari’a Courts64 and Administrative Courts (Board 
of Grievances
65
). Besides these forms, there is another type known as Quasi-Judicial Committees, of 
which there are more than 75.
66
  These are administrative tribunals exercising and performing judicial 
duties for the consideration of certain disputes according to certain procedures;
67
 however, they are 
committees affiliated to governmental executive departments, such as the Saudi Monetary Agency, 
CMA, MOCI and others. All these committees are composed of technocrats as well as administrative 
and legal teams from outside the judicial system.   
 
It has been argued that some tribunals combine the task of the prosecution, trial and execution at the 
same time, which detracts from the principle of the independence of such committees. For example, 
the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (referred to as the CRSD) is considered as a 
body independent of the CMA, but in reality its members are appointed by the CMA. Therefore, it is 
assumed that their appointment is through the Law of the Judiciary (to ensure their independence from 
any interventions from other government bodies
68
); however, in this case, the Committee members are 
like employees who are subject to the CMA's authority. 
Some committees can hand down strong penalties, such as imprisonment. This was evident in the 
verdict against the chairman of the board of Bishah Agriculture Co. who was found guilty of insider 
trading and to be in breach of his duties.
69
 Some corporate specialists argue that the CRSD should not 
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The most prominent features of the new system is the change of name from Supreme Judicial Council to 
Supreme Council of Judgment, and the change in its competence; it now considers the functional affairs of 
judges, and look into the affairs of the courts to determine their jurisdiction in terms of place and type. 
64
 Shari’a Courts consist of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Courts of Appeal and First-Instance Courts 
(General Courts, Summary Courts). 
65
 The Board of Grievances was established in 1955 by Royal Order No. M/51. It is considered as an 
administrative judiciary system. Also, the Board has authority over commercial dispute cases resulting from 
SCL 1965; however, applications that result from outside the CL fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee for 
the Resolution of Securities Disputes (subject to the Saudi Capital Market Authority). 
66
 Yousef Al-hadeethi. Quasi-judicial Committees in Saudi Arabia. Centre for Judicial Studies. 2009. Available 
at< http://www.cojss.com/search.php?s=415 > accessed 8 February 2012. 
67
 Mansour S. Alknezan. Quasi-judicial committees, problems and solutions. Riyadh Newspaper, Vol 15869 on 
05 Jun 2011. available at< http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/06/08/article639561.html> accessed 8 February 2012. 
68
 According to the Article 1, “Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be subject 
to no authority other than the provisions of Shari’ah and laws in force. No one may interfere with the Judiciary”. 
69
 See<http://www.cma.org.sa/Ar/News/Pages/CMA_N528.aspx> accessed 9 February 2012. 
21 
 
pass such sanctions, on the grounds that sanctions such prison are criminal penalties that may only be 
imposed by the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution; they argue that this is the only 
competent authority for such sentencing, and that such matters should not be decided by quasi-legal 
committees. 
 
Within a government agency, there may be more than one committee; each committee is designed to 
consider specific issues, and they should not interfere with the competence of the courts mentioned 
above; their particular powers are always determined by the decision for establishing them.
70
  Actually, 
the establishment of committees is based on one of main four tools, which are: Royal Orders, Royal 
Decrees, decisions of the Council of Ministers, or ministerial decisions.
71
 
 
However, it is noteworthy that the reforms made to the judicial system have not delivered concrete 
improvements on the ground; the judicial system is still suffering from a lack of cadres and the 
complex nature of appointment, and there is no prestige in this body because of poor achievement rates 
and long periods of time needed for litigation.  It could be said that the main reasons for this latter are: 
the huge number of suits before the general courts and the administrative courts, and the current 
shortage in the number of judges in contrast with the large number of suits; for example, the number of 
judges in KSA is approximately 1,250 (according to recent statistics), and they preside over 
approximately 800,000 suits per year, with an increase of upward to 12% per year.
72
  As a result, there 
is only one judge for every 32,000 citizens, whereas in the countries neighbouring KSA, there is a 
judge for every 3,000 residents; the ideal is to have a judge for every 2,000 residents.
73
 
  
These problems were recently confirmed in a statistical report delivered by Saudi Ministry of Justice, 
which revealed that the average workload for judges in Saudi courts was 94 cases per month for each 
judge.  According to President of the Board of Grievances, a large number of suits need highly 
qualified judicial staff, and therefore, it is necessary to reconsider how judges and their staff are trained 
and appointed.
74
  This is an urgent matter, as should the current situation not be reconsidered, it will 
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have negative consequences for litigants, whether individuals or companies, and this will lead to 
reluctance on the part of foreign companies to invest in the country, merely because there are problems 
in the judicial system; it will also affect KSA’s reputation and credibility amongst nations. 
 
On the other hand, in KSA the system of judicial precedent is not used as a source of legislation, and 
many of the judgments handed down are not published in the public domain. It may be that a judge is 
minded to hand down a verdict based on discretion but that it would be contrary to his colleagues in 
considering a similar case; however, he may not do so as he does not have the power to set new law.
75
 
The importance of precedent lies in its ability to create new legal texts, and this strengthens the 
confidence of both litigants and investors in the local judicial system, which in turn helps to attract 
foreign investment.  Precedent enriches jurisprudence and facilitates the tasks of lawyers, as lawyers 
depend on the orientations of any likely judgment to establish grounds for their client’s defence. The 
system of precedent assists in filling the gaps in legislation or in addressing the inability of regulatory 
frameworks to keep pace with developments in various fields.  Also, it benefits researchers (as well as 
judges), who can then become acquainted with the varying published decisions and assess how they 
correlate with unified principles; this can assist judges and legal advisers in deciding how they should 
proceed in similar subsequent cases.
76
 
 
2.5 Company Law of 1965 
 
The Kingdom was unified in 1932; the discovery of oil was an important factor in changing the pattern 
of life in the state and its populace, which led to an increase in business investment and a wide variety 
of economic projects.  The government founded a package of laws and regulations, of which a key one 
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was Company Law.
77
  This law was enacted for the first time by Royal Decree in 1965, and represents 
the first legislation that regulated business transactions and all commercial operations in KSA; it was 
modified in 1982, and then again in 1998.
78
 
 
However, there are very few legal articles within this law and they do not cover all corporate affairs in 
general, or JSCs in particular; the number of legal articles that cover the provisions of JSCs is less than 
100, and, unfortunately, the number of articles relating to the rights of shareholders does not exceed 
15.  When reading this law, it is clear that there is are gaps in the legislation, and this is in need of 
urgent attention.
79
  
 
It could be said that the reasons behind this lies in the fact that SCL 1965 was formed to a great extent 
according to the Egyptian Companies Act, which was derived from the French Companies Act and the 
Articles of the Justice Magazine; therefore, many of the provisions within Saudi law were formed 
according to the French/Egyptian model.  The other element that also contributed to the formulation of 
Saudi law was Islamic law (Islamic jurisprudence), which identified the general principles of law in 
KSA.
80
  As a result, SCL 1965 has been affected by various laws from different environments; French, 
Ottoman, Egyptian and Islamic law as well as the local environment and its traditions, all of which 
contributed directly or indirectly in the drafting and construction of the provisions of the current law. 
 
SCL 1965 have been modified more than once, but the fundamental weaknesses have not been 
addressed; and over time, local businessmen and foreign investors have expressed discontent towards 
the current law.  Although sharp criticisms have been levelled at this law, a long period of time has 
now passed without any significant modifications, and it no longer keeps pace with modern 
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developments in commercial activities, notably the trend of the Saudi government to move towards 
privatization and attracting foreign investment as well as joining the WTO, which requires developing 
national laws to be more compatible with international trade.  The Saudi government, in 2007, 
prepared the final draft of the new law, which will replace the old law, but unfortunately, so far it has 
not been ratified by the Council of Ministers, which means that it has been in the process of being 
approved for more than five years. 
 
As noted above, there have been several attempts at amending SCL 1965 but they all faced obstacles; 
the most notable ones are bureaucratic delays and centralized decision-making.  It is surprising that no 
substantial modifications or additions have been introduce to the current law so far; this is certainly the 
demand of a great many specialists and concerned professionals because the law as it currently stands 
is not fully fit for purpose, being largely out of date and containing too few articles.  As for those who 
argue that the SCGRs, issued in 2006, covers some of these flaws, this argument is criticized because 
most of the articles within the SCGRs are taken from SCL 1965; on the other hand, the SCGRs was 
only ever designed to be a guide and is not binding (more on this below).  Generally speaking, KSA is 
considered a developing country, with little experience in the world of business and trade; therefore, it 
needs the expertise of other countries, especially developed countries such as the UK.  UK laws 
represent is a good model to follow, and should be used to contribute to the development of the laws of 
KSA, making them more modern and flexible. 
 
2.5.1.1 Shareholders’ Rights under SCL 1965   
Shareholders in listed companies under the Saudi system enjoy a particular set of rights.  The source of 
most of these rights is SCL 1965, and the others are distributed among CML (and its implementing 
regulations such as the Listing Rules) and the CGRS; all of these rights are directly related to the 
proportion of each individual’s ownership of the company’s capital.  The share holder is accordingly 
entitled to certain rights, the important of which are: the right to receive a proportionate share of any 
profits as they are distributed, the right to take his share of the assets in the case of liquidation, the 
right to attend the company’s General Meetings, to debate and express opinions, and to vote on any 
GM decisions, the right to supervise and follow up the activities of the board of directors, the right to 
obtain information about the company without compromising its interests, and the right to dispose of 
25 
 
shares and leave the company.
81
 
 
In general, the existence of the shareholders’ rights detailed in SCL 1965 does not mean that there is 
effective protection of those rights, and the existence of those rights does not mean that they are 
exercised by the shareholders in an effective manner; therefore, the effectiveness of shareholders’ 
rights in the company cannot be assured without taking into account several associated factors.  The 
factors that are particularly significant in this regard are the structure of the ownership of the company 
(this seriously affects the level of protection for shareholders’ rights), the legal system (as mentioned 
above), cultural and religious traditions, and the political atmosphere; these are in addition to the 
general difficulties associated with commercial and industrial activity.
82
 
 
Thus, one significant factor is the ownership structure; this plays a crucial role in shaping the 
protection of shareholders’ rights; the more the ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals, the more the minority shareholders become vulnerable.
83
  In addition, the civil litigation 
system in KSA has consequences for the level of protection for shareholders’ rights.  This has been 
confirmed in various legal studies but perhaps the most prominent and well known is that conducted 
by La Porta and his colleagues.  They argued that the system of common law countries provides more 
protection for JSC shareholders and creditors against any manipulation by the company board or large 
shareholders.
84
  
 
Those countries that follow the French civil law system are those where corporate managers have 
greater freedom to act without fear of intervention from the minority shareholders in the company’s 
management.
85
  This is actually what we find in the Saudi system, where the majority shareholders in 
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the company have a strong presence in the management, and can impose their agendas without regard 
for the minority shareholders.  Most of the listed companies in KSA were originally family companies 
that became JSCs, and they are still managed by the owners, who are generally the majority 
shareholders.
86
  
 
It could be said that the reason for the Anglo-Saxon countries following the common rather than the 
civil law system is because of the existence of explicit laws governing the rights of minority 
shareholders, monitoring their application, and not allowing contravention; this was explained by 
Lazarides.
87
  In regard of the protection of shareholders’ rights, the states following the Anglo-Saxon 
system have more ownership protection than those of the Continental Europe system.  This kind of 
protection usually stems from the legal system and judicial structure, which together maintain effective 
control of capital market.  However, there is a kind of balance between responsibilities and rights in 
this environment.
88
 
 
2.5.1.2 The Importance of Protecting the Rights of Shareholders in JSCs 
There are two key factors in the protection of the shareholders’ rights in JSCs; the most important of 
these is the principles of justice and fairness.  In general, the position of minority shareholders in a 
company is inferior to that of the controlling shareholders (due to the latter’s possession of huge 
numbers of shares in the company’s capital); thus, the minority shareholders are in a weak position 
relative to the other players in the company.
89
   
This is evident in SCL 1965, which accords those who owns greater numbers of shares more control 
over the company; the generally accepted principle is that the dominant shareholders should have the 
right to participate to a greater extent in the administration of company affairs than minority parties; 
however, it is unacceptable for them to ignore the legitimate rights and interests of minority 
shareholders.  Justice and fairness require that minority shareholders be treated fairly, and that no 
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particular class of shareholder should be able to influence events at the expense of another.
90
  This 
does not mean that there shall be full equality among shareholders; rather, respect shall be maintained 
for the weaker shareholders’ equity, and their rights shall not be violated by any stronger party in the 
company. 
 
Thus, the minority shareholders’ rights should not be neglected even if the majority shareholders own 
most of the shares in the company,
91
 and this shall not lead to their domination over the company’s 
decisions, in particular those that do not support the interests, benefits and rights of the minority 
shareholders and the company in general. 
 
Therefore, the majority shareholders, when exercising their right in managing the company and 
participating in decision-making shall seek the achievement of the general interests of the company 
and not their own interests; the company is a mere business venture that aims to achieve financial 
returns for shareholders.  It is only just and fair that majority shareholders take into account the 
interests of other shareholders in the company even if their proportion is small; it is not true that the 
value of the interests of the majority is superior to the value of the interests of the minority.  
 
However, concerning this point, the Global Corporate Governance Principles of the ICGN (the 
International Corporate Governance Network), which were revised in 2009, advocates, “Boards should 
treat all the company’s shareholders equitably and should respect and not prejudice the rights of all 
investors.  Boards should do their utmost to enable shareholders to exercise their rights...and should 
not impose unnecessary hurdles.”92  Unfortunately, this does indeed happen in most developing 
countries; the position of minority shareholders is weak in listed companies in KSA, while the position 
of majority shareholders in the company is relatively strong, and they tend to have the upper hand in 
management decision-making and can direct it as they think best suited to their own interests first (the 
interests of the company in general are often neglected).  This is why it is important to draw the 
attention to the fact that although the majority shareholders have the right to a stronger position than 
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the minority shareholders (because they own more shares), they do not have the right to prejudicially 
abuse this position; the strong must be restricted by certain constraints to protect everyone, and this 
must be subject to the provisions given in the relevant laws. 
 
On the other hand, and of no less importance, justice and equity must be maintained through protection 
as well as constriction; minority shareholders must be afforded a series of provisions that protect them 
when exposed to any attack on their rights or interests, and this protection must exist even if there are 
not violations of those rights or interests.  What matters is that those legal provisions should protect the 
minority shareholders against the dominant shareholders with regard to the fate of the company and its 
shareholders generally.  The powers granted to the majority shareholders in a JSC should not be used 
in a way that is harmful to the minority and their interests in the company, i.e. power cannot be 
provided to the majority shareholders without corresponding accountability.
93
 
 
The second key factor is the economic one; the greater the protection that is accorded minority 
shareholders in JSCs, the greater the attraction to participate and invest in these companies.  The 
shareholder, regardless of being a national or a foreigner, looks for security for his money, and 
endeavours to make sure that it will be invested wisely by people who have no narrow interests, but 
are only seeking to achieve the company’s goals.  In this manner, it is entirely normal for the investor 
to wish to safeguard his interests and to exercise his rights.  No matter how long the term of the 
investment, the truth of the company will be revealed to all, and it will be clear if it was managed to 
achieve the interests of the company and its shareholders as a whole, or was just to achieve the 
interests of a particular class; this will be reflected in the company’s public reputation.  
 
Adequate protection of shareholders’ rights is the key reason for investors being attracted to invest 
their money in a company; this is in addition to reasonable and appropriate restrictions on their 
obligations.
94
  It is true that minority shareholders have non-controlling shares in the capital, but they 
are considered an important source of finance for listed companies; consequently, their opinion within 
the company must be respected, and they should be suitably protected against any possible abuse or 
injustice.  Fundamentally, although majority shareholders may have a bigger say over company affairs 
(because they own more shares), it does not logically follow that shareholders’ rights increase or 
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decrease according to the percentage of shares in the company’s capital.  The existence of such 
protection for minority shareholders will contribute to the company’s growth through providing more 
liquidity; this will ensure that the company will not need to borrow from creditors such as banks, 
which often entail financially onerous obligations. 
 
From the economic perspective, it is believed that protecting minority shareholders delivers various 
benefits, in particular for the growth of a country’s GDP.95  For instance, the volume of savings, 
through being strengthened, could increase; in addition, these savings could be directed into 
appropriate fields of investment, leading to further increases in capital; moreover, investment 
regulations could be adjusted to benefit the business environment, and, as a result, capital would more 
easily flow toward productive areas.  For the above reasons, this kind of protection would appear to be 
a prerequisite to economic growth.  
 
Many studies have indicated that the greater the level of protection for shareholders, the greater the 
attraction to invest, which in turn improves the business environment, increases financial and 
economic stability, and raises the level of transparency and credibility in the business environment for 
those investors; this suggests that there is a strong relationship between the effectiveness of the 
protection of shareholders’ rights and the development of a country’s economy.  For example, the UK 
is a developed country with a strong reputation for investment and business, wherein protecting 
minority shareholders is effective and durable against any prejudicial moves by company directors 
(whether shareholders or managers), and where strong rules and standards for liability are applied.  
This is unlike the case with Continental European countries and Middle East countries, including KSA, 
where manipulation and the promotion of special interests are evident.
96
  
 
2.6 The Impact of Corporate Governance on Minority Shareholder Protection 
 
Shareholders’ rights are protected through many sources: the law, the judicial system, regulatory 
control measures, or adopting the company codes of Corporate Governance (referred to as CG), 
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including the CG principles and internal control systems.
97
  Furthermore, CG principles offer a range 
of measures for improving the practices of within the business environment, making them more 
transparent, accountable and responsible; CG may be considered as one of the most important sources 
for improving shareholder protection.
98
  Not only does CG address the protection of minority 
shareholders, it also offers a great deal of advice for anyone who has a relationship with a listed 
company.  It can be argued that CG contributes to raising the level of shareholder control over the 
company through a combination of internal and external mechanisms, as well as protecting the 
beneficiaries of a company, and creating an environment free from corruption (thereby attracting 
additional capital).
99
 
 
The CG principles among countries are not identical;
100
 this is due to differences in the economic, 
political and other aspects of each state.  It is the same when attempting to define CG; it is not possible 
to give one definition because of varying perspectives of those who have tried to do so.  In fact, it 
could be defined in relation to economics or to law, and these will deliver different definitions.  Thus, 
the definitions of CG differ according to subject-matter (business, economics, investment, etc.), in 
addition to where it is practiced (in regard to the level of a country’s development).  It also depends on 
the type of trade policy followed, the practitioner, and the researcher or theorist. 
 
Nevertheless, in general, CG can be referred to as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”.101  This definition appeared for the first time in the Cadbury Committee (1992); however, 
it is too broad and does not give specifically explain all the aspects of CG.  Recently, Plessis described 
CG more accurately, thus: “It is the process of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of 
balancing the interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties .... who can be affected by the 
corporation's conduct in order to ensure responsible behavior by the corporation and to achieve the 
maximum level of efficiency and profitability for the corporation.”102 
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As mentioned above, there are many definitions for CG but for the purposes of this study, a suitable 
would be: “Corporate governance is the framework of laws, rules, and procedures that regulate the 
interactions and relationships between the providers of capital (owners), the governing body (the board 
or boards in the two-tier system), senior managers and other parties that take part to varying degrees in 
the decision making process and are impacted by the company's dispositions and business activities. 
Corporate governance defines their respective roles and responsibilities and their influence in steering 
the course of the company.”103 
This definition indicates that CG is an integrated network that addresses the rights and interests of all 
parties, including shareholders (whether majority or minority), through the various relevant laws.  
These laws include binding legal rules designed to protect the owners of those interests, including, for 
example, protecting the weaker party in the company from the stronger party.  It is worth mentioning 
that these laws are to be taken seriously with regard to company governance and finance (along with 
the proper oversight of the relevant legal bodies) if the company is to thrive.
104
 
 
Theoretically, the concept of CG is related to various other fields, such as economics, management, 
finance and sociology.  Hence, the CG system can be explained in relation to these fields;
105
 however, 
most researchers working on the concept of CG contend with two main theories: the theory of agency, 
which is related to finance and economics, and stakeholder theory, which is related to the social 
perspective of CG.
106
 
 
Given the increasing attention being paid to CG, many institutions are keen to study and analyse it, and 
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to develop specific criteria to apply through it.  Some of these institutions are: the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International Settlements represented 
in the Basel Committee, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
107
 
 
Perhaps, the most important CG principles are those issued by the OECD in 1999, which is charged 
with assisting all Member States as well as non-members in the development of legal and institutional 
frameworks for the application of CG (both public and private companies, whether listed in the capital 
markets or not), through providing a number of guidelines to strengthen CG practices, the efficiency of 
capital markets, and the stability of the economy as a whole.  Those principles have been divided into 
five major groups, as in the following: 
1) The Rights of Shareholders; this includes the right to transfer ownership of shares, vote in the 
GM, select the board of directors, and receive profits; these are in addition to the right to 
participate freely and effectively in the GMs.  
2) The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders; this means equality between shareholders within 
each category, as well as their right to vote in the GM on all important decisions in the company, 
and working to protect them from any dubious acquisition or merger, in addition to their right to 
access all transactions of board members or executive managers. 
3) The Role of Shareholders; which means respecting their legal rights, compensation for any 
violation of those rights, enhancing their role in the control of the company and accessing any 
information required.  Stakeholders denote bondholders, banks, customers and others who are 
linked to the company through their interests. 
4) Disclosure and Transparency; this entails disclosing any important company information 
(including to the auditor), detailing the ownership of the majority of the shares, and listing the 
interests of the members of the Board of Directors and managers.  This all provided that 
exposing such information shall be done in a fair manner between shareholders and stakeholders, 
and without any undue delay. 
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5) The Responsibility of the Board; this includes the structure and legal duties of the Board of 
Directors, how to select its members, its core functions, and its role in overseeing the executive 
management of the company. 
 
The question that arises here is: what is the status of CG in KSA?  Has it contributed to raising the 
level of protection of minority shareholders in JSCs against the more dominant parties in the 
company?  KSA was the second state in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
108
 after Oman,
109
 to 
adopt CG for its public companies.  The Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (referred to as 
SCGRs) have been historically voluntary since their issuance in 2006.  It was during that year that the 
Saudi Stock Market (referred to as Tadawul) crashed, and the general index fell nearly by 25%.
110
  The 
CMA insisted on issuing new rules to prevent further crises; it announced a first draft code of the 
SCGRs with many applications, all of which were optional until the beginning of 2009, becoming 
compulsory in 2010 for listed companies in terms of implementation.  However, the listed companies 
are now only required to demonstrate adherence to the SCGRs on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.111 
 
It could be said that the objective of the SCGRs is to provide a general guideline of best practice for 
listed companies and their shareholders; this was meant to increase the level of protection for all 
shareholders, especially the minority ones.  Furthermore, in 2009, Saudi listed companies were 
required to establish audit committees comprising at least three non-executive directors (one of whom 
had to come from a financial background).
112
  The audit committee was to be responsible for, amongst 
other things, establishing robust internal controls, dealing with external auditors, and devising 
appropriate accounting policies. 
 
The SCGRs cover five main areas, which are: the introduction and definition of CG, the rights of 
shareholders and the GM, disclosure and transparency, the board of directors, and closing provisions.  
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A great deal of criticism has been directed at this list within the SCGRs, and some of the shortcomings 
shall now be reviewed in brief.  
 
Most of SCGRs are just recommendations, except for those stated as being mandatory, i.e. they are 
optional in application and there is no penalty for non-compliance.  This is somewhat negative because 
it opens the way for many companies to evade following the provisions.  The SCGRs are completely 
free of any definition of what is meant by the term CG, although it is the term that needs the most 
clarification, due to its novelty on the one hand, and the need for each person to be aware of its gravity 
and to know what it entails on the other; many shareholders do not know the full meaning of the 
concept of CG.
113
 
 
The SCGRs also overlook any consideration of the employment of modern technology (Internet and 
video conference) in holding GMs.  As a result, it has deprived many shareholders from voting on GM 
decisions online or through any other modern means of communication.  Undoubtedly, this gap has 
had negative consequences for many shareholders, as it is not reasonable to ask a shareholder who 
owns a limited number of shares to travel from one city to another in order to vote on GM resolutions 
in person when modern means of communication should suffice, i.e. he should be able to vote on GM 
matters wherever he is, in a secure manner and without incurring travel, accommodation and other 
expenses.  In addition, the lack of employment of modern technology in GM meetings is inconsistent 
with the need for speed and credibility, on which business is based. 
 
Despite the above, the SCGRs deal well with the issue of disclosure and transparency, which is 
arguably the most important aspect in the context of CG, but they overlook stating any sanctions for 
violating the rules of disclosure and transparency. 
 
A further issue is that many of the provisions within the SCGRs are actually listed as obligatory and 
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binding within SCL 1965.  The CMA, when preparing the regulations, quoted many of the provisions 
from SCL 1965, which caused some problems.  For example, Article 3 of SCGRs is taken from the 
first lines in Articles 108 and 78 of SCL 1965; Article 5(A) of SCGRs is taken from the ending of 
Article 84 of SCL 1965; Article 5(B) of SCGRs is taken from Article 87 of SCL 1965; Article 5(C) of 
SCGRs is included in Article 87 of SCL 1965; and Article 5(G) is in Article 94 of SCL 1965.  
 
All the above SCGR articles are stated as being for guidance only, and so the CMA had to reassert that 
they are indeed mandatory in order to avoid any conflict and ramifications for JSCs, and in order not to 
violate any provisions of higher legislation.  In terms of application, the provisions of SCL 1965 are 
paramount.  Therefore, the SCGRs that are taken from SCL 1965 are in fact obligatory and should be 
followed accordingly, not on the basis of or in accordance with the concepts stated in the SCGRs.  
Thus, corporations tend only to apply those SCGRs that are included in SCL 1965 under threat of 
penalty, being unable to argue that they are not mandatory, even though those same regulations are 
stated as being for guidance only in the SCGRs.  Owing to these problems, the SCGRs must be 
modified to comply with SCL 1965, and all conflicts should be resolved by MOCI and the CMA in the 
public interest. 
Unfortunately, it was thought that the application of the SCGRs would contribute at least to addressing 
the shortcomings within the provisions of SCL 1965 until a modern CL had been issued, but it did not; 
it was the duty of the CMA, which issued the regulations, to cooperate with other relevant bodies, such 
as MOCI, to coordinate over their contents, and to fill some of the gaps in SCL 1965.  Some may 
argue that the SCGRs are for guidance and should not be mandatory; certainly, most of the principles 
in the SCGRs take the form of guidance, but it does not matter that some of them be deemed 
mandatory when needed.  This is now the case with the SCGRs in KSA, wherein some are now 
deemed mandatory; indeed, there is no reason why a rule should not be mandatory if it is in the public 
interest or if it is to correct a mistake. 
 
On the other hand, one of the defects in the SCGRs is that there are many contradictions between its 
articles and the provisions of SCL 1965.  For example, Article 88 of SCL 1965 requires publication 
twenty-five days before the date of any GM, whereas the SCGRs require only twenty days
114
.  Also, 
incompatibility exists between Article 79 of SCL 1965, which is related to the issue of the board of 
directors appointing a chairman and a managing director from among its members and the possibility 
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that one board member could occupy both posts, and the SCGRs, which states,
115
 “D) It is prohibited 
to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board with any other executive position in the company, 
such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the general manager”.  The 
irony is that the text uses the word ‘prohibited’ although the context is for guidance only.  In any case, 
such conflicts are not in the interests of the company and its shareholders, and for any defect the law or 
regulations, there must be clear and accurate legal provisions to prevent confusion in their 
application.
116
 
 
Economists have noted that the current SCGRs are (theoretically) being applied in JSCs but that many 
companies are trying to evade their application.  This situation will open the door to corruption on the 
part of those companies, and therefore the competent authorities must endeavour to enforce the 
application of the SCGRs in order to close that door before those members of boards of directors and 
corporate officials who wish to exploit the absence of application can damage the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
According to a research presented by The Council for the Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(CSC),
117
 the poor application of the SCGRs in companies is considered one of the factors feeding the 
economic corruption now evident in KSA.  The CSC  stresses that there are several reasons behind the 
spread of corruption in companies and institutions  nowadays: poor transparency and accountability, 
the difficulty of identifying the criteria that constitute the basis for contracts and transactions and 
selecting tenders, corporations carrying out projects with no real feasibility studies, and weakness or 
lack of competition; in this latter, many leading business companies are actually monopolies and they 
seek to gain the trust of decision makers in other companies or in governmental institutions in order to 
make deals, obtain supply contracts, or implement projects.  In addition to fraud and corruption 
conducted in this manner, some companies are pushed into searching for underhand ways to dispose of 
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their products through kickbacks and bribes, paid to other companies or governmental institutions. 
 
In the respect of directors’ remuneration and compensation, the SCGRs explains that they can be in the 
form of salary, attendance allowance for meetings, benefits in kind, or a certain percentage of the 
profits; they may combine two or more of these.
118
  It is believed that these rewards are often high 
because the profits generated by JSCs are also often high; we must also take into account that the 
regulations allow directors to retain membership of five companies.
119
 
 
Essentially, many members of boards of companies are also members of other boards, although they 
are not working full-time and are unable to follow up all the affairs and situations of their various 
companies.  This leads us to conclude that the regulations open the door wide to a few members of 
corporate boards obtaining greater financial rewards, and dominating a large number of boards, while 
many scientific, highly qualifies and competent professionals are prevented from membership.
120
 
It is suggested, in this regard, to amend the above text as follows, “A person may be a member of the 
Boards of Directors of three JSCs at most at any one time in his personal capacity, and may also be 
representative of a legal person in the Boards of Directors of three JSCs at most; in all cases, the 
person may not be a member of boards in more than five JSCs, in his personal capacity in some and as 
a representative of a legal person in others, and any membership obtained on the board of a JSC that is 
contrary to the provisions of this article is considered void accordingly.” 
 
In general, protecting the rights of minority shareholders is actually the fundamental goal of corporate 
governance; this is in addition to providing the necessary legal devices that help them exercise their 
rights and counter any oppression on the part of majority shareholders.  However, minority 
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shareholders should not have to depend on company rules alone in seeking to preserve their rights.
121
  
In this regard, the OECD emphasizes that, “[T]o ensure an effective corporate governance framework, 
it is necessary that an appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundation is 
established upon which all market participants can rely in establishing their private contractual 
relations”.122 
In the case of KSA, there is an opportunity the CMA to enhance the protection of minority 
shareholders through the following procedures: increase the accountability of the members of board of 
directors, reduce the power of controlling shareholders in the company, grant minority shareholder 
extra tools to strengthen their participation in decision making, and force listed companies to adopt 
electronic communication. 
In fact, it has been argued that reforming the laws concerned with investor protection and improving 
judicial quality are quite difficult, lengthy, and require the support of politicians and relevant bodies; 
on the other hand, improving corporate governance at the firm-level seems to be a feasible goal.
123
  
However, it is the CMA that has the greatest opportunity to adjust the SCGRs and to change its status 
from being ‘comply or explain’ to being obligatory, particularly given that reforming the CL has taken 
longer than expected. 
In its Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), the World Bank mentioned that CG in 
KSA is still in a nascent concept but one that reflects the international standard, particularly the OECD 
principles;
124
 however, the CMA is still in the process of finalisation, and therefore still has the 
opportunity to improve the text and enhance the implementation of the SCGRs.  In this, the CMA and 
all public agencies and private parties (such as listed companies, universities, media, etc,) should play 
a role in educating all parties engaged in the capital market (such as directors, shareholders, auditors, 
etc.).  Furthermore, workshops, seminars and committees should be established to assess the efficacy 
of the SCGRs, determining how to improve the implementation of the regulations, identifying the 
parties that can benefit from their implementation, and addressing the problems facing that 
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implementing; these together would serve to create reasonable recommendations and to improve the 
reputation of the SCGRs. 
 
2.7 Legal Forms of Companies under Saudi Company Law 1965  
According to SCL 1965, a company is defined as a contract under which two or more persons commit 
to contributing in an enterprise in order to generate profits by providing a share of money or services, 
for sharing what may result from this project, be it profit or loss.
125
 Therefore, companies under SCL 
965 have a legal entity except a joint venture.
126
 
 
In addition, without prejudice to such companies, as it is known in Islamic jurisprudence, any company 
that does not assume one of the above mentioned forms shall be considered null and void, and the 
persons who make contracts in its name shall be personally and jointly liable for the obligations arising 
from such contracts.
127
 
 
In fact, the classification of companies in the Saudi system is based on the French Commercial Law, 
which played a major role in the formulation of company laws of many countries in the Middle East, 
such as Egypt, Jordan and the Arab Gulf states; the provisions of the Saudi Company Law were largely 
derived from the Egyptian Company Law.
128
 
 
The main authorities responsible for regulating, supervising and monitoring companies in KSA are 
four, namely, the MOCI,
129
 the CMA,
130
 the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA),
131
 the Saudi 
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Organization for Chartered Public Accountants (SOCPA),
132
 and the Shura (Consultative) Council.  
The role of these bodies is significantly important in protecting investors’ rights; they create rules and 
regulations whose aims are to protect investors and preserve the market’s integrity, in addition to 
ensuring that those rules are implemented in the proper manner.
133
 
 
2.8 Joint Stock Company  
JSCs differ from closed joint stock companies in several ways.  The former is a type of public 
companies, however, the most important characteristic of a private company is that the company’s 
founders, who signed the contract to set up a company, restrict any IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) in 
the capital of their company only to themselves, i.e. the company founders do not offer any of the 
company’s shares for public subscription, where the founders of that company share the financial 
ability and the desire to cover the company’s capital, and thus to manage the company affairs.134 
 
In the mid1930s, the first Saudi listed company was born, namely the Arab Automobile Company, and 
there were about 14 companies by 1975.  A number of large corporations and joint stock banks were 
established due to the rapid economic expansion of the 1970s, besides the Saudisation of parts of 
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foreign banks (and their capital) at that time.
135
  However, this research focuses on listed companies; 
all other companies are beyond the remit of this research. 
 
SCL 1965 defines a JSC as a company whose capital is divided into portions called shares, equal in 
value, and characterized by susceptibility to negotiation through commercial methods, and the 
commercial partners’ liability is confined to the proportion each one of them has contributed in the 
company’s capital; also, it is not titled by the names of the partners.136  In terms of the name of a JSC, 
it must be derived from the purpose of the establishment of the company, and it may include the name 
of one of the natural persons if the purpose of the company is to invest a patent registered in the name 
of such person, or unless the company acquires a commercial firm and adopts the name of the latter as 
its own name;
137
 in such cases, the phrase ‘joint stock company’ should be added to the name to refer 
to the type of the company. 
 
It has been argued that listed companies in KSA are like their counterparts in the GCC in terms of 
ownership, i.e. they are very ‘centred’;138 this s not surprising for various reasons, such as the region’s 
socio-economic, socio-political, and nomadic norms and traditions.
139
  Usually, rich families and 
individual investors have the greatest share of capital in various sectors, where 90% of 57% of Saudi 
Capital Market are owned by families.
140
  Thus, they are the major shareholders of banks, and they 
occupy their boards of directors; for example, three out of the ten listed Saudi banks are founded by 
single families, such as Bank Al-Jazira, Al Rajhi Bank, or by a small number of allied families such as 
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Bank Al Belad.
141
  Foreign share constitutes only 3% of the total market, while cross ownership of 
JSCs is only 2%.
142
  
 
As for Saudi ownership of the listed companies in the Tadawul, it is estimated at about 37% of the 
total capital market; however, these have significant influence over the capital of large listed 
companies, where the value of Saudi contribution in the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
is 75% of the company’s capital, it is 83.6% in the Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC), and 
76% and 70% in the electricity and telecommunications sectors.
143
 
 
The ownership structure is based largely on the rich families and the state; these are the two largest 
shareholders in JSCs, where their influence on the company is quite clear, and they dominate the 
company’s management directly, which could undermine the minority shareholders’ rights and their 
ambitions.
144
 
 
In this context, Lazarides shows that in the Continental Europe system the markets are less liquid, and 
governments do not have the same capacity to monitor and control them; this is because firms are 
controlled by a small number of shareholders such as banks and families.
145
  Typically, as is the case in 
most countries in developing markets, there is the situation where corporate ownership is concentrated 
to the degree that one person can have effective control of the firm, and therefore the nature of the 
agency problem shifts away from the conflict between shareholder and manager to the conflicts among 
the controlling owners as a manager and the minority of shareholders.
146
 
2.8.1 Incorporation Procedures for JSCs 
Establishing a company is subject to certain procedures, and these differ from those of other 
companies (due to their importance).  These procedures start with issuing a Royal Decree or 
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ministerial decision authorizing the establishment, depending on the nature of the company’s activity, 
and the company gains the status of ‘juristic person’ only after the issuance of a decision by the 
Minister of MOCI, declaring the establishment of the company and publishing it in the Official 
Gazette.
147
  The purpose of this is to enable the state to control the establishment of JSCs, to emphasize 
the gravity of the project in question, and to protect public funds. 
 
In fact, JSCs often arise to undertake huge projects; so upon their founding, several procedures must be 
taken.  Those include ones related to the technical aspects of the company, such as technical studies, or 
the establishment of factories and the purchase of machinery and raw materials; others include aspects 
the regulatory procedures necessary to establish the company.  The actions concerning the technical 
aspects are not the subject of this search; however, the statutory procedures are those that do concern 
this research. 
 
Generally speaking, founding a JSC passes through more than one stage.  In the preliminary stage, 
SCL 1965 requires those who wish to establish a JSC submit a request for establishing a company 
signed by at least five of the founders; the request shall show how to subscribe to the capital of the 
company, the number of shares specified for the founders themselves, and the amount subscribed by 
each one of them; also, a copy of the company’s memorandum of association and its bylaws, signed by 
each one of the incorporators and other founders must be attached.
148
  However, the company’s articles 
must be identical to the standard bylaws for JSCs issued by the Minister of MOCI.
149
  The founders 
must attach with the license application a study that demonstrates the economic feasibility for the 
company’s goals unless the study has been provided to another competent governmental authority that 
has authorized the establishment of the project. 
 
This is the preliminary stage of the establishment of a JSC.  Article 53 of SCL 1965 defines the 
founder as everyone who signs the contract of a JSC or requests a foundation license, or anyone who 
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offers a share in kind when establishing it, or actually participates in the establishment of the company.  
It is not required that the founder should be a natural person; it is possible that all or some of the 
founders be legal persons.  The founders in Saudi system are not those who agree on the idea of 
establishing a company and sign a contract for it; rather, the circle of founders includes every person 
who has a role in the establishment of the company. 
 
As long as the founder is a party to the contract, she/he must be legally fully competent to act, so that 
the founder may bear civil and criminal liability on the failure to establish the company; also, the 
juristic person may become a founder of a JSC, provided that the establishment of such a company 
falls within the objectives, i.e. there must be a link or relationship between the purpose of the legal 
person that takes part with others to establish the JSC and the purposes and activities of the company 
to be established.  However, all the founders can be natural persons, or involve juristic persons, or all 
be juristic persons. 
 
Every founder must be a partner in the company to be established, wherein Saudi law requires that the 
founders subscribe to the shares of the company to be established, and set a maximum for the total 
percentage of shares for the founders in the company’s capital that they seek to set up; the minimum 
number of founders in JSCs is five.
150
 
 
The second stage of incorporation for JSCs entails inviting the public for subscription in the 
company’s shares through banks authorized by the Minister of MOCI, where the founders shall leave 
sufficient copies of the company’s articles at the banks authorized to receive subscription applications, 
and each interested person may obtain a copy at a reasonable price.
151
  
 
The IPO will remain open for not less than ten days, and not more than ninety days; if the subscription 
does not cover the whole capital within the assigned period, it is possible (by the permission of the 
Minister of MOCI) to extend the subscription period for a period not exceeding ninety days.
152
  
Subscription is made by signing a document (by the subscriber or someone on his/her behalf); the 
document contains, in particular, the company name, purpose and capital, the conditions of 
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subscription, the name, nationality and address of the subscriber, the number of shares of subscription, 
and the subscriber’s commitment to accept the company’s articles as approved by the constituent 
general meeting. 
 
The IPO proceeds shall be deposited in the name of the company under formation, in a bank 
designated by the Minister of MOCI, and shall be delivered only to the board of directors   after the 
publication of the establishment of the company, in accordance with Article 63.  Then, to allocate each 
subscriber the number of shares she/he subscribed for, if the number of shares subscribed for exceeds 
the number offered for the IPO, shares will be distributed to subscribers according to percentage of 
subscription of each one of them, taking into account whatever is determined by the Minister of MOCI 
in each case for small subscribers.
153
 
 
The last stages in the establishing a company begins after the IPO has finished; the founders call all 
subscribers to the constituent general meeting, whose mission is to complete the establishment 
procedures; it convenes after fifteen days from the date of the call.  Each subscriber (regardless of the 
number shares) has the right to attend this meeting.  However, it is necessary for the meeting to be 
legal to be attended by a number of subscribers representing half of the capital at least; if this majority 
is not available, another call for a second meeting within 15 days shall be made, and this meeting is 
considered legal regardless of the number of subscribers attending, where the decisions of this meeting 
are issued through an absolute majority of the shares represented therein.
154
 
 
Fundamentally, the tasks of this meeting are to view the report of the founders’ committee, which must 
include complete information and data for all acts of incorporation and procedures with supporting 
documentation, validation and compliance with the law and the company’s articles.  This is in addition 
to checking the expenses of incorporation, having discussions and taking appropriate decisions.  
Electing the first board, and the auditor or auditors, and determining their remuneration, or authorizing 
the Board of Directors to determine these, are also entailed. 
 
The procedures for JSC establishment end by the Minister of MOCI issuing a decision to declare the 
establishment, where the founders must submit within fifteen days following the convening of the 
                                                          
153
 Ibid   
154
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Articles 60 & 61 
46 
 
meeting a request to the Minister to declare the establishment of the company; issuing this decision of 
declaration of establishment is made after the Minister has verified the validity of the incorporation 
procedures. 
 
The company is considered accordingly founded from the date of issuance of the Minister’s decision 
declaring its establishment; the consequences of this decision are as follows: not hearing the case of 
invalidating the company for any violation of the provisions of SCL 1965 or its Memoranda or bylaws; 
transferring all actions carried out by the founders of the company to its pact; the company bearing all 
the expenses incurred by the founders during the period of incorporation; publishing in the Official 
Gazette (at the expense of the company) the decision of Minister to declare its establishment together 
with a copy of the company’s constitution; and the members of the board of directors being required, 
within fifteen days from the date of the mentioned resolution, to request registering the company in the 
Register of Companies at the General Administration for Companies (referred to as GAFC), as well as 
registering it in the Commercial Register (in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial 
Register).
155
 
 
2.8.2 Founders’ Duties and Rights 
Article 55 of SCL 1965 stipulates that the founders are jointly responsible for the validity of the data 
contained in the subscription prospectus and the completion of the data referred to in that article.  As a 
result of the decision to declare the establishment of the company, all actions carried out by the 
founders for the company shall be transferred to its account; also, the company shall bear all expenses 
incurred by the founders during the period of establishment; if it is not established in accordance with 
SCL 1965, the subscribers then may reclaim the sums they paid or shares in kind that they gave, and 
the founders will be jointly liable for the fulfilment of this obligation (and compensation where 
required).  Thus, the founders bear all the expenses incurred during the establishment of the company, 
and are jointly liable to third parties for acts and conducts made by them during the period of 
incorporation.
156
 
 
Article 100 of SCL 1965 confirms that cash shares subscribed by the founders shall not be traded, 
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along with the shares in kind and quotas of establishment, before the announcement of the budget and 
of the profit and loss calculations for two full fiscal years of no less than twelve months for each of 
them from the date of establishment of the company. 
 
Nevertheless, during the period of this ban, the transfer of ownership of cash shares in accordance with 
the provisions of sale of rights, from one founder to another, or to a member of the board of directors 
for submission as guarantee for the management, or from the heirs of one of the founders to others in 
the event of his death, the provisions of this article apply to whatever is subscribed by the founders in 
the case of any increase in value before the end of the period of the ban.
157
 
 
2.8.3 Shareholders’ Duties and Rights 
Shareholders here are the non-founder shareholders; SCL 1965 contains many shareholder rights as 
well as the corresponding obligations, which will be described briefly.  Article 57 of SCL 1965 states 
that the shareholder’s first commitment is to pledge upon subscription to accept the company’s articles 
as approved by the constituent general meeting; the subscription or the owning of shares indicates 
acceptance by the shareholders of the articles of association, as well as their commitment to the 
decisions issued by the shareholders’ meetings.158  This is in addition to the right of each shareholder 
(regardless of the number of shares) to attend the constituent meeting.
159
  
 
In fact, each shareholder has the right to raise a liability case against the board members assigned by 
the company for any violation that may cause harm; he may not file the aforementioned suit unless the 
rights of the company are made clear, and the shareholder shall notify the company of his intention to 
file the suit.
160
 
 
Each shareholder who holds twenty shares has the right to attend the GMs, even if the company’s 
articles state otherwise.
161
  Every shareholder has the right to discuss the issues on the GM agenda, and 
to ask the members of the board of directors and the auditor relevant questions.
162
  On the other hand, 
the shareholder commits to pay the value of shares on the dates designated; if he fails to fulfil the 
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commitment by the due date, the board of directors (after warning shareholder through a written letter) 
may sell the share at a public auction.  However, any shareholder who does not fulfil that commitment 
until the day of the auction shall pay the value due plus the expenses incurred by the company, where 
the company takes the due amounts from the proceeds of the sale and returns the rest to the 
shareholder.
163
 
 
2.8.4 Share Capital of JSCs 
Shareholders in listed companies are a significant element because they provide funds.  Actually, the 
capital is the guarantee for the creditors of the company; it reveals the company’s financial position.  
These companies usually have large capital reserves because they are established in order to achieve 
large-scale projects, and capital is raised through the subscription of major shareholders as well as 
minority shareholders.  The capital of listed companies in KSA should not be less than 10 million 
SAR,
164
 where the capital of the company is divided into shares of equal value, which are 
negotiable.
165
  Additionally, SCL 1965 stipulates that the paid-up capital at incorporation shall not be 
less than half the minimum at least, and the value per share not less than 50 SAR; the value of the 
share is paid either once or through determined payments which are stipulated in the company’s 
relevant article.
166
  There has been a recent change in the law that allows JSCs to issue preferred shares 
without voting in an amount up to 50% of the capital.
167
 
 
SCL 1965 allows the shares offered in the capital of the company to be either shares in-cash or in-
kind.
168
  In respect of quotas in-kind, they are subject to certain conditions in order not to exaggerate 
their assessed value.
169
  Shares are traded according to certain rules but some shares are prevented 
from being traded for gain or benefit for a certain period of time; for example, shares of warranty for 
board members are prevented from being traded until the end of the period specified for hearing any 
liability suit against the board of directors,
170
 and the shares of the founders (either in cash or in kind) 
may not be exchanged or traded before the publication of the budget and the profit and loss 
                                                          
163
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 110  
164
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 49 
165
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 48  
166
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 110  
167
 Royal Decree No: M/22 Issued on 4 February 1992 
168
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 99  
169
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 60  
170
 Saudi Company Law, 1965 Article 68  
49 
 
calculations for two full fiscal years, a period of not less than twelve months for each type, from the 
date of the company’s establishment.171  Generally, one of the advantages of JSC shares is that they 
can be traded except for certain particular cases stipulated by law or by the company’s articles.172  
 
According to SCL 1965, JSCs have the right to raise capital if a resolution in an EGM is taken, once or 
more often according to need, provided that the original capital is fully paid.
173
  It is the company 
shareholders’ priority right to subscribe to the shares of the new shares of the company before any 
third party from outside the company, in accordance with their ownership of shares in the capital of the 
company.
174
  On the other hand, the EGM may decide to reduce the capital if it exceeds the needs of 
the company, or if it has suffer losses; in the latter case alone, capital reduction can be made below the 
limit specified in the law.
175
  
 
2.8.5 Board of Directors in JSCs 
A JSC is managed by its major organs, which are the board of directors and the GM.  Each has its own 
tasks set by law and the company’s articles, such that they not to overlap; they work with each other in 
order to achieve the company’s goals.  In fact, the board of directors holds the broadest range of 
powers in the management of the company, but taking into account the tasks reserved for the GM as it 
may (within its limits) authorize one or more of its members or others to perform certain act or acts.
176
  
The status is the same in KSA, the UK and the USA, regarding the board of directors, where it attends 
to both executive and non-executive affairs.
177
 
 
As in many countries, the type of board of directors is based on a single-tier structure; the CMA 
conducts its work through a set of specialist sub-committees, such as for auditing, nomination and 
remuneration.  All these committees have become mandatory in KSA.
178
  Additionally, the GM 
officially requests that the company be compliant with Shari’ah law in appointing an independent 
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board called the Shari’ah Supervisory Board, whose function is to supervise the application of Islamic 
rules on the products and services offered all Islamic institutions.
179
 
 
The board of directors consists of a number of shareholders not less than three and not more than 
eleven; they are appointed through a series of votes in the GM for the period stipulated in the 
company’s bylaws ,180 provided that their terms shall not exceed three years.181  There is however an 
exception, as the members of the first board of directors may be appointed for a period not exceeding 
five years, together with the first auditor, the director may be reappointed more than once unless the 
company’s articles stipulate otherwise.182 
 
In fact, the majority of the members of the board must be non-executive;
183
 also, the board of directors 
must have no less than two independent members or one-third, whichever is greater.
184
  A member of 
the board of directors shall not act as a member of the board of directors in more than five listed 
companies at the same time.
185
  Each member of the board of directors must be the owner of a number 
of shares in the company worth at least ten thousand SAR (equivalent to GBP 1,665),
186
 with the 
exception of board member who represents a legal person.  These shares shall be deposited within 
thirty days from the date of appointment of the member in a bank appointed by the Minister of MOCI; 
these shares are allocated to ensure the responsibility of the members, and remain non-negotiable until 
the end of the period specified to hear any case of liability set forth in law, or until taking a decision in 
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any such lawsuit.
187
  If any member of the board of directors does not offer his ‘guarantee shares’ 
within the time specified, his membership shall be invalidated by virtue of law.
188
 
 
The company’s bylaws detail how membership of the board may be terminated, and a GM may vote to 
isolate one, some or all board members at any time, even if the company’s articles stipulate otherwise; 
they may only do this without prejudicing the rights of the isolated member(s), who may question and 
challenge the company if such isolation occurs without acceptable justification, or it occurs at an 
inopportune time.  Any member of the board may retire on condition that it shall be within a 
reasonable timeframe; otherwise, will be responsible before company.
189
 
 
The directors may not take loans whose lengths exceed three years, sell or mortgage company 
properties or stores, or discharge the company’s debtors from their obligations unless otherwise 
permitted in the company’s articles under the conditions set out under the law.190  If the company’s 
articles do not include any rules in this regard, it is not permissible for the board to do the 
aforementioned actions without being granted permission by the GM, unless such behaviours are 
naturally included in the purposes of the company. 
 
The company’s articles detail the manner in which the members of board are rewarded.  This reward 
may be a specified salary or an allowance for attending sessions, or benefits in kind, or a certain 
percentage of the profits; it may be a combination of two or more of these.  However, if the 
remuneration is a certain percentage of the company’s profits, it shall not exceed a ratio of 10% of the 
net profits after deducting expenses, consumptions and reserves, as established by the GM and 
pursuant to the provisions of SCL 1965 (or by the company’s articles) and only after dividend 
distribution to shareholders of at least 5% of the net profit; each estimate otherwise shall be void. 
 
The board of directors appoints the chair from among its members, together with a representative 
member, and it is possible to combine the two positions in one member.  The company’s articles also 
describe in detail the duties of both the chair and the representative member, and the special 
remuneration earned by each, in addition to any bonus assigned to the members of the board.  If the 
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bylaws do not stipulate the provisions in this regard, the company’s board undertakes assigning the 
competencies and identifying any special remuneration.
191
 Nonetheless, it could be said that one of the 
faults evident in SCL 1965 is that it accords the board of directors a great deal of authority in 
determining the directors’ remuneration and bonuses; the wages assigned to the board members of 
companies in KSA tend to be inordinately high, and many minority shareholders complain about this 
and the fact that they are set by the board of directors themselves; certainly, the board of directors 
often seek to satisfy personal interests, regardless of the objections of the minority shareholders. 
 
The board of directors undertakes to discharge its managerial duties within the limits of its 
competence, but it is also responsible for compensating parties for any damages arising from wrongful 
acts.  The members of the board shall be jointly liable for compensating the company, shareholders or 
third parties for any damage arising from wrongful management of company affairs, or for violating 
the provisions of SCL 1965 or company bylaws; any complaint that is not in accordance with these 
conditions shall be considered null and void.  The responsibility for compensation includes all 
members of the board if the damage results from a decision issued unanimously; in resolutions made 
by majority voting, the opponents shall not be held responsible as long as their rejection of the 
offending resolution is expressly detailed in the minutes of the meeting. Furthermore, being absent 
from the meeting at which the offending decision was made shall not be considered a reason for 
exemption from liability, unless that member can prove that he was not aware of the resolution or was 
unable to object to it after learning of it.
192
 
 
The company may file a responsibility suit against the members of the board because of errors that 
resulted in damage to the shareholders; the GM may decide to such a this case and to appoint a 
representative for the company to expedite it.  Should company be dissolved, the liquidator conducts 
the ensuing lawsuit after obtaining the approval of the GM. 
 
2.8.6 Shareholder General Meetings (GM) 
The GM is considered the highest authority in the company.  GMs express the views of the 
shareholders in the company, and clarify the purposes and objectives of the company; these are 
achieved through voting, and through voting, the GM monitors and assesses the performance of the 
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company’s board.  SCL 1965 accords each shareholder who owns twenty shares or more the right to 
attend the GM even if the provisions of the company’s bylaws stipulate otherwise; each shareholder 
may appoint (in writing) another shareholder (non-board member) to attend the GM and vote on his 
behalf,
193
 and the MOCI is entitled to send a delegate (or more if need be) to attend the GMs as an 
observer.
194
 
 
Except for matters that are specific to EGMs, the GM is competent in all matters relating to the 
company; it is held at least once a year, usually the six months following the end of the company’s 
fiscal year.  A further meeting may be arranged should the need arise.  As well as the competencies 
specified for an EGM, it may issue resolutions on matters that are normally under the purview of the 
GM, with the same terms and conditions prescribed for any recent GM.  
 
It is axiomatic that the GM may not pass any amendments that would relieve the shareholders of their 
basic rights, which emanate from being a partner in the company as per the provisions of law or of the 
company’s articles.  Also, it is forbidden in any way to increase the financial burden of the 
shareholders, or to change the purpose the company for which it was established (as stated in the 
memorandum of association), or to transfer the company’s head office to any location outside KSA, or 
to modify the nationality of the company.  On the other hand, if a GM resolution modifies the rights of 
a certain class of shareholders, such a decision shall not take effect without the approval of those who 
have the right to vote on their own association, in accordance with the provisions set forth for GMs. 
 
Generally, a GM is held through an invitation delivered by the company’s board in accordance with 
the conditions set forth in the bylaws.
195
  Furthermore, the board must call a GM if requested by the 
auditor or a number of shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital; GAFC, at the request of a 
number of shareholders representing at least 2% of the capital, or based on a decision of the Minister 
of MOCI, may call an EGM if one month passes after the designated meeting has not convened.  The 
call to convene a meeting shall be published in the Official Gazette and a daily newspaper, and shall be 
distributed in the main centre of the company at least twenty-five days before the date of that 
meeting.
196
  If all shares are nominal, it is sufficient to invite shareholders on the designated date 
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through registered letters, which shall include the agenda; a copy of the invitation and agenda must be 
sent to GAFC at the MOCI within the period specified for publication. 
 
 
2.8.7 Company Account 
Listed companies have one or more certified accountants (according to need), and the GM determines 
their bonuses and period of work; it may also reappoint them, as well as substitute them at any time 
without prejudice to their rights.
197
  The auditor is entitled to all the time he needs to see the 
company’s books and records and other documents that he may determine important and pertinent to 
the completion of his work; he may also ask for extra data and clarification as he deems necessary, and 
may also investigate the company’s assets and liabilities.198 
 
All employees in the JSC must assist in facilitating the work of the auditor in the public interest of the 
company; disrupting the work of the auditor in any way is considered a punishable offence.  The 
auditor must submit an annual report that includes the attitude of the company directors with regard to 
enabling him in obtaining the data and clarifications requested by him, together with any revelations in 
relation to violations of the provisions of SCL 1965 or the provisions of the company’s bylaws, in 
addition to his opinion on the how the company’s accounts accord with reality.  The auditor’s report 
shall be recited at the GM, and if the report of the board of directors is approved without considering 
the auditor’s report, then its decision will be null and void.199 
 
One of the rights guaranteed by SCL 1965 for shareholders is the right to discuss the auditor’s report 
during the AGM, and the auditor will be responsible for any errors or negligence, and must to 
compensate for any damage caused to the company or its shareholders if the error is made by him.
200
  
However, it has been suggested that the provisions for auditors under the law need comprehensive 
reconsideration to enable those auditors to expedite their duties in full; their position is still weak and 
subject to the authority of the board of directors of the company. 
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2.8.8 Company Liquidation 
SCL 1965 mentions certain cases where a JSC is in a state of liquidation, in particular when the 
company is at the end of the period specified for it, it has achieved the purpose for which it was 
founded, or it has become impossible for the company to achieve its objectives.  Also, the company 
may be terminated when all the quotas or shares are returned to one partner, or when three-quarters of 
the company capital (or more) is lost, where it would be possible to reinvest the rest fruitfully.  
Further, the partners may agree to dissolve the company before the end of its term (unless the 
company’s articles provide otherwise) or integrate the company with another one; the courts may 
decide to dissolve the company at the request of an interested party, provided that there are well-
grounded reasons for doing so. 
 
If a decision for liquidation is taken by an EGM, it must be attended by shareholders representing at 
least two-thirds of the company’s shares subscribed, and the resolution must be approved by at least 
75% of the total shares represented at the meeting; the resolution is subject to the procedures of 
approval, registration and publication as stipulated in the law. 
 
Whether the resolution issued to liquidate the company has been issued by EGM or by the Commercial 
Court, there are certain provisions that should be applied in terms of how to run the liquidation 
proceedings, such as appointing a liquidator (or more if need be) to oversee the company’s business, 
maintain the funds and assets, pay its debts, and settle its accounts.  Also, during the liquidation period, 
the company ceases its business from the date of issuance of the resolution in the case of voluntary 
liquidation, and from the date of issuance of the court’s decision in the case of compulsory liquidation.  
Also, all contracts and receipts, advertising and other documents issued by the company shall declare 
that it is under liquidation.
201
  The legal personality of the company continues until the completion of 
the liquidation. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
The source of the laws in KSA is the legislative authority represented by the King and the Council of 
Ministers.  After a law has been issued, the executive authority is charged with overseeing its 
implementation.  It can be argued that the problem in issuing laws in KSA is the long and complex 
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procedures involved; issuing a law can take a long time, for example, the new CL was completed in 
2007, but it has not yet been approved.  Here, an important point must be paid attention: suppose that 
the new law is issued next year, it is likely that it will still contain legal faults that need to be modified, 
and this will necessitate yet further consultation with all those concerned with the law, including 
businessmen, shareholders, lawyers, judges and others.  On the other hand, the proposed law was 
drafted in 2007, and thus it cannot be claimed to be modern in the full sense of the word; it is closer to 
being a law only partially amended, and it is unlikely to cover all the provisions required of it in this 
modern era. 
 
Additionally, the legislative system in KSA has a defect in that it does not consider the judgments of 
court as a source of law; legal precedent is considered an important factor in the development of law 
and in any modification to address gaps in the legislation.  In this context, in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, case law and legal precedent are of great importance and represent a basic source of 
legislation (along with their parliaments); thus, the UK system is flexible and advanced, and the 
process of enacting laws proceeds more easily and with fewer complications than in the Saudi system.  
Development and change in any country require a flexible environment so that reality can be dealt with 
quickly, but, unfortunately, the legal system in KSA is rigid, and enacting laws passes through highly 
complex procedures.  Therefore, the development and implementation processes of any law are 
difficult and cannot be done sufficiently quickly. 
 
A JSC is a legal person, with rights and obligations.  The company is managed through its main 
organs, and the board of directors and the GM play a significant role in the life of the company.  The 
law states the duties and responsibilities of each, and distributes power between them according to 
their need.  This is the case at least in theory, but in practice the board of directors in KSA is the 
dominant force in the company, and has absolute power; this is because it is managed by the owners of 
large quotas, who are usually members of the board, and the distribution of power between these 
bodies is not equitable.  Certainly, it is believed that the concentration of ownership within a few 
shareholders is the main reason for the growing strength of the board of the company over the 
resolutions of the GMs; at the present time, there is no significant role for other shareholders in the 
Saudi market. 
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Largely due to the absence of an important role for the shareholders inside the company, GMs no 
longer exercise their role as they should, and have become no more than an ineffective parliament.  
There is no real participation in company decisions and that is for various reasons that will be 
discussed later (see 4.5).  Actually, this has made the board of directors the highest authority in the 
company, and satisfying personal interests has become the overriding goal of the members of the board 
of directors, largely at the expense of minority shareholders. 
 
The most important questions to be answered before discussing shareholders’ rights are: what is the 
legal status of shareholders in listed companies?  What is their role within these companies?  What are 
the reasons that make the role of shareholders weak?  These are the issues that shall be addressed in 
the following chapters. 
 
It could be said that one of the main reasons for the weakness of SCL 1965 is that the law is old; it was 
issued in 1965 and the amendments made to it have not been sufficiently substantial.  Therefore, the 
law is still weak and vague in many of its provisions, and does not mention many cases.  As a result of 
these defects in SCL 1965, the role of shareholders in JSCs is unclear, and their position within the 
company remains ineffective.  This law has failed to address many important issues relating to 
shareholders and their rights within the company. 
 
However, this research represents an attempt at revealing the true relationship between the apparent 
lack of protection for minority shareholders in JSCs and the concentration of ownership on the part of 
a few shareholders.  In the next chapter, this study focuses on the position of shareholders in JSCs, 
both theoretically and under the law, and it highlights the position and the rights of shareholders.  
Thereafter, this study concentrates on shareholders’ rights in JSCs according to SCL 1965. 
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Chapter 3: The Position of Shareholders in JSCs 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In order to understand the position and role of shareholders in the JSC we must more fully comprehend 
the context; in this regard, this chapter concentrate on two aspects.  For the first, we will review the 
nature and meaning of company, which is based on two main theories: contractual and institutional.  
However, each theory places JSC shareholders in a different position.  Accordingly, number of 
questions concerning JSCs and their shareholders must be addressed, such as: is the company founded 
by the state, or is it only a contract between people?  With respect to shareholders, where do they stand 
in these two situations?  Do shareholders actually own the company, or are they only contributors in 
the capital for the sake of obtaining profits?  How is power and authority distributed within the 
company?  Who are the most significant and influential persons within it?  Where does any permanent 
power lie?  What powers do shareholders have?  
The position of shareholders in JSCs and the rights they should enjoy will be become clear when these 
questions are answered.  In the second part of this chapter, having identified the position of 
shareholders in JSCs, we address additional matters relevant to this subject, which revolve around the 
meanings of share and shareholder, as well as the various types of shares and their characteristics; we 
also address how a person becomes a shareholder in a JSC, and what happens when they lose 
membership of the company. 
3.2 Company Theory 
The two different theories deliver different descriptions of companies, and accordingly the place and 
role of the shareholders in them also differ.  Generally, shareholders can be considered owners of the 
company when considering the company as a private entity, but if the company is considered an 
institution created by the state, its shareholders are the providers of capital and are separate and distinct 
from the company.
202
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3.2.1 Contractual Theory of Corporation  
Contractual theory is considered the oldest attempt at trying to explain the nature of corporation; this 
theory is based on the idea that a JSC is merely a kind of contract, and that the JSC is dominated by the 
will of the shareholders from its inception to its closure.
203
  The corporation, in this sense, is 
established through a legal act of will (represented in the agreement of the shareholders) to produce it, 
and this legal disposition meets the traditional elements of a contract.  The partners provide money in 
return for certain rights such as sharing in potential profits.
204
 
 
In accordance with contractual theory, the company is considered a nexus contract; this contract is a 
private contract that falls under the purview of private law.  Therefore, the role of the state in such 
contracts is limited as it must respect the principle of freedom for private parties to enter into 
contract.
205
  Consequently, shareholders are considered the owners of the company, and the 
relationship between them and the managers of the company is based on the nature of the agency; the 
managers and directors of the board are the agents who work to achieve the interests of the (principal) 
owners of the company, which are the interests of the company itself.
206
  Therefore, there are no 
minority shareholders as the interests of all of them are equal. 
 
The company contract is the legal force that determines how the company exercises its activities; it 
states the purpose of the company or the activity that the company will undertake, determines the 
amount of capital required, describes how the capital is to be managed, organizes the relations among 
the partners and between them and any third party, and details how the company may be dissolved; all 
of these depend on the will of the partners.  Thus, contractual theory treats a JSC as a private contract 
represented in its memorandum and articles of association; any modification in the company contract 
is subject to the general rules of civil law.  Thus, any decision to modify the memorandum or articles 
of association of the company regarding the rights of shareholders requires consensus by shareholders 
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on the amendment.  The French Civil Code, in Article 1134, stipulates that contracts are not alterable 
except for being approved by all contracting parties.
207
  
According to this theory, there should be full consensus on the part of all shareholders when making an 
amendment.  If the company needs to increase its capital, issue bonds or establish a financial reserve, 
this requires the consent of all shareholders; however, this may be impractical, as a JSC may have a 
large number of shareholders and it may not be possible for them all to agree on a decision.  According 
to the concept of full consensus if one shareholder objects to a resolution, then that resolution cannot 
be passed; this is incompatible with the idea that JSCs that need to be flexible in making decisions.
208
 
 
Contractual theory developed the concept of consensus through jurisprudence; advocates argued for it 
when the features of JSCs first emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, influenced the 
French Revolution, which demanded complete freedom, including freedom of trade.  As a result of the 
inability of contractual theory to fully comprehend the concept of JSC, the supporters of this theory 
considered the possibility of allowing a company to modify its articles according to need through 
voting at a GM, provided that any such modification is subject to the approval of the majority of 
shareholders, rather than consensus, where all shareholders commit to respect the opinion of the 
majority when they join the company.
209
 
 
Contractual theory evolved further through the arguments of Jurist Thaller in 1893; he established 
what is known as the theory of the “basic rights of the shareholder”. Also at this time, companies 
developed the concept of an independent legal personality, which is free to act, and which is distinct 
from the shareholders.
210
  Therefore, the GM of the company is entitled to modify the articles of 
association, but this power is not absolute; it is constrained by the condition of being non-prejudicial to 
the fundamental rights of the shareholders, and the company or the legal personality has no right to 
abolish it without the consent of those shareholders. 
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Thaller listed a set of rights that shall not be compromised by the company: a shareholder’s right to be 
heard and taken into consideration, the right not to be excluded from the company, the right to limit the 
liability of the shareholder to the amount he owns in the company, and the right to dispose of his 
shares.  Modern jurisprudence then further developed this theory, and gave GMs greater powers 
together with increasing the rights of the shareholders; the shareholders now have more financial and 
administrative rights, including the right to attend any GM, and to vote on its decisions, the right to sue 
on behalf of the company to save its interests, the right to sue to defend his own interests, as well as 
the right to ask the judiciary to cancel or dissolve the company if there is a legal reason to do so; these 
are in addition to the right to obtain information about the company in a timely manner that enables 
him to learn of the status of the company, and the right to take part in the management of the company. 
 
3.2.2 Institutional Theory 
Some jurists and commentators believe that contractual theory is no longer valid as the basis for 
shareholders’ rights in JSCs; they argue that this approach to corporation contradicts the legal concept 
of corporation when the entity is founded by the state.
211
  Therefore, the right to establish a company 
should include a public aspect, as its existence is dependent on the will of the state.
212
  
 
Jurists, in this theory, believe that a JSC is no longer necessarily created by the will of shareholders, 
but rather it may be created based on laws set in advance; this could be a contract that is coherent with 
other individual companies (with limited members) to some extent, which could be applied to the JSC 
at its time of establishment, although this situation would be less relevant when the shareholders enter 
the IPO phase.  Therefore, contractual theory is not consistent with all JSCs, which consist of a very 
large number of shareholders, unlike individual companies; in addition, the legislature clearly plays a 
role in regulating them, which means that the shareholder who receives the shares is not a party in the 
contract of the company but a shareholder in the capital, and he only has to submit to the provisions 
stipulated by the legislator and organized by the company’s constitution.213 
 
According to this theory, shareholders are not considered as owners of the company, unlike the case in 
contractual theory, and so their relationship with the company can be described as being members; 
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they constitute just one party of all those who have relations with it, in accordance with the various 
contracts that state their rights and that constitute the entire corporate enterprise.
214
  That is why the 
board of directors is considered a member of a JSC as well as the GM, auditors and employees; each 
member has certain duties and rights and the source of these authorities is the law and the company’s 
constitution.
215
  
 
However, when a shareholder receives his shares through the stock market and then sells them after a 
few days, it is hard to consider him as a party to the contract of the company, as is the case of 
contractors in other usual contracts; so, the legislature did not want to leave these companies to the 
desire of their founders, but intervened through peremptory texts to protect stakeholders and dealers 
within the company equally in order to support the trust and credit that must exist within the business 
community.  The legislature is also concerned with protecting the national economy and national 
interests, resulting in some argue that, in JSCs, the contractual feature is of limited importance.  
 
JSCs thus consist of two key parts, which are the board of directors and the GM.  Some liken a JSC to 
a democratic state, wherein the shareholders are members of the state and the GM is the legislative 
authority, whereas the executive authority is the company’s board.  The GM decides upon the general 
plans of the company, discusses the annual budget, receives the reports of the board, and controls the 
performance of the company, whereas the board implements the company’s policies and achieves its 
interests; the shareholders in the company are like individuals who have rights, as stipulated by the 
law, on the basis that they are members of the company.
216
 
 
In brief, institutional theory, with regard to JSCs, is based on the following arguments:
217
 firstly, the 
legislature intervenes to a considerable extent in organizing commercial companies, particularly JSCs, 
through peremptory provisions at all stages of the life of a company, from the establishment phase to 
the liquidation phase, wherein the will of individuals does not play a significant role; they only obey 
those provisions.  Secondly, at a fundamental level, contracts are designed on the basis of the 
contrasting interests of the parties, although this feature evaporates in JSCs, as the interests of their 
members coincide in a common goal, which is to achieve profits and avoid losses as far as possible.  
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Thirdly, it is based on the idea of common interests, which enables the parties amend the provisions of 
the act of establishing the company through the majority agreement of its parties; this differs from the 
nature of a contract, which is based on the idea of consensus to modify its provisions.  Fourthly, a legal 
person arises from a JSC, and this person has its own will, which is independent of the natural persons 
and will of the shareholders in the company; this legal personality continues into the liquidation phase, 
to the extent necessary to complete it. 
3.3 The Nature of JSCs under SCL 1965 
The Saudi legislature has not specified precisely the legal nature of a JSC; however, many jurists agree 
that a company, in accordance with SCL 1965, is merely a contract.  Article 57 of SCL 1965 states, 
“A) The subscriber, or his representative, shall sign a document setting forth specifically the 
company’s name, object and capital, the conditions of subscription, the subscriber’s name, address, 
occupation and nationality, the number of shares subscribed by him, and a covenant to accept the 
company’s bylaws established by the constituent general meeting.  B) The subscription shall be final 
and unconditional.  Any condition laid down by the subscriber shall be considered nonexistent.”  
 
It is understood clearly from the above article that the IPO process of the company’s shares, in 
accordance with SCL 1965, is a contract between the company’s subscribers.  This means that this 
contract is between one party, which is the company, and the other party, which is the subscriber.  
Therefore, the issuance prospectus is considered to be an offer by the company to the subscribers, and 
signing the prospectus is an approval on their part.  The company is based on a network of contracts, 
not only between it and the shareholders or founders, but, in fact, a variety of parties participating with 
it, such as employees, creditors, managers, distributors and others, and the company must protect their 
interests, as it does with shareholders.
218
 
In general, all the parties to the contracts with the company have an interest related to running the 
company; those contracts arrange the contrasting obligations and duties of each party.  Perhaps the 
most important of these contracts is the contract between the company and its subscribers, due to the 
consequent establishment of the rights and duties of the shareholders within the company. 
 
However, the constitution of the company, like other contracts, must be subject to the general legal 
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rules pertaining to contracts, wherein the parties should have the contractual capacity to make a 
contract with free will.  On the other hand, the objective of the company’s formation shall be a 
legitimate one and can be achieved, and thus the company must be established for legitimate reasons.  
A company contract is different from other contracts in that it should meet certain criteria stipulated by 
law, specifically SCL 1965.  This law details certain conditions that shall be met: the agreement of at 
least five persons to found a JSC,
219
 whether they be natural or legal persons, but not employees of the 
state.  In addition, it is required that each of them contribute in the capital; the share provided by them 
may be in cash or in kind.
220
  Thus, the people who founded the company have the wherewithal to 
achieve the goals of the company.  The aim of founding the company is to achieve financial gains; this 
is common to all shareholders and not to a certain class, and in the case of loss, the shareholders bear 
it, each one according to his share in the capital of the company.  Finally, it mandatory to gain the 
approval of the relevant competent authority before establishing the company; the company appears 
only after it is approved by MOCI.  
 
Most civil law countries consider the company as a contract between two or more people; for example, 
we find that French Civil Law stipulates, “Company is a contract between two or more persons 
agreeing to constitute a common stock with intent to sharing any profit arising therefrom”.221  Directly 
or indirectly, most of the Arab countries consider a JSC to be contract between two or more people, 
and this is the case in SCL 1965, which states, “A company is defined as a contract under which two or 
more persons undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, with each contributing a share in the 
form of money or service, with a view to dividing any profit (realized) or losses (incurred) as result of 
such enterprise”.222  
The above denotes that a company is a contractual agreement between two or more parties; their 
commitment is to work together in order to achieve profit, and those same people contribute with 
shares in the capital in the form of money or services, with the aim of sharing profits or losses resulting 
from the project. 
 
Despite the lack of a definition for company in institutional theory, this theory remains the only one 
that allows us to explain the possibility of amending the shareholders’ rights, and that it explains 
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considering the members of the board of directors of the company and its managers not as merely 
agents for the company, but as being the authority charged with achieving the common purpose upon 
which the company is established; it is the idea that, finally, justifies the continuous intervention of the 
legislature, which is due to the desire to control corporate activities in the economic life of the country 
and to protect public funds. 
 
In fact, company law gives all parties in the company’s contract a series of rights and duties, and at the 
same time, it also gives the state a number of powers that enable it to play a key role in the 
establishment and operation of companies.  In this respect, Bratton Seymour Service Company Ltd v 
Oxborough showed that “[t]he contract between a company and its members formed by the company's 
articles derives its binding force not from a bargain struck between the parties but from the terms of 
the statute…”.223 
 
JSCs are not absolutely private contracts signed between private parties, and therefore the description 
of a company is similar to a project organized by rules; some of them are stated in the company’s 
constitution, and the others by law.  Thus, it is not true that a company is free, in general, to exclude 
the application of the rules of law, as the most important of those rules are binding.
224
  It is clearly 
stated in SCL 1965 that, when creating a JSC, the company must provide the particular model of 
company establishment to the competent government department (MOCI);
225
 the Minister of MOCI 
shall not issue the licence without having examined a study that is submitted by the company and that 
demonstrates the economic feasibility of the purposes for which the company is being established, 
unless the company has provided such a study to another competent governmental entity authorized to 
set up the project.
226
   
 
Based on the foregoing, it can be said that a company is not a pure contract nor a pure institute, but 
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rather a legal entity based on contractual and regulatory rules, with a different ratio of each according 
to the type of the company; the amount of contractual rules increases in individual’s companies, while 
the amount of regulatory rules increases in capital companies. The legal nature of the company 
combines the idea of the contract and the idea of the institute at the same time; it cannot accept any of 
the two views absolutely.  
3.4 The Nature of a Shareholder's Position in a Company and the Basis of his Rights 
It is now clear that a JSC has a legal personality independent from shareholders; therefore, it owns 
itself.  Once the license from the Minister of MOCI has been received and the establishment of the 
company has been announced in the official Gazette,
227
 the company becomes a legal entity 
independent of the founders and subscribers.  The consequent result of the decision to declare the 
establishment of the company is to transfer all actions conducted by the founders to its pact; also, the 
company undertakes to pay all the expenses incurred by the founders during the period of 
establishment.
228
  Undoubtedly, the principle of company independence has been agreed upon among 
various legal jurisdictions for a long time, particularly in developed countries; for example, in the UK, 
in the case Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd, Lord Macnaghten said, “The company is at law a 
different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum”.229 
 
Such judicial decisions clearly explain that shareholders of JSCs do not legally possess any portion of 
the company’s assets according to the relevant laws, and the corporation is the only owner of all assets 
in it; therefore, all the property is under the name of the company.
230
  Accordingly, shareholders 
usually invest their money in shares, not in bonds, because they aspire to gain profit.  The fact that the 
shareholders are owners of shares, not owners of the company, results in the shareholder’s 
responsibility for the company’s debts being limited to the amount of his shares; in fact, a share is not 
considered money, but an interest measured by a sum of money.
231
  Thus, it is the ownership of shares 
that entitles shareholders to their rights in the company, not their being owners; however, these rights 
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are limited to what is stated in the law or in the constitution of the company.
232
  Shares belong to 
shareholders in a JSC, and as a result, they have the right to do what they want with them, such as sell 
or gift them; therefore, there is a difference between ownership of shares and ownership of a 
company.
233
  
 
According to the above, share bearers in a JSC are not the owners of the company, but they are one of 
the important financial sources for the company.  Shareholders provide money for the company in 
order to obtain financial return, and their responsibility shall be as much as their share in the 
company’s capital; they are not responsible for more than that, and the company is not obliged to 
deliver positive outcomes for shareholders, i.e. it does not guarantee to pay the shareholder any 
financial gains each year.  The shareholder must be able to withstand the failure of the company, and 
therefore, the shareholder must have a special position within the company, i.e. he is in a position 
different from the owners and other stakeholders.   
The company actually makes many contracts with other parties, such as creditors, employees and 
suppliers, who become stakeholders and who have certain rights through these contracts.
234
  Thus, 
shareholders are not protected because the activities and decisions of the company cannot always be 
predicted.
235
  F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, say that shareholders are ‘residual risk bearers’; “We 
believe that shareholders are residual claimants to the firm's income.  Bondholders have fixed claims, 
and employees generally negotiate compensation schedules in advance of performance.  The gains and 
losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand 
last in the end.”236 
 
Due to the enjoyment of the shareholders of their position in the company, most legal jurisdictions 
accord the them a wide range of rights that are not given to other interest owners; for example, the 
right of shareholders to attend the GMs and to discuss the agenda, voice their opinion, vote on 
resolutions, and object to any issues raised; they also have the right to appoint (and remove) directors, 
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and in certain cases they may file a suit against them.  In general, the shareholders in the company 
have a variety of rights, whether financial or managerial, stipulated in the relevant laws and in the 
constitution of the company.  
These rights are a real force conferred to them by virtue of their position in the company, and give 
them the right to participate in the management of company affairs.  However, it is noticeable that they 
often do not exercise those rights in the proper way, and thus they lose some of their power within the 
company to another party.  For instance, many shareholders do not actually exercise their rights at the 
GM, which is the entity that is supposed to support the board of directors in their efforts to control the 
company.  There are many reasons for the absence of shareholders participating in the GM, and 
perhaps the most important is the large number of shareholders; this may mean an individual 
shareholder expects that his vote will have no value in company decisions, or it may be simply that 
some shareholders do not care about the minutiae of running the company, but are only focused on the 
financial benefits.  Nevertheless, if the company does not meet their expectations, then the easiest way 
for them to leave the company is to sell their share in it.  
 
Making money for its shareholders is not the only goal of the company;
237
 the company cannot be 
limited only to the members of the board of directors and its shareholders because there are 
stakeholders other than shareholders who are in relationships with the company via contracts that 
legally bind the two parties.  Based on this, there is an obligation on the company to take their interests 
into account, as well as towards the wider community.
238
  The company must not ignore the rights of 
non-shareholders, as there is full protection of their interests through by the provisions of the law and 
the company’s articles.239  There are several ways to protect the interests of those other groups; for 
example, company employees, according to the Saudi System, are under the protection of labour laws, 
and in the UK, CA 2006 in S. 172 commits members of the board of directors to work in good faith in 
order to achieve the interests of the company, including the interests of its employees and staff.
240
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Also, there is a set of provisions under the Saudi CL for protect the interests of the company’s 
creditors.
241
  Furthermore, we find emphasis on the importance of protecting the interests of non-
shareholders in the case of Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum Co Ltd, which ensured that directors should care 
for the interests of non-shareholders, holding, “These are not exclusively those of its shareholders but 
may include those of its creditors”.242 
3.5 Definition of a Share 
There is no specific definition of the term share within SCL 1965, as is the case in many countries, and 
in general, jurists define share in several ways.  Nevertheless, it is important to clarify the meaning of 
the term share if the rights and obligations of shareholders are to be properly determined.  The Saudi 
Capital Market (Tadawul) defines a share as an investment that represents an ownership portion in a 
company, and accords its owner the right to receive a part of the profits of the company and its 
assets;
243
 it is also defined as an instrument issued by JSCs with a certain nominal value, representing a 
partner’s share in the capital.244  A share is thus defined as a part of the company’s capital, and it gives 
its owner the right to a share of the profits achieved by the company (and approved by GM) to be 
distributed to shareholders.
245
  Due to the above, a share can be defined as an instrument that 
represents equal parts in the ownership of the company’s capital (whether in kind or in cash), that is 
owned by multiple parties, that is indivisible and negotiable, and that entitles its bearer certain rights 
and imposes certain responsibilities.
246
 
 
A definition of share is not included in the CA 2006 of the UK;
247
 it could be that the most common 
judicial definition is that of Farwell J. in the case Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd,
248
 
where he says, “A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, 
for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series 
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of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se in accordance with Companies Act 
(now the CA 2006, S.33 (1)).  The contract contained in the articles of association is one of the original 
incidents of the share.  A share is not a sum of money, but is an interest measured by a sum of money 
and made up of various rights contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of a 
more or less amount.”249  Nevertheless, RR Pennington sees that in formally registered companies, 
shares are a kind of immaterial tradable ownership that result in a group of rights and obligations 
associated with some benefit in a company with economic activities and owned by certain people, 
laying no debts.
250
 
 
3.6 Features of Shares 
A share is considered as the shareholder’s portion in the capital of the company, and this share has a 
certain financial value; ownership of it entitles the holder to a set of rights and requires of him some 
obligations.  The question that should be asked here is: What are the characteristics of a share? Also, 
what are those rights given to a shareholder in accordance with those characteristics?  In general, SCL 
1965 mentions several features of shares when referring to JSCs; the most important of which are that 
a share is freely negotiable, and that a shareholder’s liability is limited.  Then, it mentions another 
feature of shares in Article 98, which is that a share is indivisible, having a stated nominal value.  Each 
of these features are discussed in the following subsections vis-à-vis multiple shareholders’ rights in a 
JSC. 
3.6.1 Shares Are of Equal Nominal Value 
One of the features of shares in JSCs is that they are of nominal equal value, and this is stated in 
Article 48 of SCL 1965, “A) The capital of a corporation shall be divided into negotiable shares of 
equal value”.  The equity of the value of shares means that it is not possible to issue shares in a 
different nominal value; the purpose behind this is to unite the rights and duties conferred by shares of 
the same type upon their holder, and this would facilitate the process of share trading in the capital 
market, the exercise of the voting process in the shareholders’ assemblies, and the distribution of 
profits and losses.  Therefore, the capital can be divided into different classes of shares, provided that 
the nominal value of each class is equal.
251
 
                                                          
249
 Sealy & Worthington. Cases and Materials in Company Law. 8
th
 Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2292, 
p. 518 
250
 Pennington, Robert, Can Shares in Companies be Defined? 10 Co. Law. 1989. p. 144. 
251
Fread ALarini, Commercial Companies, Cairo, Dar Aljamah Publishing. 2007. p. 222 
71 
 
Thus, the company may issue premium shares that entitle their owners to priority in profits, or in the 
output of liquidation, or in both; however, there must be equality between similar shares that belong to 
a certain class.
252
 
 
However, it is important to distinguish between the types of value, i.e. whether it be of nominal, actual 
or commercial value.  The nominal value is the result of dividing the company’s capital by the number 
of shares; therefore, the nominal value of the total shares represents the company’s capital.  Article 49 
of SCL 1965 stipulates that the value of the share shall not be less than 50 SAR.  The issuance value is 
the value at which the share is issued; the issuance value shall be identical to the nominal value when 
the company is founded.  Article 98 of SCL 1965 states that shares shall not be issued at less than their 
nominal value, but they may be issued at higher than this value if the company’s bylaws state so, or the 
GM approves it.  The commercial value is the share’s value in the stock market, which is subject to 
going up or down, depending on many factors relating to the financial market in general, such as new 
ventures, political and economic conditions of the state, as well as the amount of profit offered by the 
company, the rise in the value of its assets, and the prospects for the company’s future projects.  The 
actual value is the part that a share deserves in the net assets of the company after deducting its debts 
and obligations.  If the company succeeds, the actual value of the share rises; if it does not, the actual 
value falls, and this value is given to the shareholder upon liquidation of the company. 
 
3.6.2 Indivisibility of the Share 
Shares are characterized as being indivisible, i.e. the ownership of a share may be shared by more than 
one person, regardless of the reason for owning it, e.g. whether it is a gift, bequest or inheritance.  
Article 98 of SCL1 965 explicitly stipulates, “A) Shares of stock of companies shall be indivisible as 
far as the company is concerned.  If a share is jointly owned by several persons, these must elect one of 
their numbers to exercise their rights attached to such share on their behalf.”  Therefore, those rights 
cannot be divided; for example, not all the owners of a share may attend and vote during a GM; 
therefore, there must be someone who represents them before others, and that person shall be jointly 
responsible for the obligations arising from their ownership of the share.  The company in this context 
recognizes the share more than the shareholder.
253
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3.6.3 Share Transferability 
Shares are characterized as being freely traded; shares can be traded to others without the consent of 
other shareholders, unlike the transfer of quotas in personal companies.  Thus, every shareholder can 
transfer the ownership of his shares to another person through commercial means very easily.  
Therefore, by virtue of their ownership of the shares, a shareholder is entitled to their free disposal; he 
can treat his share as he likes, such as to sell, donate or mortgage it as well as to authorize someone to 
do these. 
This property is one of the most important characteristics of JSCs, and it one that encourages investors 
to join these companies.  SCL 1965 provides this feature explicitly in Article 48; shareholders, 
according to SCL 1965, can deal in shares in the stock market through licensed brokers, after fulfilling 
the required conditions.  In certain cases, the law or the company’s bylaws restrict the negotiability of 
the company’s shares in the public interest;254 such a restriction is limited to a specific period, for 
example, in the case of founders’ shares and the shares of the members of the board of directors; in any 
case, share trading cannot be prohibited.
255
 
 
3.6.4 Shareholder’s Liability is Limited to Share Value  
The shareholder is not liable for the debts of the JSC except for within the limits of his ownership of 
shares; nor does he acquire the status of merchant because of his contribution in the company’s 
capital.
256
  This feature is one of the most important characteristics of shares in JSCs, and it encourages 
a great many people to invest their money in JSC shares instead of shares of other companies.  The 
company is to bear the risks regardless of its levels debt or the extent of its loss; the company here has 
a legal entity independent from the shareholders.  Nothing contrary to this can be agreed upon even if 
mentioned in the memorandum of association or through a decision taken by the GM. 
 
CA 2006 in the UK states that JSC shareholders shall only bear limited liability, which must not 
involve their personal property; as a result of this, the financial liabilities cannot be extended by any 
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resolution issued by the company.  There is a key difference between a JSC and its shareholders in that 
a JSC has a separate legal entity with an independent personality, which is reflected in liability; this 
basic principle was established by the House of Lords in the case of Salomon v A Salomon & Co 
Ltd,
257
 which found, “The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum, and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it 
was before, the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits , the company is 
not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, 
in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the act.” 
 
Moreover, as stated in S.58 of CA 2006, JSCs must mention ‘Public Limited Company’, or 
‘plc.’ in their names.  As a public company, otherwise it may be considered to have 
committed a criminal act.
258
  
 
3.7 Types of JSC Shares 
 
JSCs have the right to issue various categories of shares that give their holders different rights; 
therefore, a shareholder’s rights are dependent to the type of shares he has.  JSCs issue shares with 
certain rights in order to attract certain categories of investors, and certainly the existence of different 
classes of shares and shareholders tends to encourage investors to invest their money in such 
companies.  The company may deliberately issue such shares in order to preserve the voting power of 
the current shareholders, whereupon, for example, it issues preference shares that have no voting 
rights.  In general, this diversity is due to the nature of the quota provided on the one hand, where 
shares are divided into monetary or in-kind contribution shares, and due to the nature of the rights 
associated with the share on the other hand, where shares are ordinary or preference shares.   
Shares can also be divided according to whether the shareholder has recovered the value of the share or 
not, into dividend and enjoyment shares, and finally, they can be divided according to the manner in 
which they are traded: registered, bearer and ordered shares. 
 
It could be said that the most well-known shares issued by JSCs (and by far the most common) are the 
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ordinary shares and the preference shares.  Nevertheless, there are various sub-types that are issued by 
JSCs according to particular needs, of which the most usual are: deferred shares, non-voting shares, 
shares with limited voting rights and employee shares.  The most important of these types are 
stipulated for in SCL 1965, and accordingly are reviewed in the following subsections. 
 
According to SCL 1965, JSCs shares can be divided according to the nature of the proportion, which is 
either monetary or in-kind; however, in the case of monetary shares, the payment of its value should 
not be less than a quarter of its nominal value.
259
  Monetary shares are tradable once the company 
receives the approval of the CMA; in-kind shares (such as land, real estate, equipment) are accredited 
by the Saudi CL but are subject to certain provisions.  In-kind shares shall not be handed to their 
owners before the transfer of full ownership of these shares to the company.
260
  When offering in-kind 
proportions, GAFC, upon the request of the founders, appoints one or more experts, in order to verify 
the assessment of the in-kind shares; the expert reports to the GAFC within thirty days from the date of 
assigning him to such task, and the GAFC may (upon the expert’s request) grant him another period 
not exceeding thirty days.  GAFC sends a copy of the expert’s report to the founders who should, in 
turn, distribute it to subscribers fifteen days at least prior to the constituent meeting.  The report is to 
be kept in the company’s head office, where any interested person may see it.  
The report shall be presented at the constituent meeting for deliberation; if the constituent meeting 
decides to reduce the return specified for in-kind proportions, or to reduce the special benefits, then the 
providers of the in-kind shares and the beneficiaries of any special benefits must accept this reduction 
during the meeting; if they refuse to accept this reduction, the memorandum of association is 
considered null for all parties.
261
  The purpose of these measures is to ensure credibility and accuracy 
in the process of assessing the in-kind shares in order to protect the shareholders, and make sure they 
conform to the real value; such share values may be exaggerated by owners who might seek to raise 
their value in order to gain a larger share in the company. 
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3.7.1 Ordinary & Preference Shares 
The general rule is that all JSC shares are shares of equal nominal value, as an application of the 
principle of equality between shareholders in the rights and obligations stipulated in the CL and the 
company’s memorandum and its articles, as explicitly stipulated in Article 103 of SCL 1965, “1) 
Shares carry equal rights and obligations”. 
 
If the company has a single class of shareholders, then certainly they are the owners of ordinary shares; 
the owners of these shares are the common shareholders in the company, and that is why some 
scholars consider the holders of ordinary shares to be the owners of the company (because they 
contribute the largest part of the capital).  This means that the owners of these shares have an 
important role in monitoring the performance of the company’s management in order to achieve the 
interests of the company itself and its shareholders.  The most important characteristic of ordinary 
shares is that the bearer has a set of rights, including the right to attend the GM, as well as the right to 
vote;
262
 for example, SCL 1965 gives one vote per ordinary share, and prevents the share from having 
more than one vote.  In addition, a company is allowed to issue such ordinary shares in a different 
class.
263
 
 
Ordinary shares, as the name implies, are also called ‘common’ shares;264 they do not accord their 
owners any preferential rights, and they are considered equal at the GMs, in dividing profits, at 
liquidation, etc.  However, they take their share of the profits only after the owners of preference 
shares, in accordance with the company’s articles.265  Thus, the shareholders of ordinary shares do not 
receive a fixed annual profit as is the case with the owners of preference shares; rather, their profits 
depend on the company’s financial status and what has achieved by the end of each fiscal year.266  On 
the other hand, when the company is under liquidation, for whatever reason, the owners of ordinary 
shares are returned the value of their shares, after fulfilling their obligations to the company, such as 
satisfying the rights of creditors and preference share owners; if a surplus remains after liquidation, 
then it is distributed among ordinary shareholders, each according to his share in the capital (they 
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receive nothing should there be no surplus after the liquidation). 
 
As for preference shares, SCL 1965 entitles the GM to decide to issue these, or to convert ordinary 
shares into preference ones, unless the company’s articles provide on the contrary.  Therefore, there 
should be a provision in the law or in the company’s articles authorizing the issuance of such shares.267  
It could be argued that preference shares afford their owners additional rights and privileges not found 
in ordinary shares; these may be of a managerial or financial nature, or both.  If the aim of ordinary 
shares is the generation of capital, then preference shares encourage investors to join the company for 
additional features. 
 
Generally speaking, there are several ways to issue shares; when founding a company, it is possible to 
allocate preference shares alongside ordinary shares, and when the company already exists, it may 
issue preference shares to increase its capital, either through converting bonds, or converting ordinary 
shares into preference ones.  When the company is generating profits, it is entitled to distribute 
preference shares to shareholders, each according to his share; the final way is by converting an 
amount of the optional reserve into capital and customizing it to issue preference shares.
268
 
 
Preference shares take either of two forms; the first is shares that give their owner preferential rights or 
priority in receiving a certain percentage of the profits before other shareholders, i.e. before the holders 
of ordinary shares.  The second form is shares with multi-votes that give each share more than one 
vote; given that these shares offer minority shareholders the opportunity to control the company’s 
decisions through multiple votes, even though they do not own the majority in the capital, some 
legislatures have prevented the issuance of such shares; this is stipulated in Article 103.2 of SCL 1965: 
“Preferred shares may vest their holders with priority in the receiving certain dividends and/or in 
receiving their paid-in capital upon liquidation, or with any other benefits, but no multiple-vote shares 
may be issued”. 
There are two key reasons for the company wishing to issue preference shares: to increase the financial 
resources available to the company through attracting a certain category of investor, and to use other 
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people’s money without involving them in the administration (most preference shares do not have the 
right to vote, nor can they participate in management).  Therefore, the company can acquire what it 
needs in the form of additional funds without any interference on the part of shareholders in the 
management. 
 
There are several types of preference shares, such as cumulative and non-cumulative preference shares, 
convertible preference shares, participating and non-participating preference shares, convertible and 
non-convertible preference shares and redeemable and non-redeemable preference shares.
269
  Also, the 
company can issue preference shares convertible into ordinary shares at a particular time, or in certain 
cases, or when shareholders wish; the aim of these shares is to encourage investors to contribute to the 
company by reducing the risks they might face, where the conditions of the issuance of these shares 
include giving their holders the right of option to convert them into a certain number of ordinary 
shares.
270
 
 
The company’s articles may also allow the preference shareholders to receive part of the remaining 
profits together with the owners of ordinary shares, i.e. after fulfilment of their own preference shares 
first.  Ordinary shareholders participate in the remaining profits under agreed terms, and preference 
shareholders may participate in the form of a rate akin to what ordinary shareholders receive.  Thus, if 
the dividends for preference shareholders are 10% for example, ordinary shareholders shall then also 
receive 10% but only after the completion of the preference shareholders; what remains of the profits 
can then be distributed among the holders of ordinary and preference shares in an agreed-upon 
manner.
271
 
 
JSCs shall not issue any new preference shares that affect the rights of the existing preference 
shareholders because such an issuance would affect the priority that they enjoy; this is explicitly 
stipulated in Article 86 of SCL 1965.  This provision shall also apply when modifying or cancelling 
the planned priority rights of preference shares in the company’s articles.272 
 
With regard to the attitude of Islamic law in terms of priority to profits in preference shares, or in terms 
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of priority access to the company’s remaining funds after liquidation, some argue that the issuance of 
this type of share is haram (taboo or forbidden); they argue that shareholders are all equal in their 
rights.  Resolution No. 63(7/1) 1992 issued by the Fiqh Council for the Organization of the Islamic 
Assembly (at its seventh conference) says, “It is not allowed to issue preference shares that have 
financial characteristics, leading to a capital guarantee or ensuring an amount of profit, to be provided 
upon liquidation or at the distribution of profits; however, some shares can be given characteristics 
related to procedural or administrative matters on condition that these should be stipulated in the 
subscription document”.  
The reason for this is that the owners of preference shares do not inject any extra money or do any 
extra work to deserve such an increase in profit.  Moreover, the fixed ratio taken by the owners of 
preference shares from the profits is, in fact, a form of interest (usury) because it is an unreciprocated 
increase, and interest is taboo, as the company might not achieve profits other than this ratio; this will 
cause harm or injustice to the other shareholders, and will undermine their rights, something that is not 
permissible in Islam.  In addition, the company is based on risk (either it achieves profits or losses); the 
loss is actually in the capital, and if the company were to guarantee to return the value of these shares 
to their owners, this would contravene the basic precept of the company, as they, in the event of loss, 
would receive the value of others’ shares, which is contrary to justice, is prejudicial to the other 
partners, and is not religiously permissible.
273
 
 
3.7.2 Redeemable Shares 
Equity shares are those whose value cannot be paid back to the holder before the end of the company 
or after paying its creditors; thus, a shareholder remains a partner in the company as long as it exists.  
However, redeemable shares can be issued by the company (as this is one of its rights), and these 
shares can be issued as ordinary or preferred shares; they constitute part of the capital, which then can 
be disposed of during the life of the company.
274
  Issuing redeemable shares is subject to the 
company’s articles.  
 
The company may be forced to issue such shares if it fears losing its assets at the end (as in the case of 
mines and quarries, which end after a certain period, or in the case of the company receiving 
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governmental privilege, where the company and its assets are vested in the government at the end of 
the agreed period, such as in electricity, water and transport companies).
275
  The Saudi legislature 
details certain conditions that must be met for the consumption of shares to be valid; the company’s 
articles must provide that it is possible to redeem shares during the life of the company (otherwise, it 
requires that an EGM be convened to amend the company’s articles in order to allow the shares to be 
redeemed).
276
 
Another condition is that the redeeming of shares is a project that gradually perishes, or is based on 
temporary rights; the latter condition is that any shares redeemed shall be taken from the profits or 
reserves (which may be disposed of).  According to SCL 1965, shares are consumed through an annual 
draw or in any other way that achieves equality between shareholders.  The holders of these share have 
fewer rights than those of the shareholder whose shares have not yet been redeemed, such as their right 
to profits and to attend the GM, and their right in the liquidation surplus; thus, the owner of the these 
shares still retains his capacity as a partner in the company, where he is given all the rights granted to 
owners of ordinary shares except for redeeming the share’s nominal value upon liquidation of the 
company, due to the fact that they have already redeemed the nominal value of their shares.
277
 
3.7.3 Classifying Shares According to the Way in they Are Traded  
There are two basic types of shares issued by JSCs, which are the most common and most requested 
by shareholders: nominal shares and bearer shares.  The nominal ones are those in whose certificate 
the name of the share owner is mentioned, and their property can be transferred to another person, 
where this transfer must be registered in the shareholders’ register at the company or in the stock 
exchange.  The transfer of property shall be carried out through certain mechanisms, as stated by CL, 
wherein the buyer replaces the seller, and this is registered in the company records.  On the other hand, 
bearer shares do not carry the name of the owner, and are known only by their number; they are 
movable properties subject to the rule of tenure in movable property, i.e. they are ownership 
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documents, and are transferred by handing or delivery.
278
  SCL 1965 stipulates that a JSC’s capital is 
divided into cash or in kind shares, and that shares remain nominal until their value is fulfilled.
279
 
3.8 Definition of Shareholder 
SCL 1965 and the majority of Arabic legislations do not contain a precise definition of a 
shareholder;
280
 in general, shareholder as any natural or legal person who owns one or more shares of 
the shares of the company, whether he received them through subscription when the company was 
started, or as the outcome of ownership after it was founded.  In either case, the holder acquires 
property,
281
 and consequently, a shareholder is entitled to a range of rights and obligations.
282
  Both 
‘partner’ and ‘member’ in the context of JSCs refer to a shareholder; shareholders are partners in the 
company which is a separate legal entity, and in a JSC, they are not responsible for the debts of the 
company (only in so far as they share in the capital).
283
 
 
Generally speaking, shareholders are classified into individual investors and institutional investors.  
Individual shareholders are natural persons investing their own money, while institutional investors are 
organizations investing other people’s money in a variety of securities.  The institutional investors are 
considered the largest investors in global financial markets; for example, in the UL, the institutional 
investors constitute more than 70 percent of investors in securities, and have a significant effect on 
JSCs.
284
  Some examples of institutional investors are endowment funds, investment companies, 
mutual funds, brokerage firms, investment banks, pension funds and insurance companies.
285
  This is 
the opposite situation in KSA, where individual investors constitute the bulk of investors in the 
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Tadawul, while institutional investors do not constitute more than 30 percent of investors.
286
  
 
Shareholders can also be divided according to their amount of shares in the capital; there are a majority 
and a minority.  The majority does not mean that they constitute the largest number in the company, 
but rather they have a controlling stake the company; they may be one person or more, but they have 
significant influence over the company’s affairs.  For example, they have influential voting power at 
the GM, and they can form the board of directors according to their interests.  
On the other hand, small shareholders constitute the minority, and they are usually dominated by the 
majority shareholders; their influence is so weak that they do not seem to be included in the company’s 
activities, with minimal control over the company
287
. At the time of writing, there is no clear definition 
for minority shareholders in SCL 1965, but it is indicated in some of the provisions; the SCGRs define 
them as “shareholders who represent a class not in control of the company in so far as they are unable 
to influence it”.288 
 
3.8.1 Terms of Membership in a JSC 
A shareholder in a JSC may be an individual or a group, a natural person or a legal entity; if there is a 
group of shareholders who have a number of shares, there shall be a representative for them in the 
company.
289
 A company can also be a shareholder in another company if this is provided in company’s 
bylaws, so it too shall have a representative on its behalf in the company.  In case a shareholder dies, 
his shares are transferred to his legal heir; if the heir is more than one person, one of them shall 
represent them in the company, and the full right to exercise the rights granted to the deceased 
shareholder shall be transferred to him, such as the right to transfer shares, attend and vote at 
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shareholder meetings, and receive profits; he shall also bear the obligations entailed in the share.
290
 
 
There is nothing in SCL 1965 or in exchange law that refers to a shareholder’s capacity in JSCs, but it 
can be said that the general rules of Islamic Law apply; a person who is a minor can be a shareholder 
in a JSC,
291
 unless the company’s articles provide that a shareholder must be an adult, or that a minor 
must have a guardian who is then the legal representative of that minor in the company. 
 
According to SCL 1965, all JSCs established in KSA are of Saudi nationality,
292
 and their headquarters 
are in KSA; all Saudi and Arabian Gulf State citizens are entitled to contribute
293
 and to practice 
commercial activities within these countries in accordance with the agreements signed by their 
respective governments.
294
  One such activity is owning shares in companies listed on the capital 
markets, and therefore anyone can become a member of a JSC unless the CL or the company’s articles 
state otherwise.  According to SCL 1965, residents of KSA are also entitled to be shareholders in JSCs 
but they are only entitled to subscribe in any capital increase; new JSCs are limited in subscription to 
the citizens of KSA and the Gulf States, unless the company’s articles provide otherwise. 
 
In fact, both institutional and individual foreign investors are allowed to buy swaps to invest in the 
Tadawul;
295
 this was decided on 18 August, 2008 by the CMA.
296
  However, the investment is actually 
indirect and known as a Swap Agreement; this process is expedited through a brokerage firm licensed 
and certified by the CMA, and the legal ownership of the shares belongs to the brokerage firm.  These 
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agreements are of various types, such as currency swaps, commodity swaps, interest swaps, equity 
swaps and credit default swaps; equity swaps are the most common type in KSA.
297
 
A foreign investor is entitled only to the profits of shares, to gifts in any increase in capital, and to 
subscribe in the capital increase of JSCs.  Exercising the rights related to shares, such as attending and 
voting in GMs, running for election on the board of directors as well as other rights are for the 
brokerage firm only.
298
 
KSA recently joined the WTO; in order to keep pace with global developments in the field of business, 
the government has decided to open its doors to foreign investment and expertise, and they are now 
allowed to directly invest in the capital market.  There may be some state restrictions on foreign 
investment but they are generally designed to ensure that economic development in the Kingdom is 
appropriate to its needs and/or culture.  Perhaps, the most prominent advantage of opening the door to 
foreign investment is that it makes KSA an attractive investment destination for large multinational 
corporations, which will contribute to the development of the country’s economic growth, provide 
liquidity and enhance the effectiveness of the market, as well as promoting levels of disclosure and 
transparency in the market.
299
 
 
3.8.2 Register of Members 
Under the law, all companies, particularly JSCs, must keep a special register of shareholders, which 
shall include the names of the members, their addresses, the number of shares held by each, the 
amount paid for each share, the date of registration of each member, and the date on which any 
member left (including the manner in which he left).  This register shall be kept in the head office of 
the company, or in another place stipulated in the company’s articles; all shareholders in the company 
shall be allowed to view it for free, as well as anyone from outside the company in return for a 
reasonable fee.  This register is an important tool in determining the status, rights and obligations of 
each shareholder in the company; this is referred to in SCL 1965.
300
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Unfortunately, SCL 1965 does not cover all the issues relating to the register of shareholders, such as 
what legal provision there may be in the case of a company preventing a shareholder (or others) in 
gaining access to a copy; nor does it address under what conditions the law can prevent a shareholder 
from browsing the register.  It also does not consider the legal ramifications of a company changing 
the register or deleting somebody without justification.  On the other hand, CA 2006 UK regulates (in 
Section 2) the provisions of the shareholders’ register in detail, covering many of the issues that may 
arise, and states the appropriate punishment in the case of any violation of the provisions of these 
materials; for example: every company must keep a register of its members;
301
 if it has more than 50 
members, it must keep an index of the names of the members of the company;
302
 the index and register 
must be at all times kept available for inspection at the same place, or at a place specified in the 
regulations under Section 1136, within working hours.
303
 
 
3.8.3 Termination of Shareholder Membership 
A shareholder in a JSC ceases to be a member when his name is removed legally from the register of 
shareholders in the company; this happens for several reasons as stipulated in the CL or in the 
company’s articles, but the most important of which is when a shareholder leaves the company.  When 
the shareholder transfers the ownership of his shares, whether to another shareholder or to the 
company, he leaves the company, and a new owner replaces him.  
Membership also ceases when the shareholder’s shares are confiscated by virtue of law or by court, or 
upon the death of the shareholder; he then loses the status of being a partner, and his shares are 
transferred to the legal heirs, and thus they become new partners in the company, with the same rights 
and obligations of the shares.  If there is more than one heir, one of them shall represent them in the 
company.  In addition, membership ends when the company is dissolved and enters liquidation; it also 
ends when the shareholder retrieves the value of his shares in the capital of the company in the case of 
a merger with another company (or in some other manner of acquisition).  
3.9 Conclusion 
As we have seen in this section, a JSC is not entirely based on contractual theory, nor is it an 
organization created by the state. The parties who sign the constitution of the company are not the 
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owners of the company; rather, they are the providers of capital, according to establishment theory.  
Thus, shareholders are considered owners of shares in the capital of the company, and they bear the 
company’s debts in accordance with their ratio in the capital.  This means that a JSC is a mixture of the 
two theories, and it is clear here that the company is a legal person entirely separate from its 
shareholders, having its own possessions.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the Saudi legislature has 
adopted either of the two theories; rather, the legislature stresses the importance of the contract and its 
significant role in the formation and management of companies.  Nevertheless, in listed companies, the 
legislature plays a major role in the establishment and control of the company; state intervention here 
is represented by the Ministry of Commerce and the Capital Market Authority.  It could be argued that 
a JSC, in accordance with SCL 1965, is a combination of the two theories.  The company is managed 
in accordance with the contract signed among the shareholders in the company, and this contract, for 
example, gives each shareholder a number of rights and responsibilities.  State intervention in the 
organization of these companies is for various reasons, including protecting the country’s economy 
against manipulation, preserving the shareholders’ money, and preventing corruption or illegal acts by 
the company’s management.  
  
This right is made clear in the final judgment of Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Conflicts (referred to as ACRSC)
304
 issued on 23/06/2009 against a registered company, through 
ratifying the validity of the decision of CMA forcing that listed company to cease trading its shares 
because of financial instability.  The CMA thus has the authority, under the laws governing the 
financial market, for example, to prevent trading in securities in the market, or to suspend their release 
if the Authority deems it necessary; this is stated in Article 21 of the Listing and Registering Rules, 
which give it the right to suspend or cancel the listing at any time as they deem appropriate in the cases 
identified by this article.
305
  
 
Due to the above, the shareholder is in a distinctive position in the company, compared with other 
stakeholders, where he has a set of rights and bears certain obligations; and the source of these rights is 
the company’s articles and the memorandum of association.  On the other hand, shareholders are 
considered the source of legislation for the company and the activities entailed are implemented by the 
board of directors, which means that a balance is created between them in order to achieve the goals of 
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the company.  However, if the shareholders do not fare well in the company, this will negatively affect 
their interests but the company’s management still has the freedom to manage as it sees fit; thus, the 
role of shareholders in reality may be in contradiction to its theory.  Actually, this case vis-à-vis the 
role of shareholders is now apparent in many Saudi listed companies, where the role of shareholders in 
controlling and directing the company’s management is ineffective, and needs further clarification. 
 
In this section, we also dealt with the definitions of shareholder and share; however, there is some 
criticism directed at SCL 1965 because it lacks these definitions.  The rules concerning shares are very 
few, and the details are insufficiently adequate.  SCL1965 includes many ambiguities, and needs a 
complete overhaul if it is to comply with the current era.  In general, a person becomes a shareholder 
in the company when he acquires shares, and he may pay for them in cash or in kind.  There are two 
types of share in accordance with Saudi law, which are ordinary shares and preference shares; the 
Saudi stock market is considered one of the biggest in the Middle East, where the majority of its 
contributors are individual shareholders, and the proportion of financial institutions is relatively small.  
So far, there have been no academic studies on financial institutions in the Saudi market, which is 
contrary to what exists in the UK, where such establishments constitute more than 70% of shareholders 
in the market, and play a major role in the management and control of the company. 
 
Also in this section, we discussed the importance and characteristics of shares, including the fact that 
they are tradable, and that the shareholder cannot be prevented from trading shares except within very 
narrow limits; otherwise, any prevention will be void and null.  This property attracts many people to 
invest in such companies.  When a company does not achieve the goals of its shareholders, they simply 
withdraw from the company and reinvest in another company that would appear to achieve their 
ambitions. 
 
In addition, other characteristics of shares are: they cannot be fragmented, the shareholder’s 
responsibility is limited (where a shareholder is only responsible for the company’s debts as far as his 
portion in the capital, i.e. not extending to his own property), and any decision that adds financial 
commitments to the shareholder shall be void and null.  On the other hand, these properties may 
explain the lack of attention paid on the part of many shareholders to the company’s affairs, resulting 
in their not exercising their role within the company in terms of control and direction; their primary 
goal is financial benefit at the end of each fiscal year.  Thus, in the next chapter, we will discuss the 
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financial rights of shareholders within the company, which are considered as the main motivation to 
invest in JSCs. 
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Chapter 4: Financial Rights of Shareholders in JSCs 
4.1 Introduction  
Shareholders are considered to be an important source of finance for listed companies; therefore, they 
are a vital element of the company in addition to the board of directors. In general, shareholders invest 
in company capital in order to obtain some financial benefit; however, holding a share in a JSC means 
that they are partners, and thus are entitled to a set of rights. Normally, each shareholder in a JSC is 
entitled to all rights related to the ownership of the share, some of which are managerial rights, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter (Ch. 5); others include the many different financial rights, which 
will be discussed in this chapter. Shareholders’ rights, more particularly financial rights, must be 
protected by both Company Law and the company’s constitution. Therefore, the following questions 
are addressed in this chapter: Among the rights to which a shareholder is entitled, what are the 
financial ones? What obstacles face them in practising such rights? Are shareholders granted those 
rights by Saudi Law? 
 
Shareholders have many important financial rights in JSCs; the first of these is the right to transfer 
shares, which is considered to be one of the most important financial rights for all shareholders. This 
right is one of the main reasons why many people prefer to invest their money in publically listed 
companies rather than in any other types of companies; this right gives the shareholder the right to 
complete freedom in selling or transferring his/her shares at any time as a sale, a gift or a pledge. The 
second financial right is known as the pre-emption rights; this right gives existing shareholders in the 
company the right to purchase any shares that are newly offered before offering them to external 
parties. The third significant right is the right of shareholders to receive profits at the end of each fiscal 
year. The shareholder’s primary reason for purchasing shares is to make profit; the company’s 
constitution clearly states that all shareholders in the company have the right to receive profits, which 
are distributed at the end of each fiscal year. In additional, shareholders have right to have the value of 
their shares reimbursed when their company goes into liquidation, in the form of a company debt 
settlement, and only in the case of the company having surplus assets. This right is enjoyed by each 
shareholder, as provided in the company’s articles and the law. All of these rights and other related 
topics under SCL 1965 are discussed in this chapter. 
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4.2 The Right of a Shareholder to Transfer Shares  
As indicated earlier, shares can be transferred through commercial means between the shareholders 
very easily; this is one of the most significant features relating to owning shares in JSCs, where 
shareholders can fully transfer their shares as a sale, a gift, a pledge, etc. No doubt, this right and other 
associated share rights are the factors that motivate many people to invest their money in such 
companies. The transferability of the share is considered a personal right on a par with the right to 
dispose of property;
306
 therefore, it is not possible to restrict the shareholder from transferring his 
shares permanently to other parties. Clearly, this lack of restriction or prohibition is in the public 
interest as well as benefitting the company and its shareholders.
307
 In SCL 1965, this right is clearly 
stated: “The capital of a corporation shall be divided into negotiable shares of equal value”.308 
In general, these shares are transferable in the capital market after the approval of the CMA and after 
listing them in the Securities Depositary Center.
309
 However, SCL 1965 imposes a number of 
restrictions on the transfer of shareholders’ shares; some restrictions may be agreed upon and included 
in the company’s articles, as described later in this chapter. 
 
Nevertheless, a shareholder’s shares in the company are transferable; that is, they can be transferred by 
commercial means, according to certain simple procedures in order to facilitate a speedy transfer from 
the original owner to another, without the need to obtain prior consent from other shareholders in the 
company. If the shares are bearer shares, these can be traded through handling, but if the shares are 
nominal shares, then they are transferred to another through registration in the company register.
310
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Article 27 of CML states, “A) the registration of ownership of Securities traded on the Exchange and 
the settlement and clearance of Securities shall be made by entries in the Depository Center’s records. 
Ownership of Securities traded on the Exchange must be registered with the Securities Depository 
Center in order to be protected against third party claims. The Depository Center’s records will also 
report pledges or other claims related to the Securities traded on the Exchange. B) The Depository 
Center shall be the sole entity to register all property rights in Securities traded on the Exchange. The 
final mentions reported in the records of the Depository Center shall serve as conclusive evidence and 
proof of ownership of the Securities indicated therein together with the encumbrances and rights 
associated therewith, subject to the provisions of paragraph (d) of this Article”. 
In general, in order that a shareholder can trade his/her shares in the capital market, certain 
requirements and conditions provided by the Saudi system must be fulfilled.
311
 In the UK, shares in 
public companies are transferable, according to CA 2006 and to the company’s articles. According to 
the case of Smith, Knight & Weston, shareholders have a prima facie right to transfer their shares; 
directors have no discretionary powers, independent of any powers given to them by the above article, 
and thus cannot refuse to register a transfer.
312
 The transferee becomes a member of the company when 
he allows his name to be entered on the register of members
.313
  
A share is considered to be the proprietary right of the holder; every shareholder has the right to 
protect that property from being interfered with, ultimately through filing a lawsuit.
314
  S 544 of CA 
2006 states, “(1) the shares or other interest of any member in a company are transferable in 
accordance with the company’s articles. (2) This is subject to (a) the Stock Transfer Act 1963 (c. 18) 
or the Stock Transfer Act (Northern Ireland) 1963 (c.24 (N.I.)) (which enables securities of certain 
descriptions to be transferred by a simplified process), and (b) regulations under Chapter 2 of Part 21 
of this Act (which enable title to securities to be evidenced and transferred without a written 
instrument)”. 
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4.3 General Rules that Govern Share Trading 
Firstly, for trading JSC shares in the Tadawul, a licence must be obtained from the relevant 
governmental authority; the CML states that no JSC share trading is possible without the approval of 
the CMA.
315
 Article 20 of the CML provides, “A) A market shall be established in the Kingdom for 
the trading in Securities which shall be known as the “Saudi Stock Exchange”, and will have the legal 
status of a joint stock company in accordance with the provisions of this Law. This Exchange shall be 
the sole entity authorized to carry out trading in Securities in the Kingdom”. 
The Tadawul, in accordance with Article 20 of the CML, is the sole body authorized to perform the 
trading of securities in the Kingdom. The Tadawul is a Saudi JSC that is wholly owned by the Saudi 
Public Investment Fund (PIF). It deals with the executive and operational functions of the market, and 
is the only body licensed to perform the task of managing the stock market.
316
 The above law gives the 
Tadawul management the right to collect any information about the shares traded in the market; this is 
believed to be necessary for investors, and it has the right to make this information available to all 
traders. 
 
Under this law, it is essential to register the ownership of any shares traded in the market, when they 
are circulated from one shareholder to another, in the records of the Securities Depository Center.
317
 In 
general, the centre is the only body to record all ownership rights of securities traded in the market. 
The final entries in the SDC records provide evidence and conclusive proof of ownership of shares, 
and set forth therein are the burdens and rights relating to them.
318
 Shares can be traded from Saturday 
to Wednesday, from 11.00 am to 3.30 pm, i.e. about four hours.
319
 The number of trading days in 2011 
was 248.  
 
The second article of SCL 1965 states that all shares or JSC securities that are traded in the capital 
market, together with the source of each one, must be registered in the Security Deposit Centre,
320
 in 
accordance with the instructions issued by the Tadawul. However, the following transactions are not 
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considered securities: commercial bills such as cheques, bills of exchange, order notes, documentary 
credits, money transfers, as well as the instruments exclusively traded by the banks among themselves, 
and insurance policies.
321
 
Another noteworthy point is that many minority shareholders who trade in the market (and who 
represent the largest shareholder class in it) consider that the trading period is not appropriate. This is 
due to various reasons, for instance, the inconvenient opening hours; Saudi Arabia has customs and 
traditions, for example, 30 minutes after opening time is the noon prayer
322
 (there is no trading at all 
during this time). This is also the time to collect children from school, as well as having lunch at home 
with family members and taking a nap; therefore, the actual trading time is very short compared with 
other countries. For instance, the regular trading sessions at the London Stock Exchange operate from 
8:00 until 16:30 every day of the week, except weekends and holidays declared by the exchange 
provider. Moreover, global stock markets can be accessed around the clock.
323
 
 
Accordingly, the CMA should open the capital market such that is available for direct foreign 
investment (individual and institutional), while taking the necessary measures to protect the market 
form the phenomenon of ‘Hot Money’.324 No doubt, foreign investors will return to the market as the 
confidence that was lost during the crisis of February 2006 slowly grows, but this must be facilitated. 
Also, the entry of foreigner investors will enhance transparency and disclosure in the market, and this 
will raise its profile and reputation around the world.
325
 The injection of foreign cash reserves will 
support the future of the Tadawul, through learning from the experiences of foreign investment 
cultures, which in turn will increase the level of buying and selling in the market, as well as reducing 
the control of a small number of powerful individuals in the market. All of these factors will contribute 
to strengthening the Saudi economy and increasing confidence in it; foreign investors tend to focus on 
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a number of major sectors in KSA, which include petrochemicals, banking, telecommunications, 
construction and real estate.
326
 
 
3.2.1 Transferring Shares should be conducted by Licensed Stockbrokers 
 
Licensed brokers act as mediators in the Tadawul, and represent the only facility to play this role. It is 
intended that these brokers implement the buying and selling of shares on behalf of the investor in the 
stock market, and that they do so in accordance with the CML; otherwise the transaction will be 
invalid. The CML stipulates the requirements necessary for obtaining a licence to engage in brokerage 
prior to performing any stock transactions.
327
 
 In the vein, The CRSD has adjudicated in favour of CMA against persons accused of practising 
securities business without having obtained a licence from the CMA, and has announced such 
activities to the public through an electronic newspaper; this is done in order to give confidence to 
investors and to attract the largest possible number of investors, as well as ensuring that everyone 
knows that such practices are against the law.
328
 The CRSD considers that practising brokerage 
without legal authorization by the CMA is contrary to the provisions of Article 31 of the CML, as well 
as to the provisions of Article 5 (5) & 17 (6) of the Securities Business Regulations; the CRSD states 
that the CMA has the right to regulate the financial market in order to protect investors from fraud and 
manipulation, and that any person found guilty will be punished with a minimum fine of 10,000 
riyals.
329
  
Saudi banks represent the majority of brokerage firms; among the most important tasks that they carry 
out are: opening an investment case that enables the agent or investor to make deals in the market, 
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acquiring securities or identifying their source, and providing the necessary funding and facilities for 
customers to trade shares.
330
 
 
When an investor wishes to trade in the stock market, he shall take the following steps: open an 
investment account with one of the brokers who are authorized to engage in securities business in the 
Tadawul, and fill in the specified forms when the investor desires to buy or sell a particular share 
through a broker. Most brokers offer the services of purchasing or selling shares through the Tadawul 
electronic system; this can be done on the phone without the need for the investor to attend the 
Tadawul in person. The shareholder determines the order type (to buy or sell), and when filling out the 
form, he must take care to choose the appropriate order.
331
 Shares ownership is recorded electronically 
by the SDC in the capital market; the SDC then sends all the transaction data made on their shares 
directly to the listed company during the trading period. Subsequently, the company must register the 
ownership of the shares in the name of the new buyer in its books immediately it is notified by the 
SDC; otherwise, it will be liable to punishment.
332
 
 
Significantly, minority shareholders represent the largest sector in the Tadawul; they prefer to trade 
shares on an individual basis and do not tend to place their investments with financial firms; most of 
them are interested in short-term profits and the nature of their investment is speculative, lacking 
financial or accounting expertise. Thus, many of the shareholders in the Tadawul are classified as 
speculators rather than investors. Unfortunately, many lose a large part of their investments due to 
their lack of knowledge of the rules of investing in the capital markets. In 2011, individual 
shareholders represented almost 80% of all transactions conducted on the stock exchange; the 
remaining percentage was conducted by companies and investment funds.
333
 
A statistical study of the Arab capital markets found that approximately 65-70% of the shareholders in 
the exchanges are individuals and the rest are institutions, whereas in Western stock exchanges, it is 
                                                          
330
 Article 32(A) of the CML. 
331
  Mohammad Alsohbani, Workshop on speculation in the financial markets, placed in the Aleqtisadiah 
Newspaper, Riyadh, 6 April 2007. P. 9 
332
 Article 3 of the Authorised Persons Regulations states, “A. An authorised person and a registered person 
must comply with the Regulations and Rules applicable to them and must provide to the Authority without 
delay any information, records or documents that the Authority may require for the purpose of administration of 
the CML and its Implementing Regulations”. 
333
 
 
 Tadawul, free monthly magazine published by the Capital Market Company Saudi Arabia, Feb. No. 73, 
2012, P. 63 
95 
 
completely the opposite, i.e. 65-70% are of transactions are conducted by financial establishments and 
only 30-35% by individuals.
334
 It is a condition that the trader be a citizen the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states, or a resident. Individual have been allowed to trade directly in the stock market 
since 2006; hitherto, all persons had to members of investment funds.
335
 Shareholders must pay a 
commission to brokers;
336
 the maximum commission during share sale or purchase is based on the 
following: If the amount is 10 thousand SAR or less, the minimum commission is 12 SAR; whereas if 
the amount is more than 10 thousand SAR, the commission is 0.0012% of the value of the shares per 
deal.
337
 
 
4.3.2 Restrictions on the Transfer Right of Shares 
 
Article 48 of SCL 1965 demonstrates that JSCs are characterized by tradable shares; the advantage of 
owning shares in JSCs is that the shareholder has complete freedom to dispose of his/her shares by 
various means; furthermore, this right is a property right, which is subject to certain legal or 
conventional restrictions contained in the memorandum of association of the company or its articles. In 
general, these restrictions are limited to a specific period of time and are not permanent, and thereby 
they aim to regulate the right to dispose of stock through trading (but a trade cannot be cancelled). The 
restriction can be divided into two categories, namely: legal restrictions and contravention 
restrictions.
338
 The legal restrictions will be discussed in the following section. 
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See: Aziz Al-akali, 
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4.3.2.1 Legal Restrictions on Share Transfer 
 
The Saudi legislature cites a range of restrictions on the transfer of shares, including what is mentioned 
in SCL 1965, such as preventing the company founders from disposing of their shares, as well as 
preventing the disposal of guarantee shares by members of the board of directors. Other restrictions are 
mentioned in various laws, such as the CML; details of these restrictions are as follows: 
 
4.3.2.1.1 In the first restriction, the disposal of founders’ shares is prohibited; Article 100 of SCL 1965 
states, “A - Cash shares subscribed for by the founders and shares for contribution in kind, as well as 
founders’ shares, shall not be negotiable before the publication of the balance sheet and the profit and 
loss statement for two completed financial years, each consisting of at least twelve months as from the 
date of incorporation of the company, indicating their class, the date of incorporation of the company, 
and the period during which their negotiable shall be suspended”. 
 
According to SCL 1965, the founder is any person involved directly or indirectly in the establishment 
of the company.
339
 The founders are not those who agree on the idea of establishing the company and 
the signing of the contract for this, rather, the circle of founders includes each person having a role in 
the establishment of the company; it is not permissible for them to  dispose of their cash shares, in-
kind shares or and founding shares before publication of the budget and the profit and loss accounts for 
the first two years of the fiscal life of the company, where each year shall not be less than 12 full 
months.
340
  
The purpose of this restriction is to keep the founders linked to the company for a sufficient length of 
time to ensure the stability of the company and to clarify the company’s financial position for those 
who may wish to invest in it. The other aim is to ensure that the founders are serious in establishing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
provided with appropriate information to enable dealings in such securities to take place on an open and fair 
basis”. 
339
 SCL1965 defined the founder of corporation in the article 53 thus, “A founder of a corporation shall be any 
person who has signed its memorandum of association, or applied for authorization to incorporate it, or offered 
a contribution in kind upon its organization, or actually participated in its organization”. 
340
 This provision exists in most of Arabian Gulf states, and the duration of the ban is two years from the date of 
company establishment; the Bahraini Company Law reduced it to one year. 
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corporation, and to disallow the establishment of false companies; it is also to avert any overestimation 
of the success of the company, where misleading propaganda campaigns often accompany the 
formation of JSCs in order to attract the largest possible number of shareholders. In such a case, the 
founders may then sell their shares at an inflated price, after which, the value plummets when the 
actual financial position of the company, and the real value of its shares are made known. This 
restriction exists to ensure the protection of the shareholders, particularly the minority shareholders, 
from the possibility of any such fraud, manipulation, or exploitation by the founders.
341
 The 
restrictions in this article include all actions conducted by the founders in terms of their founding 
shares, whether the action is to transfer of ownership by means of sale, gift, or custody, or whether it is 
a right claimed on the share such as mortgage.
342
 
In the event of the founders disposing of their shares contrary to this restriction, the act is then 
considered void, and any shareholder with an interest has the right to use this invalidity in court; 
indeed, the court itself can decide on invalidity, because such an action violates the rules of the public 
order.
343
 The violating founder shall be liable to a punishment as set out in Article 229, which 
stipulates the punishment for each official in the company who violates the provisions of SCL 1965,
344
 
either by imprisonment from 3 months to a year, or by a fine ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 SAR, or 
both. Clearly, such a penalty is ineffective and does not reflect the offence; therefore, both the term of 
imprisonment and the fine must be considerably increased if this is to have any real effect. However, it 
must be pointed out that this restriction excludes the possibility that the founders can dispose of their 
shares in the company among themselves, or from the heirs of the founder to others, or through the 
transmission of shares to a member of the board of directors to be allocated as a guarantee for the 
administration.
345
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4.3.2.1.2 The second restriction is imposed on the shares owned by the company board members. SCL 
1965 states that each member of the board of directors should offer guarantee shares (cash or in kind) 
for not less than 10,000 SAR (1654.87 GBP) to be offered within 30 days from the date of the decision 
of accepting a new member on the board, and shall be deposited in a bank specified by the Minister of 
the MOCI; the law provides that the deposit of such shares shall be made at a licensed bank in KSA.
346
  
 
Regarding the criterion for assessing the value of guarantee shares, the law does not set specific 
standards regarding whether the legislature means the nominal value of the shares or the commercial 
value. If we assume that the legislature means the commercial value, this criterion is not suitable as an 
accurate standard because the value of shares changes from time to time; whereas if we assume that the 
standard is the nominal value of shares, then it is more accurate because the company’s capital consists 
of the nominal value, which is considered the general guarantor for creditors. In Bahraini Company 
Law
347
 a member of the board of directors shall have a number of shares whose nominal value shall 
not be less than 10 thousand Bahraini Dinars (BD).
348
 
 
It can be argued that guarantee shares are not tradable until the end of the period specified for hearing a 
case of liability, as provided for in Article 77, or until any judgment in the lawsuit. The purpose of this 
restriction is to ensure the proper management of a member of the acts ascribed to him, i.e. not to 
abuse company funds, and to not to put personal interest before company interests. The defect in this 
article is the amount of shares required by the member, equivalent to 10,000 SAR, which is very little 
if compared with the capital, as well as being considerably less than the amounts earned by a member 
of the board of directors from awards and incentives.
349
 
 
For example, the total value of salaries and bonuses obtained by the Big Five directors in JSC amounts 
to almost 10 percent of net profits, and to approximately 18 percent of the distributed profits, i.e. they 
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receive one fifth of the distributed profits, whilst thousands of share owners only share in the 
remainder.
350
 Clearly, it is the duty of the legislature to provide a certain percentage (between 2% and 
5%) of share ownership in the company; this would be more stringent and effective against the 
members being inordinately greedy. Also, the legislature should demand that the company’s articles 
include the right to request a certain percentage not less than the percentage set by law.
351
 For instance, 
Kuwaiti Company Law requires every director to have a number of shares constituting not less than 
one percent of the company capital; however, it is sufficient for a director to hold a number of shares, 
the nominal value of which is equal to ten thousand Kuwaiti Dinars unless the company’s articles 
provide otherwise.
352
 
 
4.3.2.1.3 According to the CML, the third restriction imposed on every person or group of persons, 
specified in the prospectus for owning shares in the JSC, is, at the date of the prospectus, shares must 
not be disposed of during a period of six months from the date when trading in those shares first 
commences in the Tadawul. However, the CMA may require that any person or group of persons, 
specified in the prospectus as owning shares, from the date of the prospectus shall comply for a period 
longer than six months; it considers that this is for the protection of investors.
353
  In this case, the 
company needs to increase its capital, and the main purpose of this restriction is to ensure non-
manipulation of the shares of the company by majority shareholders, as this would have a negative 
impact on the company and its minority shareholders.  
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4.3.2.1.4 The fourth restriction in the CML is that the Saudi legislature prevents the directors of the 
board, executives and anyone related to them from trading their shares, whether this be sale or 
purchase, based on insider information in order to achieve personal interests. This restriction is not 
provided in SCL 1965 but it is stated in the CML; Article 50 provides, “A) Any person who obtains, 
through family, business or contractual relationship, inside information (referred to as an “insider”) is 
prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in the Security related to such information, or to disclose 
such information to another person with the expectation that such person will trade in such Security”. 
 
Insider trading can be defined as: the illegal dealing in shares by people who, because of their 
privileged position, have information, which materially impacts on the value of the shares, before that 
information has been made public.
354
 When an insider purchases or sells shares, they do this depending 
on the information obtained by virtue of their position; they know whether or not the company is 
profitable and therefore, an insider can trade his shares at an unfair advantage. Therefore, all persons 
knowledgeable about the company, or those who are in any relationship with them, are prohibited from 
buying or selling the company’s shares. Insider trading cause share values to rise or to fall, and this 
information is obtained it by virtue of their position for personal benefit (for themselves or others). 
The following question arises here: Who is an insider person according to SCL 1965? In fact, SCL 
1965 targets only members of the board of directors, whereas the CMA includes a larger group of 
people, stating
355
 that an insider person is a member of the board of directors, a executive officer, or 
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any employee in the company who has easy access to internal company information. This article has 
expanded its definition of the insider to include every person who can obtain such information through 
family relationships, business relationships, or a special relationship with the staff of the company. 
 
Another important question here is: What is insider information for exploitation according to the Saudi 
system? SCL 1965 uses general terms to define insider information, whereas the CML and the 
Implementing Regulations that support the CL significantly cover this subject. Article 50 (A) of the 
CML defines what is meant by insider information stating, “Insider information means information 
obtained by the insider and which is not available to the general public, has not been disclosed, and 
such information is of the type that a normal person would realize that in view of the nature and 
content of this information, its release and availability would have a material effect on the price or 
value of a Security related to such information, and the insider knows that such information is not 
generally available and that, if it were available, it would have a material effect on the price or value of 
such Security”.  
The first property of the information is confidentiality; confidential information is information 
concerning the source of securities, whether this is focused on its activities or transactions made, 
financial or economic positions, or perceptions of future development, where this information was not 
made public, and that publication will directly or indirectly affect the price of the shares in circulation. 
Therefore, such information must remain confidential and trusted by the trustee, and shall not be 
known by the public. It is considered confidential information even if it is in the possession of a 
number of people, such as the managers of the company, and it does not lose its confidentiality until it 
is broadcast to the public.   
The second property is that the information is sufficiently specific, as non-specific information can be 
merely an assumption or a rumour; for example, to say that the company is facing some difficulties, or 
that the company is at the height of its prosperity, cannot be deemed specific, distinctive and 
fundamental information.  
The third property is that such information influences the share price; Saudi legislation clearly states 
this property in the above provisions, thus, the information shall influence the share price upwards and 
downwards. Article 50 (A) states that the information shall influence the price of the securities; 
however, this is insufficient, and it is advised that the legislature mention the possibility of this effect, 
102 
 
even if it has not actually happened. Clearly, not every piece of information that remains unknown to 
the public is considered to be secret, unique or essential information; similarly, information that does 
not affect the share price is not considered to be significant or serious information. 
In the case of the CMA against the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of SADAF Co, the ACRSC 
confirmed
356
the verdict of the CRSD,
357
 which cancelled the decision of CMA issued against the Chief 
Executive Officer. The CMA had issued a fine when the CEO disclosed to Reuters confidential 
information about the company concerning the net profit of 200% that the company had made in the 
first half-year, before informing the CMA, which was considered to violate Article 1(5) of Market 
Conduct and Article 50 (c) of the CML, as this disclosure was considered significant information that 
could affect the value of the shares. However, the CRSD accepted the appeal of the CEO and cancelled 
the decision of the CMA, referring to Article 50 of the CML, which requires (for violation) that the 
person should have prior knowledge, or that he expects the addressee to trade in securities based on 
that information; this was not the case with the addressee.  
Therefore, the Articles above do not apply; this means that there must be some benefit from such 
disclosure for the addressee (in this case, the Reuters employee), who shall make material use of that 
information, which did not happen here. On the other hand, Article 45 stipulates that the prohibition to 
disclose such information only applies to the issuer of the shares, and based on this, the text does not 
apply to the CEO. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion, the court’s decision was wrong, as the decision was made on certain 
provisions that did not consider other wider provisions. The CML and Implementing Regulations 
complement each other, and are designed to protect the market and its investors, and to impose order. 
The decision of the CMA against the CEO was the correct one because he was the person who 
disclosed the information; therefore it is unfair to burden the company and its shareholders with the 
mistakes of others. In accordance with Article 4(1/ b) concerning market conduct, the CEO is 
considered a person familiar with the company’s business, and the information that he announced at 
the press meeting was not a conclusion or expectation but a confirmed fact that he had obtained by 
virtue of his position within the company.  Therefore, the CEO must have been fully aware of the 
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confidentiality and sensitivity of the information that he had disclosed, and in full knowledge that any 
such information could affect the share price, as he is the company’s representative. 
Regarding the necessity for gaining benefit from disclosure of the information, this is an invalid 
criterion. Article 59/A indicates that gaining benefit getting a fruit (or not) is not a condition for the 
violation. In the above case, the Commission also did not explain how it had concluded that the 
addressee had not gained any advantage from the confidential company information, and depended on 
this in finding that there had been no violation. It is clear from the above that this decision is a 
deviation from the goal set by the regulator, and it will contribute to an increase in the number of 
offences committed in the market. Furthermore, it opens the door for the corporate administrators of 
JSCs not to commit themselves to the legal provisions that prohibit them from disclosing confidential 
company information to the public before providing it to the CMA. 
Observers of the Saudi Stock Market can see that the number of cases in which the CMA awards 
punishments regarding insider trading is very small when compared with the frequent penalties meted 
out to companies and individuals for other violations. This may be because insider trading is a highly 
sensitive issue, and also due to the difficulties surrounding investigating and prosecuting such financial 
crimes, in terms of obtaining proof, whereas it is much simpler for the CMA to monitor violations of a 
company that do not include the names of members of the Nominations Committee in their annual 
report for example.  Another reason may be the power and influence of large investors who exercise 
such operations, or due to lack of experience in the detection of such crimes. So far, the CMA has 
announced only three cases that have been discovered against members of a company’s board of 
directors; however, in all cases no precise details other than the name of the accused and the 
punishment (being fines) were given. It is however not reasonable that only those three cases exist. 
Unfortunately, to date, no academic studies have been conducted on the subject of insider trading in 
the Saudi market. 
 
The small number of cases that have been brought to court for insider trading may be due to a number 
of reasons, such as the Saudi market still being in its start-up phase; it is an emerging market, which 
still has weaknesses in the legal and financial foundations for dealing in such subjects.
358
 Therefore, 
greater attention must be paid to the risks of insider trading, such as enhanced disclosure and 
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transparency, and improvements to corporate governance rules. Other possible reasons include 
weakness in the application of the financial or legal regulations in the financial market, and, perhaps 
the most important, the lack of firm application of the existing laws. Concerning this point, Gugler 
states that one of the main advantages of strongly implementing legislation in capital markets is to 
secure the benefits of large numbers of investors, especially minority shareholders; it also acts as an 
effective monitoring mechanism on corporations and their directors’ actions and, at the same time, 
prevents manipulators from taking illegal benefits.
359
  
In general, it can be said that the development of the Saudi Stock Market is similar to that of many 
modern financial markets, which are also still face considerable difficulties. These difficulties can be 
summarized as: self-interest before company interest, where managers in JSCs focus on their own 
special interests at the expense of the company and other shareholders. This impacts negatively on the 
minority shareholders; here, they become the weakest party in the company, and the board of directors 
becomes the controller of company affairs. This contributes to the majority shareholders playing a 
bigger role in the financial market due to their strong links with the management of the company, the 
ease in accessing essential information before other shareholders, and the ability to exploit such 
information for personal gain.
360
 This is known as “crony capitalism” and, sadly, exists in abundance 
in emerging markets
361.  
This can be seen in the listed companies in KSA, which have larger single family shares in the capital 
of the company; these quotas are normally divided between themselves, affording them a strong 
influence on decision-making, particularly in the company’s board of directors. A recent study shows 
that more than 62% of directors and managers of JSCs have used insider information for their own 
benefit, demonstrating an important gap between the law and actual practice; furthermore, they 
generally fail to avoid conflict of interest situations.
362
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4.3.2.1.5  In the final restriction, the CMA has the power to suspend the right of a shareholder to trade 
shares in certain cases, as stipulated by the law of the CML. Article 59 of the CML states that if the 
CMA finds that a shareholder has participated, is participating, or has engaged in actions or practices 
that are considered violations of any provision of this law, or the Implementing Regulations, then the 
CMA is entitled to bring an action against the person concerned before the CRSD to adopt a resolution 
of appropriate punishment. This was confirmed by the judgement of the ACRSC against a shareholder 
who violated the provisions of Article 49 of the CML while shares were being traded during the period 
from 1/7/2007 to 12/9/2007. The shareholder was subsequently sentenced as follows: the return of all 
payments made due to illegal trading; a fine; and a ban on trading in the shares of listed companies for 
three years from the date of judgement.
363
 
 
4.4 Shareholders’ Rights of Pre-emption to obtain New Shares  
Increasing the company’s capital is one means of financing available to it when facing particular 
economic circumstances;
364
 these include: for the purpose of capital expansion because of the increase 
in demand for the company’s products, or to address a financial crisis facing the company.  It is a 
fundamental right of shareholders to participate in this increase through what is known as the pre-
emption rights to subscribe to the capital increase.
365
 This is intended, “to protect shareholders from 
dilution, whereby shares are issued to favored investors at below market prices”.366 pre-emption rights 
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allow a shareholder to maintain a proportionate share of the ownership of a corporation when it issues 
new shares.
367
 
This right is considered one of the financial rights related to shares; here, shareholders are given 
priority to prevent outsiders from entering the company, which could reduce their influence within the 
company; however, this right does not extend to giving the shareholder in the JSC the right to purchase 
the shares of shareholders who wish to leave the company, as in the case of closed JSCs or a limited 
private company. 
The Saudi system grants the shareholders the right to obtain new shares amounting to as much as their 
share in the company’s capital during a limited period. SCL 1965 mentions this right in Article 919, 
thereby affording existing shareholders an advantage of subscription over outsiders.
368
 Therefore, SCL 
1965 gives shareholders a pre-emption rights are order to protect against share dilution and 
expropriation through capital increases.
369 This does not mean that the shareholder is obliged to accept; 
he is fully free to reject or accept the purchase of some part of the new capital. However, shareholders 
can be waived by the government in the case of companies under state ownership, and the company’s 
articles.
370
 
 
The company informs the shareholders about new shares and the decision to increase the capital (and 
conditions of subscription) by publication in a daily newspaper; however, SCL 1965 states that it is 
enough to notify shareholders via registered letters if all the shares of the company are nominal.  Each 
shareholder has the option to use his right of pre-emption; he/she must notify the company in a written 
letter within fifteen days from the date of publication or notification referred to in the preceding 
paragraph. Subscription to the new shares must only be as much as his proportion in the capital.
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SCL 1965 has a set of conditions to be met by the shareholder for them to be entitled to exercise this 
right; the shareholder must be registered in the company records on the day of the EGM
372
 that made 
the decision to issue new shares. In general, the shareholder has the right to request more than his share 
if there are any shares left without subscription on condition that the number of new shares shall not 
exceed the number requested in the first instance. If other shares are unsold, they will be offered for 
public subscription.
373
 
 
Article 136 of SCL 1965 raises a very important issue, which is that the board of directors has the right 
to place restrictions on the rights of pre-emption; the board of the company, which often holds the 
majority of the shares and has significant influence on the decisions inside the GM, can cancel this 
right or restrict it at will through a resolution approved by GM. Moreover, this article does not clarify 
when the board of directors is entitled to do so; they may seek so to do in order to secure the interests 
of the company through converting the allocation of shares to the creditors of the company in order to 
convert debt into equity, or through allocating a certain percentage of new shares, such as 30%, to the 
employees in the company.
374
 
 
It is the duty of the Saudi legislature to compel the board of directors and auditors to submit a report on 
the reasons and rationale for waiving the right of pre-emption of new shares; i.e. there must be 
acceptable reasons, such as protecting the interests of the company and its shareholders. Indirectly, this 
article gives the board of the company the right to issue new shares to non-shareholders, who may or 
may not be in a relationship with the board, in order to shift the balance of voting power within the 
company. The above article does not commit the company directors (upon the issuance of any 
restrictions on the right of pre-emption) to assert that they are acting in the interests of the company 
and not for personal purposes/interests. 
It is true that SCL 1965 gives the shareholder the right of pre-emption, but this right is need reform, 
obviously, it is controlled by the board of directors, and consequently the board has the right to 
approve or cancel it. Actually, there is a defect in the above article where the Saudi legislature should 
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have been more explicit in stating the rights of shareholders, and should not have added any legal 
subsidiary paragraphs that may allow cancelling, or contradicting the right referred to.  
Rights of pre-emption under CA 2006 in the UK are more detailed and more accurate than in the 
current law in KSA; such provisions should be utilized in KSA to improve shareholders’ rights 
regarding in this issue. However, in the UK, the pre-emption rights can arise from the provision of CA 
2006,
375
 or from the company’s articles,376 or from a shareholders’ agreement.377 A company must not 
allot shares to a person on any terms unless it has made an offer to each existing shareholder to allot to 
him on the same or more favourable terms a proportion of those shares.
378
 The offer must be in writing 
and the company must allow at least 21 days for the shareholder to take up the offer.379 The pre-
emption rights does not apply in relation to the allotment of bonus shares;
380
 also, it does not apply to a 
particular allotment of shares if these are, or are to be, wholly or partly paid up otherwise than in 
cash
381.  Furthermore, it does not apply to the allotment of shares that would, apart from any 
renunciation or assignment of the right to their allotment, be held under an employees’ share 
scheme.
382
 
The following question arises: if the company does not offer any new shares to existing shareholders, 
what is the legal status? In SCL 1965, there is no article dealing with this matter, and therefore, the 
shareholders may not be able to do anything with regard to not being notified, or being prevented from 
exercising that right. It is the same case when the company invites certain class of shareholders and not 
all of them. This explains the reluctance of many shareholders for not using the right of pre-emption in 
the purchase of new shares. This was indicated in a study conducted by the CMA on a number of listed 
companies that had increased their capital in the last two years; the CMA concluded that more than 
76% of the total shareholders did not exercise their legal right to subscribe to the capital increase. This 
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was for various reasons; the CMA mentioned the first reason as being the lack of information about the 
increase in capital available to shareholders in the company; the communication between them and 
their company is insufficiently effective; the second reason is the lack of money immediately available 
to the shareholder; and the third main reason is the lack of justification for the decision for a capital 
increase.
383
 
In the contrast, in the UK, the company and every officer of it who knowingly authorized or permitted 
such a capital increase that was in contravention with the regulations are jointly liable to compensate 
any person to whom an offer should have been made, in accordance with the provisions for any loss, 
damage, costs or expenses that the person has sustained or incurred by reason of the contravention.
384
 
The minority shareholders can bring a claim on the ground of ‘unequal treatment’.385 However, no 
proceedings to recover any such loss, damage, costs or expenses shall be commenced after the 
expiration of two years from the delivery to the registrar of companies of the return of allotment, or 
where equity securities other than shares are granted, from the date of the grant.
386
 
Undoubtedly, the eligible shareholders who do not subscribe to the new shares will be liable to a low 
percentage of total values of the shares they own. In order to resolve this problem, the CMA has 
recently developed a new mechanism for the inclusion of priority rights from the beginning of 2013, 
and it gives the shareholder the right to sell his right to an IPO to a third party, where those eligible 
shareholders who do not participate in whole or in part in the IPO are compensated for priority rights 
by granting them a compensation, if any, that is calculated by a specific mechanism. 
If the sale price of unsubscribed shares were higher than the IPO price, the difference (if any), shall be 
distributed after deducting the amounts and expenses of the IPO, as a compensation for the owners of 
priority rights who do not exercise their right to either subscribe or sell rights as the ratio of what they 
own; the issuance bulletin will determine the period of subscribing to the shares that have not been 
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subscribed for, and the period of allocation of shares to subscribers, as well as the date of transferring 
the amounts of compensation
387.  
 
Undoubtedly, the CMA new mechanism involves a number of goals, and it could be said that the most 
notable include the following: 
 
1. Protecting the investor through compensating him/her for the decline in the value of their shares as a 
result of the amendment of the share price after the approval of the EGM on the capital increase. This 
compensation is made through the deposit of priority rights as securities in the portfolios of investors 
enrolled in the company’s records at the end of the day of the extraordinary GM, as the value of the 
rights of priority deposited directly into the accounts of shareholders after the EGM will be equivalent 
to the decline in the value of their shares. 
 
2. Increasing flexibility to the investor by giving him/her a greater number of options for the use of 
priority rights. Through the new mechanism, the investor will have choice to sell the full rights of 
priority accorded to him, or full subscription of these rights, or to sell part of them and obtain the 
necessary liquidity to subscribe to the other part. 
 
3. Protecting priority rights holders who do not exercise their right to subscribe by introducing the 
remaining shares after the end of the trading of rights and subscription periods; the IPO returns will be 
distributed after deducting the amounts and expenses of subscription to the remaining holders of 
priority rights according to the ratio of rights they own.  
  
4.5 Protection of the Shareholder during Shares Trading                                            
When considering the advantages of JSCs, the key one is that their shares are transferable; the 
shareholders are free to purchase and sell the shares of the listed companies at a time that they deem 
most appropriate to them and that meets their aim. The process of buying and selling usually proceeds 
easily and quickly. In order to keep the financial market free from untoward practices and behaviours, 
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which would affect generally the shareholders and the country’s economy, the Saudi legislature has 
put forth a set of new provisions relating to the capital market through the CMA.
388
 This was following 
the heavy losses suffered by shareholders in the capital market in 2006, which were estimated at about 
$ 500 billion,
389
 and were an attempt to fill the gaps in the provisions within SLC1965.  
For example, the shareholder has the right to obtain information from the company within an 
appropriate time, and the right to obtain information and data on the performance of the company, as 
well as the right to complain to the competent administrative bodies.
390
 In addition, listed companies 
must disclose all primary actions before the end of their fiscal year, as well as announcing or declaring 
immediately any significant matters or events that may affect the position of the company.
391
 In this 
context, CAM imposed a fine against the SAMBA Group when it announced its annual financial 
statements before 23 days of convening its AGM
392
; it must declare not less than 25 days before the 
date of convening the AGM.
393
 
 
Article 49 of the CML provides, “a. Any person shall be considered in violation of this Law if he 
intentionally does any act or engages in any action which creates a false or misleading impression as to 
the market, the prices or the value of any Security for the purpose of creating that impression or 
thereby inducing third parties to buy, sell or subscribe for such Security or to refrain from doing so or 
to induce them to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by such Security”. This 
refers to any acts or practices that involve manipulation or that are misleading (known as market 
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manipulation). Here, the offence is usually due to speculators who aim to gain by harming others 
through manipulation, conducted by themselves or in participation with others, or by fabricating 
rumours and promoting recommendations without the correct reliable information; all are illegal. For 
instance, the Saudi legislature has detailed a set of behaviours that are considered crimes of market 
manipulation, including conducting fake trades, transactions that do not involve real change of 
ownership, making operations in order to give false or misleading impressions of the existence of 
trading activity in shares or interest in buying them, or for the purpose of forming false requests or 
offers of tradable shares.
394
 
In this respect, the CRSD sentenced a shareholder for violating Article 49 because he committed 
several offenses, including entering a series of orders to sell the shares of one company without any 
intention to implement them, and was obliged to pay the amounts he achieved from this manipulation, 
and a fine of 100 thousand SAR.
395
 Article 49 of the CML confirms that any person who participates 
intentionally, alone or with others, in any action creating false or misleading impressions on the market 
value of any shares, or induces others to purchase, sell or subscribe to those shares, or to refrain from 
that, or urges them to exercise the rights granted by such shares, or to refrain from exercising them, is 
violating the law. Thus, violation can be through practicing or refraining from doing the act; it may be 
negative or positive.
396
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Resolution No. 9/L/D/2005 Case No. 29/26 issued by the Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes (CRSD)   
396
 According to CML, Participation in manipulation has three forms: participation through agreement with the 
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As an application of the above, the CRSD issued three verdicts against three traders in the Tadawul, 
who had violated Article 49 of the financial market system and Article 3 of the Market Conduct 
Regulations
397
 while they were trading in the shares of a group of listed companies in the Tadawul. 
The verdicts prevented them from working in listed companies, and being a member of a board of 
directors for three years; the first trader was also fined 146,666 SAR, and the second one 17,172 SAR. 
The Saudi legislature also demands the disclosure of important information and data in any emergency 
circumstances. There is no doubt that non-disclosure of such data and information would constitute a 
hindrance to the performance of the shares market, and would provide a suitable climate for illegal 
practices; that is why various legislations have sought to oblige companies who trade in shares to 
disclose and notify the monitoring bodies with any relevant data and information on a regular 
periodical basis;
398
 however, if the legislature had not specified this, disclosure would have been  
subject to the discretion of the competent court, which usually means as soon as practically possible. 
 
The Saudi legislature stipulated in Article 46
399
 of the CML that JSCs must inform the CMA in writing 
when becoming aware of any substantial developments that may affect the prices of shares traded in 
the market; it is mandatory to inform the market of such developments. However, the capital law does 
not specify any particular manner in which the company shall report the existence of emergency 
circumstances. The goal of this disclosure is to inform shareholders and customers about the 
emergency circumstances facing the company, and to enable the monitoring bodies to extend their 
control over these exceptional cases and to investigate what they are and what their causes were.  
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These circumstances might be financial, such as a serious loss influencing the financial position of the 
company, or structural, such as the integration of the company with another company, or legal, such as 
amending the articles of association (substantial amendments or the entry or exit of a strategic investor 
from the company), or natural, such as a disaster that badly affects the company’s activities, causing 
heavy losses. In this respect, the Saudi Arabian Amiantit Company (Amiantit)
400
 was late in its 
announcement to the public about the signing of a contract pertaining to the sale of 50% of its share in 
Chong Koenig Poly Co. on 25/4/2008 to the tune of 169 million SAR, but did not announce it until 
3/5/2008.
401
 The CMA imposed a fine on the company amounting one hundred thousand SAR
402
 on the 
grounds that the act was a violation of the provisions of law, and represented damage to beneficiaries 
such as shareholders. 
In consideration of the Saudi experience, it is easy to determine what is meant by acts or practices that 
involve market manipulation, but the difficulty lies in application; more precisely, it is difficult to 
prove the occurrence of a violation before the courts. This is clear due to the lack of convictions 
against traders for committing violations of the CML and Implementing Regulations, despite the large 
number of suspected cases. From 2004 to 2006, the CMA referred to the Investigation Department
403
 
123 cases of violation, and analysed a further 203 investment cases. The CRSD issued 7 condemning 
verdicts, while the CMA issued 28 decisions for cases of violation of the CML and Implementing 
Regulations.
404
 It is worth mentioning that such verdicts take a long time; indeed, some exceed one 
year. It was intended that such cases be expedited immediately or within a short period of time in order 
to emphasize the integrity of the market and to deter others.  
4.6 Disposition of Non-Paid-up Shares 
Under Article 99 of SCL 1965, the legislature allowed purchasers to pay the value of their shares in 
instalments, and required that the shares be nominal until full payment of their value; the shareholder 
should pay the full value within the period agreed upon,
405
 and in the case of non-completion of 
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payment, the company’s board then has the right to ban the share or to sell it at auction after informing 
the shareholder. The company is entitled to priority in the reimbursement of its right, expenses and 
interests against all creditors, and any remaining amount is to be returned to the shareholder.
406
  
In this vein, the verdict of the Board of Grievances was that the plaintiff shareholder has right to 
recovery his shares and their dividends, i.e. those that have been sold by the defendant company, 
which must be sent to his correct registered address; the verdict is based on Article 110 of SCL 
1965
407
. 
However, if the sale of the share does not cover the debt, the company is entitled to require 
recompense from the shareholder’s property according to the general rules. The question that arises 
here is: is it possible to dispose of non-paid shares? In other words, is the shareholder entitled to sell 
the share whose value was partly paid in accordance with the Saudi system? If the answer is ‘yes’, who 
shall pay the rest of share’s value (the transferor or the transferee).  
There are not enough provisions under SCL 1965 to cover all the important points relating to this 
subject; the Saudi legislature has not regulated these issues, and has left answered many questions 
relating to many legal gaps in the company law. Such issues have been regulated in many Arab and 
western legislations; for example, the Egyptian system refers regulating this matter to the 
Implementing Regulations of its Company Law in Article 142.
408
 
Practically speaking, it is noted that such actions among shareholders are generally considered correct; 
thus, the buyer, the owner of the new share, becomes responsible before the company to pay the rest of 
share’s value. This matter is normal because the new owner of the share bought it at a value less than 
its true value if it were paid-up.  On the other hand, obliging the seller to pay the remaining funds of 
the share is illogical because his/her relation to the share was cut off once the share was sold and 
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registered in the records of the company, and the new shareholder replaced him, meaning that a new 
relationship arises between him and the company.
409
  
 
4.7 Shareholders' Right to Dividends 
A shareholder is entitled a set of rights once he subscribes to shares in a JSC, and they remain 
associated with them, and shall not be compromised.
410
 These rights are either financial or 
administrative. The most prominent of those rights may be the shareholder’s right to profit; thus, 
making a financial profit is one of the main reasons encouraging shareholders to participate in JSCs; 
they wait until the end of the financial year of the company to receive financial profits in return for the 
sums they invested in the company. Therefore, profit is a key factor in establishing commercial firms, 
especially JSCs. Accordingly, the right of shareholders to profit is always mentioned in the corporate 
laws and the company’s articles; consequently, it represents the most prominent right for shareholders 
in these companies, as a fundamental right that they shall not be deprived of or that shall not be limited 
by any conditions; even though there are some restrictions, they are just regulatory restrictions that do 
not prevent them from exercising their right to profit. 
 
SCL 1965 gives the shareholder a set of rights within JSCs, which are stipulated in Article 108; the 
shareholder’s right to obtain profit is first among these rights: “A shareholder shall be vested with all 
the rights attached to shares, specifically the rights to obtain equity in the company a share in the 
profits declared for distribution”. Article 7 of the SCGRs confirms this right and its importance. 
 
The company’s articles detail the percentage that must be distributed out of the net profits after setting 
aside the legal and conventional reserve, provided that the percentage mentioned shall not be less than 
5% of profits;
411
 if the percentage is not mentioned in the company’s articles, then the AGM shall 
determine it.
412
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The question that arises here is: what is the concept of net profit referred to by the Saudi legislature 
within SCL 1965? SCL 1965 does not define net profits accurately, as some comparative legislations 
do, such as the Egyptian law which stipulates in Article 40 that the net profits are “those realised from 
operations exercised by the company after deduction of all expenses needed for their realisation, and 
after accounting for all consumptions and allocations, which the accountancy rules impose and putting 
them aside before proceeding on any distribution in whatever way”. Consequently, the shareholders 
can expect their profits at the end of the year, and one can know what is considered a net profit (or not) 
through this definition. Thus, net profits distributable to shareholders represent the difference between 
the company’s assets after excluding deductions regulated by the law and the articles of association. 
On the other hand, to say that there are profits made by the company and available for distribution 
does not necessarily mean they must be in the form of cash; logically, they can be profits in kind. The 
state of having cash is not even required in the profits, and could be in any other form, such as in 
shares, which would then be distributed to shareholders, after verifying the activities for the previous 
fiscal year.
413
  
 
4.7.1 When Does the Shareholder own the Dividend? 
 
Law academics are unanimous that the right of shareholders to the company’s profits is a probabilistic 
right, and the shareholder, here, is essentially the owner of a probabilistic right as a partner, because 
the profit is uncertain. At the end of each fiscal year, after doing the annual inventory and budget 
preparation, and calculating profit and loss, the final outcome of the company’s business is determined 
(whether it has made profits or losses).
414
 If it makes profits, they must be distributed to shareholders 
after making the deductions stipulated in the law or in the company’s articles, such as expenses and 
satisfying the statutory reserve or contractual reserve as well as other reserves; the proportion of the 
profits that are to be distributed to the shareholders is determined by the GM upon the suggestion of 
the company’s board. Clearly, the resolution to distribute dividends to shareholders does not create a 
right for shareholders to the profits, but a revealing of this right; this resolution makes this right certain 
after being probabilistic, and so this right exists as long as the company has achieved profits (whether 
or not announced), and the power to declare dividends is granted exclusively to the board (no 
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shareholder approval is required).
415
 
 
Article 127 of the SCL 1965 stipulates that a shareholders deserves their share of the profits from the 
date of issuance of the GM’s decision on distribution. Consequently, this date marks the adoption of 
the shareholder’s right to profit, and then the company owes him as much as his portion of the capital; 
the shareholder, here, becomes a creditor of the company, and may follow all legal means to claim the 
right to profit if the company delays payment contrary to any agreement. 
 
The profit may become a loan with interest to the company if not distributed within the period 
stipulated by the law or as provided for in the articles of association; if the profit is not distributed 
within that period, it turns into a loan with interest, i.e. the company owes the shareholder.
416
 If the 
liquidation of the company is announced before any distributions/dividends have been done, then the 
shareholder can claim his share of the profit together with the company’s creditors; here, he is as a 
creditor, not a shareholder.
417
 Each shareholder has the right to capture profits immediately as soon as 
the decision is taken at the GM to distribute dividends to shareholders. 
However, the important question raised here is: when shall a company distribute the announced 
profits? Unfortunately, in SCL 1965 there is no clear mechanism for scheduling the dates for 
distributing profits to shareholders, or for when a company must publicize that there are profits to be 
distributed to shareholders; it leaves this matter to the board of directors, which has complete freedom 
in determining the appropriate time for the distribution of profits. Due to this lack, the board of 
directors has the right to postpone the payment of dividends to shareholders until a time of their 
choosing.
418
  
 
The second paragraph of Article 127 stipulates, “2- A shareholder shall be entitled to his shares in the 
profits (i.e. dividends) as soon as the general meeting adopts a resolution on the allocation (of profit)”. 
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On this point, the Saudi legislature needs to be more accurate and clear, and bind the board of directors 
to pay shareholders their dividends within a certain period from the date of the declaration of dividend 
distribution by the GM, in order to protect shareholders from fraud on the part of the board of 
directors. A good example for solving this problem is in Egyptian Companies Law, which provides in 
Article 44 (2), “the administrative board should precede to the execution of the decision of the general 
assembly for distribution of profits to shareholders and workers, within one month at most from the 
date of issue of the decision”.  
As an historical example that illustrates the seriousness of this point, the directors of board of 
Sipchem
419
 announced on 20/07/2008 that they would start distributing dividends to shareholders for 
the year 2007, amounting to 10% of the profits, and that the legitimacy of the dividends should be for 
each shareholder already registered in the official company registers on 7/5/2008. In fact, the timing of 
the declaration came as a surprise to investors in general and the company’s shareholders in particular, 
because the recommendation was for distribution after about six months from the end of fiscal year 
2007,
420
 and the date of the GM to approve these distributions was after about seven months from the 
end of the fiscal year; the strange aspect was that the company had held its AGM only about four 
months before the date of that second GM (specifically on 15 March 2008), without including in the 
agenda at that time a recommendation for any cash dividends. This means that the shareholders had no 
knowledge of and no intention to recommend any dividends for the fiscal year 2007; then, the board of 
directors, after only about three months, suddenly recommended cash dividends, and called for a 
second GM to approve this recommendation. 
Here, we must wonder: why were these cash distributions not recommended along with the call for, 
and in the agenda of, the AGM? Why were the shareholders subject to such a delay by the company in 
releasing their cash dividends? What is the status of those shareholders who sold their shares on the 
basis that the company had no intention of granting dividends (based on the AGM agenda)? Who is 
responsible for these? Then, how can we prevent what happened from happening again? All these 
questions need to be answered clearly in order to protect shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders; it is not fair that the board of directors can schedule the distribution of dividends in order 
to achieve its own interests and not for the sake of the company’s interests. 
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In the UK, statutory rules for distribution are detailed and set out in Sections 829 to 853 of CA 2006, 
and in the company’s articles. Distribution is defined as “every description of distribution of a 
company's assets to its members, whether in cash or otherwise”.421 A company cannot pay its 
shareholders out of its capital; it should have profits available to distribute dividends,
422
 which are 
often referred to as distributable profits or distributable reserves.
423
 The company’s articles of 
association describe the method for paying the dividends to its shareholders, according to their portion 
held in the company. 
 
Article 830 of CA 2006 illustrates the basic rule, which is that a company’s profits available for 
distribution are its “accumulated, realised profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or 
capitalisation, less its accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously written off in a reduction or 
reorganisation of capital duly made”. The directors of a company must prepare a directors’ report for 
each fiscal year of the company.
424
 The report must state the amount (if any) that the directors 
recommend should be paid by way of dividend.
425
 The company may by ordinary resolution declare 
dividends, and the dividend must not be declared unless the directors have made a recommendation as 
to its amount; such a dividend must not exceed the amount recommended by the board of directors.
426
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4.7.2 Company Policy in the Distribution of Dividends 
 
JSCs follow various policies in the way they distribute profits at the end of each fiscal year; these vary 
from one company to another, and a company may decide to deport part of the profits and distribute 
the rest, or deport all the profits to a future year; it may decide to exploit optional reserves to cover 
specific targets. Nevertheless, there is a common policy pursued by companies provided by law on 
how to distribute profits, if not provided for in the articles of association.
427
 
 
A specified percentage of the net profits of the company are deducted each year; this amount is taken 
as reserve in order to maintain the financial status of the company against losses or unexpected 
expenses, or probable future losses. Therefore, it is considered as a collateral financial guarantee for 
the company, to be used when needed; in general, company reserves are only taken only from the net 
profits realized by the company.
428
 
 
Shareholder dividends shall be only from net profits; the company’s bylaws detail the percentage that 
must be distributed to shareholders after deducting reserves. SCL 1965 requires that dividends shall 
not be less than 5% of the profits.
429
 The distribution of dividends to shareholders is not conditioned on 
achieving profits during the fiscal year; the company can distribute dividends to shareholders even 
though it does not achieve profits through cutting off part of the reserves to be distributed among the 
shareholders as profits. However, there are reserves that the GM is not entitled to decide to take profits 
from; for example, the statutory reserve of the company, which is complementary to the capital,
430
 and 
its goal is to protect the company against risks it may encounter in the future; it is a guarantee for the 
company’s creditors.431 
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As described earlier, if the company has not made net profits during the fiscal year and deducts part of 
the reserves to be distributed as dividends to shareholders, then the company must declare this and 
explain the source of the dividends, in order not to give an impression contrary to the truthful financial 
status of the company. To do otherwise would be to give inaccurate information to shareholders and 
others about the company, and to claim that it had made profits, while the truth would be that those 
profits are actually from taken the company’s reserves.432 If the company fails in the declaration of the 
source of those dividends, the GM resolution for distributing dividends to shareholders shall be null 
and revocable; moreover, the board of directors shall be subject to legal questioning on the basis that 
such an action falls within its duties.  
No doubt, such an act by the board would be considered as misleading the shareholders, and would 
create an impression for others that the company was achieving profits; this would be contrary to the 
truth. 
In brief, we can say that such a disclosure of any deductibles from reserves is a basic guarantee for the 
shareholders of the company; it is the right of every shareholder to know the status and financial 
position of the company, and to find that there is a match between what exists in the financial lists of 
the company and its financial position. That is why such disclosure reveals the factual financial status 
of the company to shareholders and others, and acts as confirmation that the company is committed to 
pursuing a policy based on truthful disclosure and transparency. 
 
Disclosure will also reveal the company’s management policy in terms of the shareholders’ money is 
managed in the company; this forces the board to perform its duties with diligence. In addition, it 
enhances the status of shareholders by increasing their oversight over the company’s performance and 
their ability to monitor its activities. In spite of the importance of this issue, SCL 1965 fails to identify 
such a guarantee, to oblige the company’s board to disclose it acting immediately. 
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4.7.3 Distribution of Dividends under SCL 1965 
 
When JSCs achieve profits, this does not mean that shareholders are entitled to the full profit realized; 
there are restrictions on those profits, mentioned in the company’s bylaws or in the articles of 
association. The first deduction from the annual profits is the 10% for the statutory reserves;
433
 after 
that, not less than 5% (or more, as provided for in the company’s bylaws) shall be distributed to 
shareholders as dividends; also, company may deduct for contractual reserve if mentioned in the 
company’s bylaws. In addition, a ratio of not more than 10% of the net profits will be deducted for 
founders’ shares;434 as well as allocating a ratio of these earnings (not more than 10%) as rewards to 
members of the board of directors,
435
 and if an amount remained as surplus from the net profits, it shall 
be distributed again to the shareholders as additional quotas. 
 
In any case, it should be noted that profits cannot be distributed to shareholders before the company 
fulfils its obligations in a timely manner. If the company distributes dividends before fulfilling all its 
obligations, the company’s creditors are entitled to sue the board of directors, and any such dividends 
are considered a sham; if the company profits are covered by the debts, then the shareholder has no 
right to claim that dividends.
436
 
 
According to SCL 1965, there are two types of financial reserves; the first is called the statutory 
reserve, which all JSCs are obliged to establish, and the other is called the contractual reserve, which is 
an optional one that might be stipulated in the articles of association. There is also the possibility for 
companies to form other reserves as needed. The obligatory statutory reserve is a ratio of net profits; 
most legislation oblige JSCs to build a statutory reserve but they differ in the percentage to be 
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deducted from profits for the reserve.
437
 Article 125 of SCL 1965 demands a deduction of 10% from 
the company’s annual net profits unless the company’s bylaws provide a higher rate. 
 
It can be argued that determining a percentage higher than 10% of the net profit for the statutory 
reserve would affect the shareholders’ right to earnings, and reduce their share of the profits, which 
may lead to reluctance on the part of individuals wishing to invest in such companies; an inordinately 
high percentage would make returns on investment inadequate and therefore not commercially 
feasible. In fact, a deduction of more than 10% is considered as prejudicial to minority shareholders, 
remembering also that there are other reserves that the company can make if it wishes to do so, as we 
shall see later. 
 
It is not possible to distribute any dividends to shareholders before making this deduction; that is why 
it is not allowed to distribute statutory reserve as dividends to shareholders. The reason behind that is 
that this reserve is treated as capital because it is used either to cover any shortfall in the capital 
resulting from losses suffered by the company, or to increase the capital should the AGM decide so.
438
 
 
It is important to mention that SCL 1965 does not specify when deductions for reserves shall be halted, 
i.e. if it reaches a certain percentage; however, it gives the AGM the right to halt a deduction for the 
statutory reserve if that reserve has reached half of the capital. Thus, there is no obligation on the 
company to halt making deductions in any way, and SCL 1965 should have stated a certain percentage 
whereupon the deduction for the statutory reserve must be halted; the Egyptian law stipulates such a 
limit, where Article 40 states that the percentage shall not exceed 50% of the capital.
439
 
 
The other reserve is contractual, and SCL 1965 allows the company’s articles to stipulate setting aside 
a certain percentage of the net profits to build this reserve. The company may decide not to exploit this 
reserve for any purposes other than those defined by the company’s articles (except through a GM 
resolution).
440
 If the company’s articles do not mention the company’s purpose for the reserve, then the 
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GM may decide to exploit it in a way that will benefit the company at the suggestion of the board of 
directors. The Saudi legislature does not determine the deduction percentage for this reserve, leaving it 
to the discretion of the company’s board; the Saudi legislature should stipulate a maximum for the 
deduction, as the Jordanian Companies Act does, which states a percentage of not more than 20% of 
the net profits of the fiscal year.
441
 
 
In addition, in Article 127 of SCL 1965, there is the so-called ‘optional’ or ‘free’ reserve; this type of 
reserve is not demanded by the law or the company’s articles, i.e. this reserve is made at the discretion 
of the company. Should a GM decide to build such a reserve, it must be for the benefit of the company 
as a whole, or to facilitate distributing fixed dividends to shareholders. 
 
SCC 1965 does not specify any particular maximum percentage for deductions from net profits, 
leaving this matter to the board of directors. Here, it is important for the Saudi legislature to intervene 
and to determine a certain percentage for the reserve because not identifying such a percentage gives 
an excuse for the board of directors to determine a percentage according to their wishes, which may 
leave no profits for shareholders at the end, or result in the distribution of dividends that do not meet 
their expectations.   
4.7.4 The Effect of the Company’s Reserves on the Shareholder’s Right to Dividends 
When the company makes profits at the end of its financial year, but then decides not to distribute 
those profits to shareholders on the basis that is for the good of the company (to fund expansion, for 
example), the shareholders may argue that this decision is against their interests because the purpose of 
investing in a company is to reap the profits. This raises an important question: how can the respective 
interests of the shareholders and the company be reconciled in the use of profits? A shareholder wishes 
to obtain a fair proportion of any profits generated; on the other hand, the company deducts part of the 
profits to build its reserves in order to be able to finance new projects and to invest in the future, or to 
protect itself from risk and maintain its financial position; this may necessitate creating new reserves. 
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Any expansion in the number of reserves should not be at the expense of the right of shareholders to 
profits. Deducting funds from profits for the statutory and contractual reserves does not represent a 
problem for shareholders because they are well informed of this. The problem starts when the 
company takes a certain percentage of annual profits to create other reserves for which the company 
has no particular need. It may create one to collect new funds in order to increase its capital, which 
may then be frozen; this is regarded as an assault on the interests of shareholders, whose financial 
returns will be reduced accordingly. Such an action should have legitimate justification; otherwise, the 
GM’s decision to create such a reserve is considered invalid. 
 
Nonetheless, the company’s shareholders may be affected by sacrificing part of their profits, although 
they may benefit in the long term.
442
 The company may decide to make new investments in order to 
expand and grow, and the company must have the necessary funds to assist in the completion of that 
goal; here, the company captures the annual profits (or part of them) to solve the problem of funding 
its business, and this type of funding is known as self-financing. This avoids the company having to 
engage in financing operations that might harm the company, such as borrowing from banks that 
impose commercial rates of interest, or interfering in company policy by converting a proportion of the 
loan into shares.  
Similarly, the company may increase its capital by issuing new shares but this may have negative 
consequences for the company; this would reduce the shareholder’s opportunity to obtain higher rates 
of profit due to the increase in the number of shareholders. On the other hand, this could lead to 
different policies being forwarded by the board of directors because the new shareholders may hold 
views that are contrary to those of the board. 
 
Therefore, self-financing is the solution best suited for a company when it wants to expand and grow; 
it maintains the independence of the company and averts the financial burden of borrowing from 
others. Significantly, company laws generally encourage companies to follow a policy of self-
financing, through the formation of obligatory reserves (with legal obligations), or optional ones in 
order to protect the company against risk and to maintain its independence at a time of crisis. Self-
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financing also helps to protect the creditors of the company, which provides the company with safety 
and stability; this will certainly be reflected positively in the reputation of the company before its 
investors and shareholders. 
 
On the other hand, any expansion in the policy of deducting funds from the profits to configure other 
reserves for the process of self-financing may have adverse effects on the financial rights of 
shareholders, and may lead to preventing them from receiving anything at all in some years; 
shareholders may receive minimal dividends, which could be seen as merely a reward for contributing 
to the company’s capital.443 Such small amounts paid to shareholders will reduce the value of the 
shares when traded, and this action by the company might force shareholders to sell their shares and 
search for companies offering better deals. Therefore, the company should not expand a reserve or 
create a new one for self-financing because the shareholder also has the right to obtain a fair share of 
the profits, and the company must not exceed its authority in forming reserves that are not fully 
justified. 
 
There should be a balance between the respective interests of the company and its shareholders; the 
interests of the company should not surpass those of the shareholders. Here, the board of directors 
plays an important role in the process of balancing the interest of the company against the interests of 
the shareholders in the use of annual profits; it is the directors’ duty to ensure that there is no conflict 
between the two parties when distributing profits, and to achieve the interests of both to the 
satisfaction of both.  
Generally, shareholders expect the company’s management to work on maximizing their funds and 
making them realize the maximum possible profits; the problem begins when the members of the 
board of directors are the owners of large quotas in the company, and thus tend to pursue the 
company’s (i.e. their own) interests at the expense of the shareholders’ interests. The members control 
the decisions of the GM and will defeat those voices in opposition to the composition of such reserves. 
So, the company’s decision to make deductions must be in the interests of the company, and must not 
affect the rights of minority shareholders to the profits. 
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4.8 The Right of the Shareholder to the Company’s Assets upon Liquidation 
As a general principle, shareholders are not entitled to claim their share as long as the company exists. 
Thus, if they wish to leave the company, they dispose of their share to other shareholders who then 
replace them. However, in the case of the company going into liquidation, the shareholders here have 
the right to claim the value of their shares as soon as the liquidation process is finished. 
The right of shareholders to the company’s assets after liquidation is one of their acquired rights, 
which cannot be waived without their personal consent; this is a basic right relating to share 
ownership.
444
 The right to preference in the distribution of the assets of the company may be granted to 
some of the shareholders (at the time of asset division) and not to others, such as to those who have 
shares with pre-emption (preferred shares, which give their owners priority in claiming their shares 
before the ordinary shares).
445
 
In general, shareholders have the right to recover their share after the liquidation as much as their 
proportion in the capital of the company. Liquidation is a completely separate process from that of 
dividing the assets of the company among its shareholders; the liquidator cannot divide the company’s 
assets before the liquidation of the company because it is contrary to the provisions of the law.
446
 
Therefore, liquidators are responsible for determining the share of each shareholder in the company’s 
assets, and for the distribution of the company’s remaining properties among the shareholders; in the 
Saudi system, this is an easy process because there are only two types of shares, ordinary shares and 
premium ones.
447
  
 
JSCs end for a number of reasons, as set out in SCL 1965; the consequences are great, the most 
important of which is the liquidation of company’s properties and distributing the company’s 
remaining properties to the shareholders after fulfilling the debts of the company’s creditors. The 
liquidation stage starts as soon as the JSC ceases to exist.
448
 In general, the liquidation of the company 
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is either voluntary (upon the decision of the EGM),
449
 or compulsory (upon the decision of the 
competent court).
450
 In the case of voluntary liquidation, the EGM, when taking its decision to 
liquidate the company, shall appoint a liquidator (or more); if it does not appoint a liquidator, then the 
GAFC shall appoint one and determine his fees.
451
 
Before dividing the company’s assets among the partners, certain procedures must be followed, such 
as appointing a liquidator to perform the operations necessary for determining the net funds, paying 
outstanding debts, and selling remaining assets to be converted into cash.
452
 Therefore, the liquidator 
shall pay the debts of the company if they are due, or keep the money if they are not due or are 
disputed; the debts arising from the liquidation itself have priority over other debts;
453
 fees, costs and 
related expenses, such as the liquidator's remuneration, shall be paid. 
 
The general rule here is that the shareholders have the right to demand their share of the divided 
properties as soon as the liquidation is approved and the debts of the company are paid. According to 
SCL 1965, the liquidator shall then distribute the value of the shares of the shareholders depending on 
their priority in the company’s capital, following settlement of all obligations relating to the company 
finances.  
Following the liquidation of the company, there are three possibilities. In the first, the liquidation 
outcome is equal to the sum of capital; this happens when the company did not achieve any profit or 
loss, and so there are no profits or losses for the partners. The second possibility is that the liquidation 
outcome is greater than the total sum of the partner’s shares; here, each shareholder takes his full share 
together with profits according to his share in the capital. The last possibility is that the remaining 
assets are less than the total sum of the partners’ shares; here, each shareholder takes his share 
incompletely. Of course, if nothing is left after the payment of expenses and debts mentioned above, 
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the partners do not take anything. If there is a surplus in the liquidation, it shall be distributed 
according to the provisions of the company’s articles; if the articles do not include provisions in this 
regard, the surplus shall be distributed to the partners according to their potions in the capital
454.  SCL 
1965 does not provide any further details on this point. 
4.9 Conclusion 
When people buy shares in a listed company, they directly join the company’s shareholders, and 
acquire a set of rights within the company. It can be said that the most important of these rights is the 
right to profit, which is the primary motivator encouraging shareholders to participate in the company; 
then, they become entitled to the right to participate in and to learn of the company affairs, and to 
make sure that their company is moving towards achieving their interests. Here, the shareholder is an 
owner of a portion in the capital, and bears any loss of the company, according to his share, and upon 
liquidation of the company, he may be reimbursed for the sum he had paid but only after other 
stakeholders. 
In fact, making profits for shareholders is not the only goal of listed companies; there are other goals. 
Companies have a web of contracts, where there are many stakeholders, and each has a certain goal, 
but as the topic of research is shareholders’ rights, we will focus only on those rights. The position of 
shareholders in listed companies differs from other stakeholders, as they have rights that other 
stakeholders do not. 
The financial rights of shareholders in a JSC, as we have seen, are many but the most important is the 
right to dividends when the company achieves annual profits, to be distributed to shareholders after 
deducting any monies due as stipulated by law or the company’s articles; however, SCL 1965 does not 
define the term annual profits in spite of its importance. 
As referred to in SCL 1965 Article 127, the shareholder is entitled to his share of the profits as soon as 
the GM has decided to make a distribution, but the question that arises here is: in what timeframe 
should those profits be sent to their owners, or is this matter left to the board of directors to determine? 
This is regarded as serious legislative lack; the board of directors should not be given the power to 
determine the date for the distribution of profits. This is a matter that should be specified by law, and 
in the case of any delay in the payment of quotas, the board of directors shall be punished. 
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As for the company’s financial reserves, the law allows the board of directors in JSCs to create 
optional reserves at any time. In this chapter we also discussed the types of reserves and their 
importance in terms of company financing, as well as in terms of the company’s ability to defend itself 
against future challenges. Certainly, creating new reserves exposes the stakeholders’ interests to risk, 
as there is the possibility of the board of directors seeking to achieve their interests at the expense of 
other shareholders. It is the duty of the legislature to explain this issue in detail, in order to protect the 
weaker parties in the company. 
 
In addition, we discussed in this chapter another financial right, as stipulated in SCL 1965 for all 
shareholders enrolled in the company, which is the priority right to subscribe to shares before any third 
party, and to have any new shares offered to them before others. This right is stipulated in Article 136 
explicitly; unfortunately, in the same article, it also states that the company’s articles may provide that 
the shareholders could have this right waived or restricted. This means that the board of directors may 
issue new shares without offering them to the shareholders. SCL 1965 needs to be more accurate and 
precise in this matter in order not to prevent shareholders from having this right taken from them in 
any way unless the shareholder himself rejects the subscription.  
In conclusion, a JSC is considered as a legal person with its own property, but once it is dissolved, its 
properties are transferred to its stakeholders, including shareholders. The shareholders must not be 
deprived of their rights to the assets upon liquidation, and the company’s assets must be distributed 
according to priority, where the creditors take their share before other parties, and then the 
shareholders take theirs as much as their portion in the company’s capital. 
Having addressed the financial rights of shareholders, there are other fundamental rights beside these 
financial ones. They also enjoy important managerial rights, the purpose of are to monitor the 
company through the GM; further, they have the right to participate in the GM, and to know what is 
happening inside the company. All these and other related research topics will be discussed in the next 
chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Shareholders’ Rights in General Shareholders Meeting  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
JSCs are controlled by two main organs: the board of directors, and GM.
455
 The GM is considered the 
supreme authority of the company, its powers stem from the CL and from the constitution of the 
company; therefore, resolutions of the GM should be compatible with the provisions of CL and 
constitution of the company; otherwise, the resolutions shall be subject to being deemed null and void. 
The same applies to the board of directors, which is considered similar to the executive power of the 
state and has specific terms of reference; thus GM cannot interfere in the work of the board of directors 
and vice versa. 
 
 In this vein, these two organs depend entirely on each other working together to achieve the same 
objectives, and therefore, balance must be struck between them. Such balance is indicated in the 
definition of corporate governance by the Cadbury Committee: “Corporate Governance is the system 
by which companies are run. At the centre of the system is the board of directors whose actions are 
subject to law, regulations and the shareholders in a GM. The shareholders in turn are responsible for 
appointing the directors and the auditors and it is to them that the board reports on its stewardship at 
the AGM”.456 
 
In this context, the question as to whether the highest organ in the company is the GM or the board of 
directors must be addressed.  This has been reconciled by Gower, who stated, “there is no doubt that 
the shareholders are supposed to be the supreme organ in the company as they are supposed to raise 
the necessary capital of the company, they are involved in the initiation, formation and direction of 
policy and they have a duty or role to protect their investment in the company, and in such a situation, 
                                                          
455
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no doubt that shareholders constitute the governing force in the company and the law is emphatic on 
this where it says that the general meeting is the company, directors are subordinates”.457 
 
Accordingly, the GM and board of directors have a contractual relationship issued from the provisions 
of CL and company constitution. Greer L.J. in the case John Shaw & Son Ltd v. Shaw held, “A 
company is an entity distinct from its shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers may, 
according to its articles, be exercised by directors; certain other powers may be reserved for the 
shareholders in GM. If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can 
exercise these powers".
458
 
 
Therefore, the main functions of GM are that:
459
 The shareholders should know about the financial 
situation of the company, in addition to the serious resolutions taken by the company management; this 
is the first function. The second concerns the case when the board of directors need to make decisions 
outside of its capacity, it seeks the approval of the shareholders; the third function is to hold meetings 
for discussions between the shareholders and directors concerning the plans, policies, and performance 
of the company, whether these be in the past or the future.
460
 
 
Generally speaking, the GM is viewed as the parliament in a democratic state; all members of the 
company meet for issues of interest to the company. It has, for example, the right to make decisions, to 
monitor the performance of the company, manage the funds of the company and its interests, as well as 
the interests of shareholders in general (i.e. not the interests of a specific group of shareholders). GM 
consists of all its shareholders regardless of their number, or the number of shares they own.
461
  Thus, 
the GM debates topics and issues that of concern to the company and that require the approval of the 
shareholders; it then adopts resolutions on those issues.  Therefore, the presence of shareholders and 
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their active participation at the GM plays an important role in the company in terms of monitoring and 
controlling the company’s performance and managing its interests and the interests of the 
shareholders.
462
 
 
Thus shareholders in JSCs have significant rights at a GM, such as attending the meeting, voting on 
resolutions, objecting to them, asking questions of the board, etc.
463
 these may be done in person or by 
proxy.
464
  GMs are held in order to take resolutions that are in the interests of the company, and they 
can be held on a regular basis or occasionally.  Shareholder meetings vary but there are several 
particular types: the AGM, which takes place shortly after the end of the company’s fiscal year (but 
ordinary GM may be held whenever the need arises); class meetings, which are for certain groups of 
shareholders; and the EGM, which is arguably the most serious type of meeting, as it is held to 
consider important and pressing affairs in the life of the company.  The law requires a legal quorum for 
shareholder meetings to be held.  
 
However, most of the legislation gives shareholders the right to request a GM, as this is a 
precautionary measure against the failure, negligence or stubbornness of the board to invite 
shareholders to the GMs, more especially if serious developments or events arise, such as the loss of a 
large part of the company’s capital. It is believed that this procedure safeguards minority shareholders 
from the domination of the controlling shareholders of the company, and establishes a balance between 
the interests of the minority shareholders and those of the majority shareholders.
465
 
 
The managerial rights will be discussed in this chapter, more specifically in relation to the GM.  When 
shareholders own shares, they contribute to its capital; this, in turn, affords them a set of rights at the 
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GMs. Examples of such rights include the right to be called to attend the GM, which is considered the 
foremost right granted to shareholders (and shall be practised); another is that it is acceptable that 
shareholders can appoint a proxy to attend the GM if the latter is unable to attend in person. When the 
shareholders attend the GM, they can exercise a number of rights, such as the right to debate issues, 
vote, and enquire about any area or function of the company. Prior to discussing shareholders’ rights in 
meetings it is important to clarify a number of points, such as the different types of GM, the 
resolutions taken at GMs and their validity, the requirements of GMs, reasons why shareholders fail to 
attend GMs, and suggestions for increasing shareholder participation in GMs.  
 
5.2 General Meeting Procedures 
In accordance with SCL 1965, the call to convene a GM by the company’s board shall be through the 
publication of a notice in the Official Gazette and in a daily newspaper distributed within the head 
office of the company at least 25 days prior to the meeting.  Nevertheless, the notice of the meeting 
may be sent by registered mail to all shareholders who have nominative shares.
466
  It should be noted 
here that the SCGRs has demanded the JSCs make the announcement of the  GM be through the 
company's website, and the Tadawul website, in addition to two daily national newspapers 20 days 
prior to the meeting.
467
 All JSCs must consult with the GAFC regarding the wording of the 
announcement and the content of the agenda prior to publication.
468
 
 
However, today, most JSCs in KSA apply the provisions of the SCGRs and leave the mandatory 
provisions of SCL 1965; the reason for this is the ease of announcing the GM through the websites. 
Nevertheless, the CMA has to mitigate any discrepancy between the SCGRs and SCL 1965, such as 
the GM notice, where the SCMA states 20 days before the determined date but SCL 1965 states that 
this should be at least 25 days.  Furthermore, SCL 1965 is issued by the supreme legislative authority; 
thus, the CMA has to take this into account when exercising their regulatory powers.  It is clear that 
some form of coordination and cooperation should take place between the CMA and all relevant 
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bodies related to the JSCs prior to the preparation of any law or regulations for such companies. 
 
In general, the board of directors in JSCs generally propose or support a call to convene a GM,
469
 
whether requested by directors, shareholders or the auditor.  SCL 1965 states that when requesting a 
GM, the application shall be addressed to the board of directors
 
;
470
 therefore, shareholders are not 
allowed to initiate the GM by themselves.  In any case, SCL 1965 does not hold shareholders to 
account for requesting a GM; it is a matter for the company’s board of directors to judge the 
seriousness of the reasons for the request and respond accordingly. It should be noted here that the 
SCL 1965 does not include explicit provisions for many of the issues that may arise after the 
submission of the mentioned application.  Such issues include: What is the legal situation if the board 
of directors refuses the application?  Is it possible to appeal against the board’s refusal? Is the board’s 
rejection contrary to the provisions of the law and its responsibilities?  These questions, together with 
many others, need clear statutory definition to determine the procedure to be followed, thereby filling 
such legal gaps.  For example, Article 131 of SCL 1965 states that the auditor has a right to request a 
GM if he encounters any difficulty in performing his duties and has not received any assistance from 
the board of directors; here, the auditor is entitled to request a GM.  However, the article does not 
mention the authorized entity to which the auditor must apply to request the meeting.
471
 The fact 
remains that neither a shareholder nor the auditor is entitled to call for a GM by themselves in any way 
or make a request to the court.  
 
On the other hand, when requesting a GM, the SCL 1965 requires the request be addressed to the 
board of directors, which is the authorized body; thus, no other entity, such as the MOCI, the CMA or 
the courts can be approached to convene a GM.  Therefore, it is the duty of Saudi legislators to 
regulate this matter in order to protect minority shareholders from potential abuse by the board of 
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directors, should those minority shareholders request convening a GM, particularly where the board of 
directors is composed of the majority and holds the company’s capital.  
 
From the above, this study suggests expanding the opportunity of the right to request a GM, and that 
the SCL 1965 should provide clear guidelines regarding requesting a GM by a neutral body in order 
that the GM can proceed in spite of the board of directors refusal. Moreover, currently, there are no 
clear provisions in the current SCL 1965 nor in the CGRS that explain when the board has to call the 
GM if requested by the shareholders or the auditor; consequently, allowing a GM remains a matter of 
assessment by the board directors, as they have the right to approve or reject an application without 
giving a reason at present.  This is certainly a major statutory omission that requires urgent legislature 
in KSA.
472
 
 
According to the CA 2006 UK, when the board of directors
 
receives a request for a GM from 
shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital, it is the board’s duty to call the meeting.473  Any 
request should clarify the subject matter to be discussed at the meeting, and should provide the text on 
which a decision is to be taken at the meeting.
474
 
 
 Normally, a resolution may be passed at a meeting, but in some cases it may not; for example, in 
instances when it is contrary to the company’s constitution or other articles, or if it is deemed 
defamatory, or is considered to be spurious in content.
475
 Furthermore, the request should be 
documented and authenticated by the person/s that made it,
476
 and, it may be submitted in either an 
electronic or hard form. Calls for a GM shall be made by the directors within 21 days of the date they 
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receive the request; and the GM must be held within a maximum of 28 days from the date of the 
notice.
477
 
 
Moreover, if the directors have to call a meeting according to the Act, then shareholders have the right 
to call a GM at company’s expense, but if not, then the members who requested the meeting may call a 
GM.
478
  A meeting may be called by the court upon an order from those who have the right to attend 
and vote at the meeting, whether they be directors or shareholders.
479
  In Re El Sombrero Ltd, the court 
held: “Examine the circumstances of the particular case and answer the question whether, as a practical 
matter, the desired meeting of the company can be conducted, there being no doubt, of course, that it 
can be convened and held”.480 
 
Article 88 of the SCL 1965
481
 stipulates that the notice to attend the meetings must include an agenda, 
essentially a statement that includes the issues to be discussed by the shareholders at the meeting, as 
well as notification of the place and time of the meeting. In general, the board prepares the agenda, s 
that is the core of its duty; however, the shareholders who have the right to request a GM, also have the 
right to include issues in their requested meeting, as well as the auditor’s right to call a meeting to 
discuss certain issues.   
 
In general, topics that are not listed on the agenda (which is drawn up prior to the GM) are not allowed 
in the meeting in order to focus on the reasons for calling the meeting. Therefore, other issues cannot 
be raised to the board of directors or the auditor during the meeting, as they would not be adequately 
prepared to answer and because the shareholders may be distracted from the real issues on the agenda 
and the reason for the meeting.  
 
However, shareholders do have the right to deliberate on any serious issue that may arise during the 
meeting, or on matters that deviate from the main topics on the agenda. For example, while 
considering the report of the board of directors, the existence of serious faults made by an officer of 
the company, is discovered, the GM may take a decision to isolate him even if the issue of isolation 
was not listed in the agenda. Although no article in the SCL 1965 refers to this point; the GM has the 
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right to decide on a course of action, depending on the shareholders attending the meeting; whereas the 
SCGRs stipulates that the rights of shareholders that represent 5% or more of the company’s capital 
are allowed to add one or more subjects to the meeting’s agenda during its preparation but not during 
the actual meeting.
482
 However, it is not forbidden to raise an issue during the meeting as long as it is 
related to the agenda, on condition that it receives the approval of a given number of the shareholders 
attending the meeting and that own 5% of the capital
483
, (or a group of shareholders containing not less 
than 100 people).   
 
Every shareholder, according to French company law, may submit I any enquiry to the company’s 
board in writing, prior to the date of the GM; the text of the response then has to be read out during the 
meeting.
484
 This is supposed to be undertaken by the board according to the legislation.  
 
Prior to the GM, shareholders must register their names in the record that the company has prepared 
prior to the meeting date.
485
 The record contains the names of shareholders, the number of shares 
owned or represented, and the names of their original owners. The shareholder is then given an 
invitation to attend. This record must be available to anyone who wishes to see it in order to verify the 
validity of representation at the GM. This method should be updated to allow for developments in 
technology to enable the shareholders to register in the record by telephone or email; using such means 
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will help improve the relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders,
486
 and increase 
the shareholders’ value within the company.487  
 
In addition, essential information shall be included in the notice, such as the date, time, and place of 
the GM, as well as including the subject matter of the business to be considered, in accordance with 
the articles of the company.
488
 Furthermore, any notice shall clearly state that it is possible for 
company members to appoint a proxy to attend the meeting and to exercise some or all of their rights, 
such as speaking, asking questions and voting in the resolutions.
489
 Moreover, when drawing up a 
notice for an AGM, it must clearly state that the meeting is an AGM
490
.  
 
It is possible to inform shareholders of the notice of a GM in various ways; for example, as a hard 
copy form, electronic form or through the company website
491
.  However, if a resolution that is 
seeking approval is not listed on the agenda of the meeting, then it cannot be approved or validated. In 
this respect, Lord Cozens stated in Bailey v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Company Ltd: “I feel no 
difficulty in saying that special resolutions obtained by means of a notice which did not substantially 
put the shareholders in the position to know what they were voting about cannot be supported, and in 
so far as these special resolutions were passed on the faith and footing of such a notice the defendants 
cannot act upon them”.492 
 
In accordance with the CA 2006, shareholders who represent at least 5% of the total voting rights, or at 
least 100 members who hold shares on which an average sum of at least £100 per shareholder has been 
paid may require the company to give notice, of a resolution to be approved at a meeting, to 
shareholders who have the right to receive notice of a GM. The written notice can contain a maximum 
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of 1000 words concerning any relevant matter to be considered at that meeting; or any other subject 
matter shall be argued at that meeting;
493
 otherwise, the shareholder who requested the meeting must 
cover the expenses upon the request of the company and deposit the payment before the circulation the 
notice.
494
 In fact, the notice of the meeting should contain the following information: the website 
address, where anyone can find the necessary information about the meeting; a text stating that 
registered members only are entitled to vote at the meeting, the time of the meeting; information about 
the forms that can be used in case of appointing a proxy; a statement about the facility the company 
offers for members to vote in advance or by electronic means; and to mention the right of members to 
ask questions.
495
 
 
In addition, there is no article in SCL 1965 that explains who should chair the GM, it is subject to the 
company’s articles that identify the persons authorized to do so;496 therefore, the chairmanship of the 
meeting may be taken by chairman of the board of directors, his deputy, or whoever is assigned by the 
board of directors;
497
 in the event of the absence of those mentioned above, one of the shareholders 
will be appointed to act as chairman of the meeting. The function of the chairman is to conduct the 
meeting properly and fairly in accordance with the provisions of CL, the company's articles and in 
accordance with the interests of the company and its shareholders.
498
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Normally, the chairman nominates the secretary of the meeting and the screening committee, and any 
shareholder has the right to nominate him/herself as the secretary of the meeting or a member of the 
screening committee.
499
 Furthermore, SCL 1965 does not require the presence of the directors at the 
GM with the necessary quorum needed as a condition for convening its meeting; however, the CL in 
certain countries does require the presence of directors at meetings, or at least some of them, as they 
manage the company, and are required to answer the shareholders’ questions or those of other relevant 
persons such as the auditor or the representative of the MOCI.  
 
Article 60 of the Egyptian Company Act is a notable example that SCL 1965 can benefit from; it states 
that the company’s directors should be present at GMs in a number not less than the quorum needed to 
convene the board meeting. However, non-attendance at meetings for a valid reason is acceptable; and 
in any case, the meeting is not considered void if it is attended by at least three members of the board, 
on condition that the head of the board of directors, his deputy, or one of the members assigned to 
management, should attend the meeting, assuming all other conditions required by law have been met. 
If the quorum of the meeting of shareholders is legally correct, but the quorum of board of directors is 
not, in this case, GMs may consider punishing those directors who did not attend without an acceptable 
excuse, with a fine; and in the case of frequent absences, GMs may consider isolating them and 
electing others.
500
 
 
However, arguably SCL 1965 does not indicate the procedures to be followed in the matter of 
adjourning a GM or who has the right to decide to adjourn the meeting.  Therefore, this could lead to a 
situation in which the company’s board carries the resolution, thereby preventing absent shareholders 
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from taking part in making decisions, which will result in weakening the position of the minority 
shareholders in the company. 
 
In the UK, this point is very well detailed.  The chairman must adjourn the meeting when directed to 
do so by the meeting, or when the quorum does not collect within half an hour before the start of the 
meeting, or if at any time during a meeting a quorum ceases to be present.
501
  In addition, there are 
certain cases in which the chairman could postpone the meeting even when a quorum is available: 
members at the meeting accepting a postponement, or when the chairman decides to postpone the 
meeting due to some threat, e.g. should an unauthorized person attempt to attending; these measure are 
merely designed to ensure that the activities of the meeting proceed smoothly and properly.
502
 
 
The decision to postpone the meeting is invalid if the chairman does not take it in a bona fide manner, 
or if he/she takes into account irrelevant factors, or ignores relevant factors.  Such a decision should be 
acceptable to all parties.
503
  In Byng v London Life Association Ltd, the Court of Appeal found that 
overcrowding is no justification for the chairman adjourning the time and place of the meeting.
504
  In 
any case, the company must give at least 7 clear days’ notice if the adjourned meeting is to take place 
more than 14 days after it was adjourned; it must do so to the same attending shareholders and with the 
same information.
505
 
 
5.3 Kinds of Shareholders Meetings 
Under the SCL 1965, there are three main types of GM, and they are: AGM, EGM and Class Meeting 
(when the company has more than one shares class).
506
  SCL 1965 identifies the competence of each 
type, and states the procedures to be followed; these are mentioned in Articles 83 to 97.  GMs differ 
from each other in terms of the topic of the resolution to be discussed at the meeting; a quorum must 
be reached to hold the meeting and to issue such a decision.  
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However, EGMs are distinct from the others as it can discuss all matters that fall within the 
competence of a GM.
507
  Class meetings convene to discuss matters related to a particular class of 
shareholders, i.e. those who have a special type of share or bond in the company; such meetings are 
held for the approval or rejection of a resolution taken at a GM regarding alteration of their rights, and 
therefore, the resolution shall not be in enforced unless all relevant shareholders approve it.
508
  For 
example, if the company has preferred shares, it is not allowed to issue new shares with priority 
conferred without the approval of a special meeting composed of all shareholders who have preferred 
shares.
509
  
 
The powers of GMs are wide but a GM may be prevented by the provisions of law from considering 
certain issues that may affect the interests of the company or its shareholders; this prevention is 
designed to protect the company and its shareholders.  Examples of this are: no meeting is entitled to 
modify the purpose of the company for which the company was established, or to amend the 
nationality of the company, or to increase the financial obligations of a shareholder, and to ask him to 
pay additional sums.
510
  Article 85 of SCL 1965 stipulates, “the extraordinary general meeting shall be 
competent to alter the bylaws of the company except in respect of: 1- Alternation of nature to deprive a 
shareholder of his fundamental rights in his capacity as a members of the company, deprived from the 
provisions of these Law or from the bylaws of the company, which rights are set forth in Articles 107 
and 108.  2- Alternation of nature to increase the financial liabilities of shareholders.  3- Alternation of 
the object of the company.  4- Transferring to a foreign country the head office of a company 
incorporated in the Kingdom.  5- Changing the nationality of the company.”  
 
According to the above, a GM is prevented from making amendments to any company’s articles that 
may deprive the shareholder from his basic rights as a partner in the company, such as to prevent the 
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shareholder from attending the GMs, or to participate in voting on resolutions.  Also, a GM is not 
entitled to deprive the shareholder from his share in dividends, to reduce them, or to prevent 
shareholders from seeing the books or other company documents.  On the other hand, GMs cannot 
move the centre of the company from KSA to any foreign state; this is in order to protect the 
shareholders’ money.  In addition, GMs cannot prevent any shareholder from filing a lawsuit against 
the directors of board, or any one of its members.  Consequently, any resolution issued that conflicts 
with the above is considered void under the law, and thus unenforceable against third parties. 
 
Attending a GM is a right for all shareholders, without exception, and this is clearly stated in SCL 
1965: every shareholder who has 20 shares or more in a company has the right to attend and participate 
in the meeting and vote on resolutions.
511
  If the company’s articles include anything contrary to this, 
then it is considered void;
512
 however, it is the right of the company’s articles to state a rate of less than 
20 shares (but not more than twenty shares).  Also, everyone who has an interest has the right to attend 
meetings, such as the representative of the MOCI.
513   
 
It is believed that stipulating a condition prescribing a certain quorum needed to attend GMs does not 
mean compromising the basic rights of minority shareholders, the most important of which is the right 
to attend and vote.  Therefore, a shareholder who does not have 20 shares can associate with other 
shareholders in order to reach the required quorum for a GM.
514
  However, this view is impractical 
(indeed, almost impossible) because shareholders usually do not know each other beforehand, and 
there is no independent authority or association for taking care of shareholders’ rights in listed 
companies (as there is in some countries).  Thus, demanding such a quorum to attend is a prejudicial to 
the rights of minority shareholders, implicitly keeping them away from active participation within 
GMs. 
 
The board of directors must invite all shareholders to attend the GMs as well as the auditor and the 
representative of the MOCI; the invitation must include the agenda.
515
  The representative of the 
MOCI has the right to decide whether or not to attend the meeting; the company law of some 
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neighbouring countries, such as Jordan, state that a GM is invalid if it is not attended by a 
representative of the MOCI, in order to ensure the functioning of the GM procedures in accordance 
with the law and the company’s bylaws.516 
 
In the UK, resolutions must be passed at shareholder’s meetings.517  The AGM must be held in public 
companies every six months starting from its reference date; this is regardless of any meetings held 
during that period, and another meeting will call the GM.
518
  According to CA 2006, it is necessary 
that the notice calling an AGM be given at least 21 days beforehand or at least 14 days beforehand if 
issued in another GM.
519
  In can happen that the period of notice differs between what is stated in the 
Act and what is stipulated in the company’s articles,520 shorter or longer.  This is if the majority of 
shareholders (at least 95 per cent) who are entitled to attend and vote at the meeting agree;
521
 therefore, 
the GM can be convened after 14 days if the following conditions are met:
522
 the meeting is not an 
AGM, the shareholders are enabled by the company to vote by electronic means (accessible to all 
members who have shares and who carry the right to vote at a GM), the period of notice has been 
reduced to not less than 14 days, or a certain decision has been taken at the previous AGM (or at some 
GM held since that AGM). 
 
Ordinary resolutions and special resolutions are the two main types of resolution to be considered at a 
GM.  The first is used for conducting most types of business,
523
 and are passed by simple majority 
(needing more than half of the shareholders who have the right to attend and vote at the GM in person 
or by proxy).
524
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Special resolutions are used for effecting major changes;
525
 these are passed by a majority of not less 
than 75% of the shareholders (present in person or by proxy) at a GM.  The main purpose of these 
resolutions is to discuss more serious company affairs, such as the company’s articles,526 increasing or 
reducing the company’s capital,527 or changing the name of the company.528  The notice for the 
meeting should provide the text of the resolution, and clarify it as being special in order for it to be 
considered and passed as a special resolution.
529
  
 
Certain actions are required under SCL 1965: at the end of the meeting, the minutes shall be written 
down, containing the names of the shareholders (present or represented), the number of shares in 
possession (in person or agency), the number of decisions taken, the number of votes accepting or 
rejecting them, and a compendium of the discussions at the meeting as well as any matters asked for 
by shareholders.
530
  The minutes shall be written down on a regular basis after each meeting in a 
special record, signed by the chairman of the meeting, the secretary, and the collector of votes.
531
  
 
In the UK, every JSC is requested to keep minutes of GMs
532
 as well as minutes of the proceedings of 
directors’ meetings.533  The minutes of GM proceedings, if purporting to be signed by the chairman of 
that GM or the next GM, are evidence of the proceedings at the meeting.
534
  Such minutes must be 
kept for 10 years at least, and be available for inspection by any member of the company free of 
charge; they also have the right to order a copy for a nominal fee (otherwise, the company may be 
punished).
535
 Such provisions do not exist in SCL 1965, and thus the minority shareholders may not be 
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able to acquire a copy of the minutes from GMs or directors’ meeting, as this is not regulated under the 
CL. 
 
5.3.1 Annual General Meeting  
The AGM shall consider all matters relating to the company except those matters that are specific to an 
EGM, as provided for in SCL 1965 or the company’s bylaws.536  Examples of these competences, but 
not limited to, are: appointment of members of the board of directors; isolating them or some of them; 
the appointment of vacant positions;
537
 the AGM’s approval of the report of board of directors; 
calculating the budget and the profit and loss statements; assessing the auditor’s report; the 
appointment of auditors or isolating them;
538
 discussing the report of a liability lawsuit against the 
members of board of directors (or some of them);
539
 the issuance of bonds;
540
 permitting one member 
of the company’s board (for a renewable period of one year) to participate in the work of a competitor 
to the company, or trafficking in one of the branches of activity practiced by it;
541
 and permitting the 
board of directors to determine the loans that the company takes and their conditions.
542
 
 
In SCL 1965, the AGM is held at least once a year during the six months following the end of the 
financial year for the company, and it may be called for another meeting whenever the need arises. The 
company’s board has the right to call a GM to convene whenever the need arises; it has the discretion 
to request to convene meeting but there are some cases in which it becomes necessary under the law to 
call shareholder meeting, and these cases are: 
1 - If requested by shareholders representing at least 5% of the company’s capital; this right is 
one of the guarantees granted by the law for minority shareholders.
543
 
2 - If requested by the GAFC upon the request of a number of shareholders representing 2% of 
the capital at least, or upon the decision of the MOCI to call a GM if one month has passed 
after the date set for the meeting without it being called to convene.
544
 
3 - If the auditor requests the meeting to convene when he faces difficulty in the performance 
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of his work;
545
 if the board of directors does not respond, he shall be entitled to call a GM to 
convene directly.  At this point, SCL 1965 does not clarify how the auditor invites the 
shareholders to a GM, something that is regarded as a lack in the legislation and that requires 
reconsideration; the board of directors may not respond, and may even reject the call for a GM.  
4 - If the number of the members of the board of directors falls below the number stated by law.  
5 - If requested by a court after an inspection on the company (instigated by shareholders 
representing 5% of the capital of the company) unveils violations attributed to a director or the 
auditor.
546
 
 
The board must prepare for each fiscal year a budget for the company, a profit and loss account, a 
report on the activities of the company, its financial position, and the manner proposed for the 
distribution of net profits; this should be at least 60 days before the AGM.  The chairman of the board 
of directors shall sign all such documents, and they shall be deposited in the headquarters of the 
company at the disposal of the shareholders 25 days at least before the meeting.
547
 
 
As provided in Article 91 of SCL 1965, a GM is not considered legal unless attended by shareholders 
representing at least 50% of the capital, unless the company’s articles provides for a higher percentage; 
if there was no quorum at the first meeting, the call shall be made for a second meeting to be held 
within 30 days subsequent to the first meeting.  The announcement for this shall be in the same way 
provided for in SCL 1965, and the second meeting will be legal whatever the number of shares 
represented, and the resolutions of that GM are passed by an absolute majority of the shares 
represented at the meeting, unless the company’s articles provides a higher percentage.548 
 
In case of any board default vis-à-vis calling a meeting, the board will be found acting contrary to the 
law, and will then be subject to the penalties provided in SCL 1965;
549
 and as example, the commercial 
court issued a judicial resolution against one JSC that did not call for the AGM within six months 
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following the end of the fiscal year, and the court imposed a fine on the board of directors to be paid to 
the MOCI.
550
  
 
In order to fill the gaps in the statutory provisions that regulate the convening of a GM, it is suggested 
that the CMA be given the right to call meeting to bring the company to account
551
 if the board of 
directors have failed to call a GM within 15 days of any request made by shareholders who represent at 
least 5% of company’ capital, or made by the auditors.  In addition, the CMA should have the right to 
call a GM if such a meeting is not convened within 30 days of the date set.  Therefore, if the number of 
the board of directors falls below the number prescribed in the CL and if it does not call for a GM to 
consider this issue, and if the CMA thinks that at any time the company has acted contrary to the 
provisions of the law or the company's bylaws, or if the board has failed to protect the company and its 
interests, then a GM can be called. 
 
5.3.2 Extraordinary General Meeting 
An EGM has a broad range of powers; it can consider matters of great importance and gravity in the 
life of the company, and it is held at any time during the year, whenever the need arises.
552
  The 
purpose of calling an EGM is to modify the company’s articles, such as modifying the duration of the 
company (making it longer or dissolving it before the end of its duration); increasing or reducing its 
capital; merging with another company; and modifying the manner in which profits are distributed.  
Such meetings are held under certain and very particular conditions, which are more stringent than the 
requirements prescribed for a GM.  
 
The company’s board has the right to request an EGM at any time in accordance with the conditions 
provided in SCL 1965 and in the company’s bylaws;553 in addition, SCL 1965 gives the GAFC (at the 
request of a number of shareholders representing 2% of the capital at least, or upon a decision of the 
Minster of MOCI) the right to call an EGM if a period of one month has passed after the date set for a 
meeting without it being called.  
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It should be noted that the current version of SCL 1965 does not mention the right of the shareholders 
or auditor to request an EGM, which is regarded as a great failure in protecting the rights of the 
shareholders.  However, the SCGRs have attempted to mend this situation, giving such a right to the 
auditor and shareholders who own 5% of the capital of the company.
554
  Furthermore, the company 
board is not obliged to call an EGM because most of the SCGRs are for guidance only and are not 
compulsory, and the board may find pretext in that.  
 
It is important to highlight one essential point, which is that the board of directors is obliged to call an 
EGM if the company losses reach three-quarters of its capital.
555
  This measure is logical but needs 
modification; even if we assume that the company has lost half of its capital, according to the 
provision, there is no need to call an EGM.  It is accordingly suggested that the Saudi legislature adopt 
the phrase ‘significant losses’ rather than ‘three-quarters’ of the capital because losing such a 
proportion of the capital is considered serious and in need to being dealt with urgently; such losses 
touch everyone but the greatest impact will be on the minority shareholders.  
 
In this respect, under CA 2006 UK, the directors must call an EGM if the company faces a serious loss 
in capital; thus, if the net assets of the company fall to half (or less) of its called-up share capital, the 
meeting should be convened not later than 28 days from the earliest day on which that fact was known 
to a director, and not later than 56 days from that day.  Such a meeting shall consider the actions that 
should be taken to deal with the situation; the directors will be liable to a penalty if they fail to convene 
this meeting, as required by CA 2006.
556
       
 
The EGM is not considered legal unless attended by shareholders representing half of the capital at 
least; the company’s articles could provide a higher percentage.  If this quorum is not present at the 
first meeting, an invitation shall be made to a second meeting, to be held within thirty days following 
the previous meeting, under the same conditions stipulated for holding the first EGM; this second 
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meeting will be valid if attended by shareholders representing one quarter of the capital at least.
557
  
Saudi legislation has set this percentage in order to protect the company and shareholders due to the 
seriousness of the decisions that will be taken at the meeting. 
 
EGM resolutions are taken by two-thirds majority (of the shares represented at the meeting), and SCL 
1965 requires the consent of a majority not less than 75% of the shares represented at the meeting in 
the following cases:
558
 
1 - If the resolutions are concerned with increasing or reducing the company’s capital;  
2 - or are related to an extension of the term of the company; 
3 - or to the dissolution of the company before the expiry of the period specified in its bylaws; 
4 - or to a merger of the company with another company or firm. 
 
The reason behind requiring high quorum in an EGM is to prevent the normal majority from 
conducting such substantive amendments, i.e. amendments that may conflict with the interests of all 
shareholders in the company.  If an EGM issues a resolution to amend the company’s articles, the 
company must announce so in the Official Gazette in a daily national newspaper and in the main 
centre of the company; in order that the resolutions be legal, SCL 1965 require the company to register 
this in the Commercial Register,
559
 and at the CMA as well.
560
 
 
5.4 Invalidity the Resolutions at GMs  
It is worth mentioning that subscribing to or owning shares means that the shareholder accepts the 
company’s articles, and commits to the resolutions issued by the GMs, in accordance with the 
provisions of CL and the articles of association, whether he is present or absent, and whether he agrees 
to or rejects these resolutions.
561
 
 
SCL 1965 states that GM resolutions (issued within the limits set by law or by the company’s articles) 
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are obligatory for the board as well as the shareholders, regardless of whether or not they attend the 
meeting or agree with the decision.
562
   
 
Article 97 of SCL 1965 states, “1- Without prejudice to the rights of any bone fide third party, all 
resolutions adopted by the shareholders’ meeting contrary to the provisions of these Regulations or of 
the company’s bylaws shall be considered null and void.  2- The GAfC and any shareholder who has 
recorded his name in objection to the resolution in the minutes of the meeting or who was absent from 
the meeting for any acceptable reason, may request to invalidate a resolution.  3- Nevertheless, an 
action of invalidation (of a resolution) shall be barred after the lapse of one year from the date of such 
resolution.” 
 
SCL 1965 in Article 97 accords each shareholder in the company the right to request an invalidation of 
a resolutions if it is contrary to the provisions of the law or the company’s bylaws, provided that the 
shareholder attends the meeting when the resolution was issued and the objection is recorded in the 
minutes of the meeting; however, if he was absent from the meeting, he must have an acceptable 
excuse.  
 
It is argued that restricting the right to object to this condition represents a significant prejudice to 
minority shareholders.  If a GM resolutions has been issued through abuse of power, or is done craftily 
or by cheating, or is conducted through controlling the shareholders, the shareholder is not entitled to 
object unless he attended the meeting and objected to it; if he was absent from the meeting, he must 
bring an acceptable excuse.  However, there is no explanation in the law of what constitutes an 
acceptable excuse.  It can therefore be said that it is unreasonable to prevent the shareholder from 
objecting on the grounds that he agreed to the resolution because he may have agreed under some form 
of duress, or they were absent from the meeting because he may have a reasonable excuse; this can be 
regarded as a violation of the rights of minority shareholders, allowing the controlling shareholders to 
act in accordance with their interests. 
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The proof that a GM resolution is invalid shall be made by the aggrieved party in person; in practice, 
proving such a case is no easy task for the shareholder, and this is due to a number of reasons;
563
 
firstly, the majority shareholders can defend themselves by arguing that they have exercised the 
authority conferred upon them by law or the company’s articles.  Secondly, it is difficult to prove any 
deviation on the part of the majority, especially if the resolution in question satisfies the conditions of 
all formal and substantive terms; in this case, the majority can defend themselves by arguing that they 
are authorized to determine the suitability of the resolution as being in the interests of the company.  
Finally, not many shareholders have the administrative, legal or technical expertise to determine 
whether the decision is void or legal.
564
 
 
A court judgment may regard the resolution in question as being taken not for the benefit of all 
shareholders and therefore invalid, but any ensuing lawsuit to declare that resolution null and void 
cannot be considered after one year has elapsed following the date of issuance of that resolution.
565
  
Any challenge to such a resolution does not halt its implementation unless the courts decide otherwise; 
however, such a procedure is not provided under SCL 1965.
566
 
 
This problem can be solved by granting the shareholders holding 15% of company’s capital the right to 
vote against the resolution and to prove that it is unfair and against their interests; this can be done 
through applying to the court within 30 days of the issue of the resolution.
567
  However, the court has 
the power to uphold, modify, overrule or defer the implementation of the resolution.  The settlement 
by the court may be achieved by buying the shares of the objectors, or through any other possible 
manner.  
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5.5 Absent Shareholders from GMs 
 Shareholder meetings suffer from the phenomenon of absent shareholders.  Many of them, especially 
minority shareholders, do not care to attend meetings, and this absence may lead to shareholders 
giving up their rights at the GM; also, it can allow the board of directors to dominate the company and 
become the sovereign and supreme power within the company.  Thus, the role of the shareholder in the 
company may become different in practice to what is stated in the law.  It has been argued that GMs 
have lost their core task and have become a rump parliament for shareholders, wherein a small group 
of shareholders, whose shares may not exceed 40% the capital, controls the greater part of the capital 
of the company.
568
 
 
In fact, various reasons contribute to the absence of shareholders at GMs; some are related to the 
shareholders themselves and the others are due to the laws governing these meetings.  It could be said 
that the first reason for the absence of shareholders at a GM is the large number of shareholders in the 
company; the shares may have been offered for public subscription, and not limited to a certain 
number of shareholders in a certain region of the State.  Many listed companies, especially large ones, 
have thousands of shareholders, and it is difficult to gather them in one place.  Many of them may not 
care to attend, particularly those who own only a small portion,
569
 and think that they will not represent 
an effective voice in the presence of shareholders having large a stake in the company’s capital. 
 
Most shareholders are distributed widely across the country, living far from the main centre of the 
company
570
 but most JSCs are located in major cities.
571
  It is therefore not logical to expect all 
shareholders to travel sometimes great distances to attend a meeting that may merely be adjourned for 
lack of quorum; this may also result in costs higher than the amounts earned from the profit generated.  
It must be remembered that attending a GM can be costly and time consuming for some 
shareholders.
572
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Another reason is lack of knowledge on the part of some of shareholders in relation to their rights 
within the company, particularly their rights at GMs, and too many shareholders believe that GMs 
deliver resolutions that have already been agreed upon,
573
 serving only the interests of the controlling 
shareholders in the company.
574
 
 
A simple example explains the reluctance of shareholders to attend GMs; that of Herfy Co.
575
  In April 
2012, the company held its AGM to discuss a range of topics; firstly, the strange thing to notice is to 
the use of the phrase ‘ratification and approval’ of the resolution instead of ‘discussion’; the latter 
indicates an exchange of views, with shareholders making suggestions on the issues in the agenda.  On 
the other hand, the former calls for the meeting to agree to the company renting land and two 
residential buildings,
576
 to agree to the company renting land and shops,
577
 and to agree to the company 
leasing a fully furnished building from the Qitaf company.
578
  The last statement in the notice came as 
follows: the quorum for the meeting will be satisfied by shareholders representing 50% of the 
company’s capital attending the meeting, which can be met through only two of the owners attending 
(who already agree); this sends a clear message to shareholders: the quorum is already reached whether 
you come or not, and therefore your attendance is only to approve the agenda.
579
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The example above explains in a simple way why minority shareholders often do not care to attend 
GMs.  Most of them have the conviction that the GM resolutions are ready for approval and do not 
need any discussion;
580
 consequently, any opposition to the interests of the controlling shareholders 
will be unsuccessful.  
 
The general principle here is: whoever has the largest number of shares, has the greatest influence 
within the company.  Often, minority shareholders in the company have a limited number of shares, 
and so they do not care deeply about the company’s future; this is contrary to those who own more 
shares and are keen to follow the company on an ongoing basis, in order to protect the money they 
invested in the company. 
 
In light of the above, it is believed that many shareholders do not really attend to their role as 
members, and do not attend GMs regularly, caring only about the annual dividends of the shares or any 
rise in their market value in order to sell them.  Many do not even care who runs the affairs of the 
company. Unfortunately, at the end of each meeting, minority investors, who may number in the tens 
of thousands, are shocked to find that one person or a few persons owning a large proportion of the 
shares support the proposal of the board of directors, rejecting all discussion and destroying the 
aspirations of all shareholders.  This can cool the relationship between the minority shareholders and 
the board of directors, resulting in the minority shareholders selling their shares and investing in 
another company. 
 
Another reason behind the absence of shareholders at GMs is their not knowing the date of the 
meeting, despite its publication in newspapers and on websites.  In KSA, the invitations are not sent to 
the shareholders directly via registered mail, as most shareholders do not have a postal address; this 
makes it difficult for shareholders to learn of the company’s meetings.  However, companies could use 
modern technology such as e-mail and mobile phone text messages to notify as many shareholders as 
possible; this would not cost the company much.  Indeed, it would be more practical nowadays to use 
modern technology to send the invitations, in particular via email, and especially for individual 
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investors; this becomes necessary if the meeting is to be convened in the very near future.
581
  It is 
believed that distant shareholders could also make use of the company’s website, where they should be 
able to find all the information they need.
582
 
 
A yet further reason for the absence of shareholders is when a GM is held at an inconvenient time, 
such as on weekdays during business hours, which makes it difficult for shareholders to attend because 
most of them are working.
583
  Most listed companies hold their AGM in January; the fiscal year 
usually starts from the beginning of January and ends at the end of December.  JSC meetings are 
therefore often held on similar dates or even on the same days, and so the shareholders who invest 
their money in more than one company may not be able to follow all the meetings of all the companies 
that they have shares in, or they may prefer to attend the meeting of one company over another. 
 
Lack of technical, administrative or legal expertise on the part of shareholders represents another 
reason for their absence; many of them do not know how to analyse the auditor’s report, or the report 
of the board of directors, and most of them have little experience in how to monitor the actions of the 
company’s board, which requires a certain level of expertise.584  Therefore, they feel unable to oppose 
the board of directors, or protest against a particular issue.  For example, most shareholders are not 
able to distinguish whether a decision is legal or void.  It has been found that many shareholders suffer 
from lack of investment culture, which is the responsibility of government agencies, universities and 
JSCs; they should contribute to raising the level of investment awareness among shareholders. 
 
Moreover, there is sometimes a lack of seriousness on the part of the company's board in terms of the 
participation of shareholders at GMs. It is argued that the law has granted shareholders the right to ask 
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questions of the directors or auditor, but in fact they are not obliged to answer all questions; indeed, the 
board can refuse to answer questions or to discuss certain points. It can be said that the reason behind 
refusing to answer a question may be: to safeguard commercial confidentiality; the time available is 
too short and it is not possible to explain everything; the response is made diplomatically or very 
briefly, and thus does not answer the question adequately; or they merely direct the shareholder to 
refer to the company reports. 
 
Consequently, the easiest way to evade a question is to assert that the required information is 
commercially sensitive and therefore confidential and cannot be disclosed.  This will result in the 
shareholders being reluctant to attend meetings.  However, the final decision as to whether or not to 
answer a shareholder’s question belongs to the chairman of the meeting, who has the final decision in 
this respect and his decision should be in good faith and in the best interests of the company.  
Nonetheless, SCL 1965 has been criticized for not explaining when the information is harmful to the 
interests of the company; the auditor may reasonably argue not to answer the questions of shareholders 
because the disclosure of certain information would harm the company.  However, this point opens the 
door to the board of directors and the auditor to evade answering the shareholders’ questions.585 
 
In brief, the CMA has stated the most common mistakes made by listed companies in this regard,
586
 
namely: the delay of some companies in calling for a GM (they sometimes call for meeting to be held 
in less than 25 days); the lack of adequate information about the meeting’s agenda, which could affect 
the decisions of the shareholders,
587
; not choosing a suitable time or place so that the shareholders can 
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attend and participate at their convenience; not discussing all the items before the shareholders; and 
discussing only what is stated on the ballot papers.  
 
Moreover, the chairman may request an adjournment of any discussion of the agenda until after the 
ballot, which means that shareholders may be making decisions based on incomplete or incorrect 
information because they have not been allowed to discuss each item on the agenda apart before they 
actually vote.  Thus, the agendas are not reviewed sufficiently or adequately; the participation of 
members of the company’s board in voting on an item discharges them from liability for the period of 
their management; not all items on the agenda are discussed; some companies demand the chartered 
accountant answer the questions of shareholders that are not related to the agenda. 
 
5.6 Shareholders' Right to Attend the GM in Person or by Proxy  
Each shareholder is entitled to attend a GM in person or by proxy, and it is a fundamental right for the 
shareholder, from which he shall not be deprived.
588
  Any action that deprives the shareholder from 
attending is considered void by virtue of law because it is one of the paramount rights inherent in the 
ownership of a share.
589
  This is in order to protect minority shareholders, not assist them in controlling 
the company’s management and to thwart any domination of the company by majority shareholders.  
 
SCL 1965 has regulated this right, enabling each shareholder who owns 20 shares or more to attend a 
GM; the company is not permitted to require a higher rate.
590
  This restriction means that if the number 
of shareholders is large, the attendance procedures must be well organized.
591
  Minority shareholders 
are allowed to unite in order to provide a quorum and to elect a representative for the meeting.  Should 
minority shareholders not be allowed to do this, they would be deprived of an important right; it is the 
duty of the Saudi legislature to allow each shareholder to attend a GM, regardless of the number of 
shares he has.
592
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This right includes all shareholders, regardless of the type of shares, except for the owners of preferred 
shares if they have no right to vote.
593
  This right also includes shareholders who have not paid the full 
value of their shares; it is not required for a person in becoming a shareholder in the company to pay 
the full value of the share.  The company may not provide in its articles any limitation that deprives the 
shareholder of certain rights related to ownership, such not being given access to profits or not being 
allowed to attend and vote at GMs until completing the full value of the share.
594
  
 
The natural person is the representative of the artificial person that owns a share in the company, even 
if the natural person is not a shareholder in the company.  In addition, a guardian or custodian may 
attend on behalf of an incapacitated or legally incompetent person because attending GMs is 
considered a form of business administration of their client’s money; this is included in their power as 
a guardian.
595
  If the shares are owned by more than one person, they must appoint a representative.
596
 
 
It should be noted that if the shareholder’s shares are mortgaged, then the right of attendance is for the 
debtor mortgagee, i.e. the shareholder, not the creditor mortgager; this is because the creditor here only 
possesses the share, and thus, the creditor mortgager may not benefit from the mortgaged shares at no 
charge to himself without the permission of the mortgager.  If it is agreed that it is the right of the 
creditor to possess all the rights related to the share, such as the right to attend a GM, then he shall 
have all the rights that were nominated for the debtor.
597
 
 
On the other hand, SCL 1965 does not require the shareholder to attend a GM by himself; he has the 
right to delegate someone else to attend the GM when unable to attend for some reason, but only under 
certain conditions; Article 83 of SCL 1965 stipulates, “1- The bylaws of the company shall specify the 
(class of) shareholders entitled to attend general meetings.  Nevertheless, every shareholder who holds 
twenty shares shall have the right to attend, even if the bylaws of the company provide otherwise.  2- 
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A shareholders may, in writing, give proxy to another shareholder other than a director to attend the 
general meeting on his behalf.”  
 
The conditions for power of proxy must first be written and formally documented; the company often 
publishes a form for power of attorney within the agenda, requesting ratification from the Chamber of 
Commerce, a bank, the employer of the shareholder, or the courts.  Secondly, the proxy should be a 
shareholder in the company in order to safeguard the secrets of the company, and not to reveal them to 
others.  This condition does not exist in the legislation of many countries, giving the shareholder the 
right to authorize non-shareholders.
598
  Thirdly, the authorized proxy should not be a member of the 
board; the shareholders are those who monitor the work of board.  Also, in order to prevent fraud when 
voting on the resolutions of the meeting, a member of board may be a shareholder in the company, and 
might purchase the votes of shareholders in order to dominate the decisions of the GM and to vote for 
his interests.  The SCGRs have added a fourth condition: that the agent shall not be an employee in the 
company.
599
  
 
Notwithstanding the significance of this matter, the above provision is the only one that refers to the 
question of proxy regarding the attendance of the shareholders at GMs.  In the provisions of proxy vis-
à-vis attendance under the current SCL 1965, there are deficiencies and comprehensive regulation is 
needed for minority shareholders to realize the benefits to be gained from participating in GMs, and 
from exercising their rights guaranteed to them by law.  For example, SCL 1965 and SCGRs do not 
specify the number of shares represented by the shareholder as being in person or in proxy for others, 
as found in some legislations (such as in Syrian company law), which determine the ratio of the 
number of votes represented by the shareholder in person or in proxy on behalf of a shareholder to 5% 
of the capital of the company.
600
 
 
However, the aim of this measure is to maintain a balance between the votes of all the shareholders, 
and not to limit the shares to a few people who may control the meeting.  Also, other issues may arise: 
How long is the proxy?  Is the power of attorney valid for all GMs or for one meeting only?  Does it 
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include all kinds of meetings or only certain types?  Also, can the company assign a certain 
shareholder to receive the agencies or not? 
 
In this vein, CA 2006 contains more details regarding such issues.
601
  The shareholders who have the 
right to attend the GM and vote can appoint another person to attend the meeting if they do not wish to 
attend in person, and this proxy may be a shareholder or not.  In fact, some or all of the rights of the 
shareholder may be exercised by the proxy, such as attending, discussing and voting at a GM.
602
  The 
shareholder is entitled to appoint one proxy (or more) for a meeting providing he holds different 
shares,
603
 and each proxy has a vote.
604
  Appointing proxies by shareholders can be processed in 
writing or in a way that the company approves.
605
  In the proxy form, it is usually mentioned that the 
chairman of the meeting acts as a proxy for the shareholders.
606
 
 
Voting by proxies is done according to certain regulations and procedures as stated by the appointing 
shareholder.  If a proxy does not vote in the manner stated in the instructions, this shall not result in the 
meeting being invalidated;
607
 legally, the situation would be that the proxy is subject to the common 
law as an agent.
608
 
 
The notice calling a GM must stipulate clearly that the shareholders have right to appoint proxies.  
However, the validity of the GM or of anything done at the GM shall not be affected if the company 
fails to do this; this only can be considered as a fault that may lead to a fine for the company official 
involved.
609
  In the company’s articles, a provision that requires the instrument appointing a proxy to 
be deposited two days prior to the day of the determined or postponed meeting is considered void 
provision.
610
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It is stated clearly in S. 326 that in any invitation made by the company in relation to the appointment 
of specified person(s), all shareholders of the company, who have the right to vote, should receive a 
copy of the invitation; otherwise, the company becomes subject to a fine.  This procedure guarantees 
the protection for shareholders against the directors who seek avocation in the voting.
611
  Any action 
made by proxies at a GM is considered valid on condition that the proxy is not given a notice of 
termination of his authority before starting the meeting.
612
 
 
5.7 Shareholder's Right to Discuss the Auditor's Report 
Practically, it is difficult for the GM to be conducted and controlled effectively and continuously due 
to the phenomenon of the absence of shareholders; also, many shareholders do not have the culture or 
experience, particularly in accounting or law; these would qualify them for controlling and supervising 
the company’s business effectively.  Therefore, the legislation gives this task to one or more auditors, 
who are professional, competent, qualified and independent, and are appointed by the GM, in order to 
assist in controlling and supervising the board’s business;613 they are also charged with auditing and 
verifying the budget, and with calculating the profits and losses for the fiscal year to which they are 
assigned, as well as monitoring the application of the provisions of law and company’s articles. 
 
Auditors are usually recommended by the board, which determines their remuneration as well; in fact, 
the auditor is appointed indirectly through the board, based on the recommendation of the audit 
committee.
614
  Thus, this contributes to maintaining a close relationship between the auditors and the 
board of directors, rather than as it is supposed to be, i.e. between the shareholders and the auditors; as 
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a result, the auditor is not fully independent in his work, rather there will be interference by the 
company’s board because of their power in terms of appointment reappointment or dismissal.615  This 
normally results in a week level of control on the part of the auditor, as an agent of the shareholders, 
over the work carried out by the company's board. 
 
It is thus believed that the auditor’s work is subject to the board and does not fully represent 
independent work.
616
  A simple example of the seriousness of the control of directors over auditors is 
that the auditor could declare to the shareholders false or incomplete information, the auditor would 
not be in a position to tell the truth to the shareholders, as he is under the control of the board of 
directors and can have no influence over it.
617
 
 
In order to strengthen the principle of non-interference on the part of the board in the auditor selection 
process, the Egyptian legislature states in the Companies Act that the board of directors may not be 
authorized to appoint the auditor, or determine his fees without specifying a maximum.
618
 
 
However, this matter can be resolved by preventing the board from interfering in the selection of 
auditors and determining their remuneration; this could be done through the formation of an 
independent committee to be selected by the shareholders, and preferably by those who have 
experience in this field but not by the owners of large quotas in the company (in order not to create a 
conflict of interests between them and the auditors).  After choosing a candidate as a potential auditor 
and determining his fees, their recommendations in this regard will be put to the vote;
619
 this, 
undoubtedly, would ensure the integrity of the selection process for the auditor, and his independence 
from the company’s board. 
 
In the same vein, according to Article 130 of SCL 1965, auditors are appointed for a full fiscal year, 
and can be re-assigned more than once.  All auditors should be independent of JSCs, and independent 
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of each other, as well as authorized by the CMA.  Therefore, the process of appointing the auditor 
occurs indirectly through the board, and the effect of the board in re-electing the auditor is quite clear; 
thus, the auditors tend to agree with the policy of board, and overlook any irregularities they discover, 
otherwise they know that they will not be re-appointed, or even dismissed.  
 
In general, the auditor’s report is subject to elementary approval by the board.  Unfortunately, the 
provision above gives the board considerable power to influence the independence of the auditor, 
where the auditor has a choice, either to respond to the dictations and conditions of the board of 
directors, or to reject their employ.
620
 
 
It could be argued that determining a legal duration of the duty for the auditor of longer than a year 
would serve to address this shortcoming, and give the auditor greater stability and independence; then 
the board’s influence over the auditor would be weakened.  The maximum duration for the 
appointment of the auditor could be three years (or more) during which he would not be re-elected.  
This is actually what is stipulated in the Swiss Companies Act;
621
 According to the French Companies 
Act,
622
 the auditor shall be appointed for longer than a period of six continuous fiscal years, where any 
contrary agreement between the company and the auditor will be considered void; it may not be agreed 
in advance to extend the duration of the appointment for a period exceeding six financial years, nor 
shall this period be shortened to less than six continuous financial years.
623
  
 
SCL 1965 gives JSC shareholders the right to discuss the auditor’s report, and to ask him questions in 
order to understand his annual report; the auditor is obliged to answer shareholders’ enquiries.  The 
auditor is in charge of delivering any information he obtains to the shareholders clearly and accurately.  
In general, the auditor must preserve the interests of the company and its stakeholders by making sure 
that the deeds of the board are in conformity what is stated in the documents of the company.  
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In the same vein, one of the drawbacks of SCL 1965 is that it does not give more details about auditor 
issues; we find only five articles that regulate the function of the auditor and they are very brief 
(Articles 129 to 133).  The law does not expressly refer to the auditor’s duties; detailing these duties is 
important as the shareholders need to know their rights and duties toward the auditor. 
 
In the UK, it is quite different; CA 2006 considers the auditor to be of great importance, and the 
provisions relating therein appear more accurate and highly professional;
624
 Ss. 498 to 502 regulate the 
provisions relating to the duties and rights of auditors.  It is hoped that the Saudi legislature, in the new 
CL, will give this matter due consideration and make the duties more detailed and clear, due to the 
auditor’s importance in protecting the interests of the company and its shareholders against any 
violation.  In order for the auditors do their job effectively, it is believed that the Saudi legislature 
should provide for the independence of auditors, fully from board of the company, and emphasize that 
auditors shall gain all the necessary academic qualifications; the final point to be stipulated is to give 
the auditor all the powers he needs to perform his work effectively. 
 
5.8 Shareholder’s Right to Vote at GMs 
The shareholders have the right to vote in their interests, provided this does not damage the best 
interests of the company.  This right is considered one of the rights of property inherent in the 
ownership of the share, and one of the basic tools that ensure the active participation of shareholders in 
determining the company’s affairs and making decisions related to it.625  In Carruth v ICI Ltd, Lord 
Maugham said, “The shareholder's vote is a right of property, and prima facie may be exercised by a 
shareholder as he thinks fit in his own interest.”626 
 
Moreover, shareholder voting is a fundamental feature of a sound corporate governance system.
627
  
The OECD emphasizes, “The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
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exercise of shareholders’ rights…4) participate and vote in general shareholder meetings”.628  
Furthermore, any resolution issued at a GMs or anything in the company’s articles that prevents the 
shareholders from exercising their right to vote is invalid by law.  SCL 1965 confirms this right,
629
 and 
the SCGRs provide that voting is a fundamental right for the shareholder and cannot be cancelled in 
any way.  JSCs should avoid any action that may lead to hindering the right to vote, and should ease 
and facilitate exercising the shareholders right to vote.
630
  This right is deemed a principal feature in 
good corporate governance practice by the SCGRs.
631
   
 
The right to vote is given to each shareholder in the company whose name has been registered in the 
record of shareholders, which is prepared prior to convening a GM.  Only shareholders are entitled to 
attend and vote, and a shareholder can vote in person or by proxy via another shareholder; therefore, 
company employees are not entitled to vote on the resolutions of meetings, neither are the creditors of 
the company because they are not partners and do not have shares in its capital.  Non-shareholders are 
not entitled to vote on any GM resolutions, even if is stipulated in the company’s bylaws (unless they 
are agents or representatives of a corporate body). Pursuant to SCL 1965, each shareholder who owns 
20 shares in the company has the right to vote regardless of the type of shares, whether mortgaged, 
owned by a group of shareholders or legal persons, or owned by incapacitated people.  
 
It should be pointed out that under the Saudi system, a shareholder only has the right to vote at a 
meeting in person or by proxy; other means of voting are not regulated by SCL 1965 or SCGRs; 
shareholders are not permitted to vote by telephone, post or electronic means.
632
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 5.8.1 Shareholder Agreements 
The shareholders in JSCs can conclude agreements between each other designed to unite their opinion 
within the company, including determining how to vote according to a certain way or to abstain.
633
  
Thus, minority shareholders conclude formal or informal agreements to enhance their influence inside 
the GM,
634
 and to maintain their presence and rights against the majority shareholders in the 
company.
635
 
 
In general, voting agreements should not be prejudicial to the interests of the company or its 
shareholders, and not contrary to CL or the constitution of the company; otherwise, they will be 
deemed invalid.
636
  In the case of Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd, Lord 
Jauncey held, “Shareholders may lawfully agree inter se to exercise their voting rights in a manner 
which, if it were dictated by the articles, and were thereby binding on the company, would be 
unlawful”.637 
 
Unfortunately, as in many other issues, SCL 1965 does not provide clear provision on these issues, and 
it does not explain whether the shareholders have the right to engage in agreement with others to vote 
on a particular matter or not.
638
  This is usually left to the court, which has the authority to approve the 
legitimacy of the agreement or to cancel it.  Usually, the agreement is valid as long as it does not 
deprive the shareholder of the right to vote, based on the fact that this right is a personal right that 
cannot be waived, i.e. it is not possible to restrict the freedom of the shareholder, or to prevent him 
from exercising his right.  On the other hand, the agreement is void if it is designed to vote for a 
particular party in return for private gain.  
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The decision of the Court of Cassation in Lebanon asserts that the concerns of shareholders about the 
company’s interests, including the election of the most effective members of board, requires prior 
deliberations among shareholders, inevitably leading to personal agreements before GMs in order to 
vote in favour of a particular candidate.  The shareholders’ agreement on one member to be a 
nominated is a legal agreement; often, the agreement is verbal but this does not matter.
639
  
 
 
 5.8.2 The Number of Votes is Equal to the Number of Shares 
The general principle in the Saudi system is that the number of votes is equal to the number of shares; 
if the shareholder owns one share, then he has one vote.
640
  This is based on the fact that the 
shareholders own shares of nominal value, and therefore they are equal in the right to vote and there is 
no difference between them.
641
  This principle is of the public order, which may not be violated; 
therefore, any statement in the company’s articles this is contrary to this principle is considered void 
automatically.
642
  Therefore, SCL 1965 prevents all JSCs from issuing shares having more votes.
643
 
 
Some legislation allow listed companies to issue shares without voting rights, including SCL 1965, 
which allows a company to issue non-vote shares, and to call them preferred shares.  This is according 
to certain criteria; their owners have, in addition to the net profits, priority in receiving a certain 
percentage of the profits, as well as priority to obtain the value of their shares of the capital in the 
company before the owners of other shares at liquidation, and to gain a certain percentage of the 
liquidation output; however, the owners of these shares are not entitled to vote on GM resolutions.
644
 
 
To maintain the equality between shareholders, the Saudi legislature does not allow issuing shares with 
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dual or multiple votes.
645
  In France, double voting of shares can exist along with higher dividends.  
Actually, this merit is granted for the purpose of strengthening the shareholders’ loyalty, and it is 
usually offered to those who hold shares for two years at least; it can also serve to maintain family 
control over company, in addition to granting the members of the family higher interests and 
rewards.
646
 
 
5.8.3 Restricting the Right to Vote 
Initially, each shareholder has absolute freedom to vote on GM resolutions, and may abstain from 
voting; the shareholder is not obliged to vote in any way and thus the shareholders position in the JSC 
is different from that of the directors, who are in fiduciary position.
647
 They are fully free to vote on 
the resolution that is suited to their interests, but not contrary to law, or the company’s bylaws, nor in 
any way that damages the company or other shareholders. 
 
In general, the shareholder’s freedom in casting his vote (or not) should not be taken lightly and he 
should interact with what is happening at the GM; shareholders are basically partners in the company, 
and at the very least, there is a moral obligation to vote in good faith, compatible with the interests of 
the company (otherwise, the decision can be challenged before the competent authorities).  The right to 
vote is restricted in certain respects by Saudi legislation in order that GM resolutions are in the public 
interest of the company, and not in the interests of a certain class of shareholders.  
 
One of these restrictions is that the shareholder who does not have 20 shares is not entitled to attend 
GMs or to vote on resolutions unless the company’s articles state so.648  Members of the company’s 
board are not permitted to vote on resolutions pertaining to their relief from liability for the 
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administration.
649
  This is considered an axiom that should be present in any legislation; it could be 
that a board member has shares that help him evade responsibility.  Directors are also prevented from 
participating in a vote on GM resolutions that are GMs issued on business licensing or contracts that 
are conducted for the company, as they may have related benefits (whether directly or indirectly) in 
them.
650
 
 
However, an additional defect in SCL 1965 is that it gives directors the right to vote in a GM 
resolution that benefits them, such as on bonuses and salaries; for example, 35 listed companies ended 
their fiscal year for 2011 with a loss, but 33 ones of them gave rewards and incentives to board 
members estimated at about 121 million Riyals;
651
 the members of one board waived their rewards, 
while the other company did not give any rewards to the directors.  One of these companies was 
founded more than 20 years ago and has not given any profits to its shareholders, but it still continues 
to give rewards to its board of directors.
652
  
 
For instance, the CEO of Savola Co. received 15.65 million SAR in bonuses and salaries for the year 
2011, while the CEO of Herfy Co. received about 5.9 million SAR during the year 2011 in salaries, 
bonuses and allowances, compared with 5.2 million SAR he obtained in 2010; in the same company, 
the General Manager of Investment (the son of the CEO) received more than one million SAR in 
salaries, compensations and rewards.
653
  It is believed that the Egyptian legislature avoids this 
problem; it states that directors are not entitled to vote on resolutions that determine their salaries and 
rewards, or that discharge them of their responsibility for the administration.
654
 
 
Again, SCL 1965 gives directors the right to vote on GM resolutions that include special benefits for 
certain shareholders, such as those deciding their relative proportions of profits.  Also, in the case of 
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the formation of a nomination and remuneration committee, and audit committee within the JSC, 
which is often decided through the company’s board, voting is usually done at GMs, where directors 
have the right to vote on the committee members, their term of office, and the committee’s duties. This 
is regarded as contrary to the rules of fairness and transparency in the world of CG; such committees 
must be independent and subject to no influence from the members of the board. 
 
It should be noted that SCL 1965 contains no explicit provision in the case a shareholder voting on a 
resolution that is of personal interest to him.  If we assume that the company rents real estate from one 
of its shareholders (who does not work in the company), is that shareholder entitled to vote on the 
resolution? Lebanese law explains this question clearly; it stipulates that the shareholder shall not vote 
for himself or for whom he represents when the decision is of interest to him; it states, “The 
shareholder is precluded from voting in his personal name or as proxy, whenever the matter concerns 
vesting him with a specific advantage or that the meeting is required to take a decision in respect of a 
dispute between himself and the company”.655  
 
5.8.4 Cumulative Voting  
This is a method of voting for selecting members of the board of directors, and gives each shareholder 
the ability to vote in accordance with the number of shares he owns, where he is entitled to use them to 
vote for one candidate or to distribute them to the selected candidates without a duplication of these 
votes.
656
 This method increases the chances of minority shareholders to gain greater representation on 
the board of directors by concentrating cumulative votes on one candidate.
657
  The main objective in 
such a method is to protect their interests against any overreaching by controlling shareholders,
658
 and 
to ease tensions between the board and minority shareholders.
659
  In fact, the greater the number of 
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vacancies, the higher the possibility of minority shareholders securing some representation by focusing 
their multiple votes on the same one or few candidates.
660
 
 
Cumulative voting is provided for the SCGRs but not in SCL 1965, which is not mandatory for the 
companies listed.  As an illustrative example of this: if a company has three vacant seats on the board 
of directors on which to vote, and there are seven candidates, then each shareholder can vote as 
follows: shareholder A owns 350,000 shares and shareholder B owns 120,000 shares; shareholder A 
can distribute his shares as follows: 120,000 shares to the first, third and fourth candidates, while the 
shareholder B can give all his shares to the seventh candidate.  
 
In contract, in most corporations, board directors are elected through ‘straight’ voting, which means 
that each shareholder is entitled to cast votes equal to the number of shares held for each nominee 
position.
661
  The consequence of this is that a majority shareholder with 51% of the company’s voting 
shares could fill every director position, while a single minority shareholder with as much as 49% of 
the voting shares would be unable to elect even one nominee to the board.
662
 
 
The MOCI and the CMA encourage all JSCs to apply cumulative voting in the election of members of 
the board, in order to give minority shareholders the largest possible participation in the company’s 
board.
663
  In 2011, the number of companies that applied this method was 20 out of the 163 companies 
in the Tadawul;
664
 many JSCs have rejected this application.  Their arguments regarding the 
disadvantages of cumulative voting usually include:
665
 a good board should not be captured by any 
special interest group; the board should possess mutual confidence and respect; disharmony could 
harm the energy of management; confidential information could be leaked; and shareholders with 
narrow, selfish interests could abuse cumulative voting. 
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Nevertheless, there is no deterrent hindering the MOCI and the CMA from requiring companies to 
apply this method.  For example, the shareholders in the National Industrialization Company, at an 
AGM in 2011, voted not to approve the adoption of cumulative voting for electing directors.  The 
refusal of the company shareholders’ attending the meeting was by a majority of 75% (who did not 
agree on the mechanism of cumulative voting) against 25% (who voted for approval); the total 
attendance was about 60% of the shares of the company.
666
  The reason given for rejecting this 
application of cumulative voting was that voting to choose the directors should be conducted in 
accordance the company’s articles and that the traditional method is compatible with the law.667  It is 
noted that this company consists of 5 family companies and a government investor that make up more 
than half of the capital, and they are the ones who manage the company;
668
 therefore, the application of 
such a voting would lessen their opportunity to be members of the board of directors, something that 
might be a danger to their interests.  
 
Consequently, the main reason for rejecting the application of this technique is that the selection of 
directors is mainly based on the criterion of ownership of shares, where most members of the board 
have large portions of the shares in this company.  Also, most JSCs do not prefer the application of 
cumulative voting; the justifications given differ from one company to another.  Some of them argue 
that nothing in the company’s articles requires the application of cumulative voting in selecting 
directors at GMs, it is not stipulated in SCL 1965, and whenever it is stipulated by the competent 
authorities, it is applied immediately.  Some companies say that the application of this method is still 
under study and it needs time to prove its success.
669
 
  
In summary, the Saudi legislature must adopt cumulative voting as a compulsory method for many 
reasons but chiefly: the level of protection of minority shareholders under SCL 1965 in general is 
weak, and remedies against oppressive actions do not exist.  It is believed that in the current 
circumstances, applying this method would give a voice to minority shareholders inside the company 
and would improve their level of protection in general.
670
 
                                                          
666
 See<www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 5 May 2012. 
667
 See<www.tasnee.com/Investor-Relation/Governance.aspx?lang=en-US> accessed 19 May 2012. 
668
 See<www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 21 May 2012. 
669
 See<alphabeta.argaam.com/?p=20227> accessed 19May 2012. 
670
 However, cumulative voting could be upon the request of a certain number of shareholders, or according to 
the articles of the company like in Brazil. See: Andreas Grimminger, Daniel Blume. Board Processes in Latin 
176 
 
 
5.8.4 Electronic Voting 
Electronic voting is an Internet-based system, through which shareholders can log in and register their 
votes on company resolutions.
671
  Nowadays, in many developed countries, distance voting has 
become very common, such as in the USA, the UK, Japan, Australia and South Korea.
672
  Many 
corporations have tried to shift from the traditional form to electronic shareholder meeting, especially 
at the AGM.
673
  There are certain benefits to electronic voting at GMs for both company and 
shareholders: it is fast, easy and cheap.
674
  It reduces the cost of convening a GM, and maximizes the 
number of shareholders having the opportunity to exercise their rights, to participate in deliberations 
and to make important decisions at GMs.  Shareholders have many ways to vote electronically but they 
should all be considered as enabling the shareholder to be present at the GM for the purposes of 
quorum and determining a majority vote. 
 
In the context KSA, too few shareholders are willing to physically attend GMs, due to the reasons 
mentioned earlier in this chapter.
675
  In order to solve this problem and as part of the process of 
improving the protection of shareholders, the CMA has applied a new mechanism, which is considered 
as a step forward in activating the role of shareholders at GMs, as it enables them to vote on GM 
resolutions without being physically in attendance. 
On 17 March, 2011,
676
 the Tadawul, with the approval of the CMA and the MOCI, and in cooperation 
with brokerage firms, built an electronic system to facilitate voting at GMs for listed companies; it is 
called Tadawulaty.
677
  It is an advanced service that is available for use by registration on the Tadawul 
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website, on the websites of brokerage firms, or through attending in person.  In fact, this service is not 
compulsory for JSCs at the moment but, according to Tadawul, 20 meetings have utilized electronic 
voting in 2011, and the number has since increased to 42.
678
 
 
The shareholder can cast distance votes on all GM resolutions through the company website, which 
therefore may be considered a variant of traditional voting.
679
  Voting is open for the shareholders to 
cast their vote before actual meeting (for a specified period of time).  The shareholder who practises 
electronic voting has the right to attend GMs, change his previous vote, cancel it, and vote again.  The 
number of voters and the total number of shares they own will be added to the number of people 
attending the GMs in order to determine the attendance percentage and the quorum for convening the 
meeting.  
 
The first trial was applied on The National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia (Bahri),
680
 on 29 March 
2011; it was a successful experiment.  200 shareholders owning at least 12% of the capital of the 
company cast distance votes on the GM items; it experiment helped in reaching the quorum for the 
GM from the first time, where the quorum was more than 60% of the capital of the company.
681
 
 
Thus, this method aims to facilitate the participation of shareholders at GMs, to raise the efficiency and 
effectiveness of these meetings, and to reduce the chances of a GM not being convened for lack of 
quorum.  This mechanism helps to overcome the obstacles that may prevent the participation of 
shareholders in GMs; it frees the shareholder from having to travel.  Also, it maintains the secrecy of 
the votes, and helps to prevent disclose of the results to any member of the administration or other 
shareholders before the end of voting, thereby circumventing any influence on their behaviour during 
the voting process.
682
 
 
It should be pointed out that this type of voting is not regulated by SCL 1965 or by the SCGRs; 
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however, JSCs are not obliged to apply online voting.
683
  According to some press releases, there 
have been attempts by some senior members of JSCs to hinder the success of electronic voting in 
their company, in order to neutralize the power of minority shareholders in making decisions and 
participating in determining any future direction for the company.
684
  They argue that the electronic 
voting is not effective and is costly for the company, which will have to pay the Tadawul 40 SAR 
(£6737.42) per year; thus the participation of shareholders is still weak. 
 
It is the duty of the Saudi legislature to compel listed companies to apply this method, as it is 
important in the protection of minority shareholders; there is no impediment to applying it and it 
will serve to solve many of the problems in JSCs, such as the absence of shareholders from GMs, 
which often leads to adjournment; the dominance of the controlling shareholders in the company; 
and the lack of an effective role of shareholders at GMs like, such as controlling the board and 
bringing them to account when they make a mistake that affects the interests of the company.
685
  
Providing such a voting facility through the Internet will help shareholders to participate in the 
activities and affairs of the company more effectively, as this will save them time and money in 
terms of travel and accommodation costs for the sake of attending a GM.
686
  Therefore, minority 
shareholders will be able to participate more strongly in the life and the affairs of the company 
through employing this facility.
687
  However, until now there have been no reliable statistics to 
demonstrate the success (or otherwise) of distance voting. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
As we have seen, the GM is considered the most important part of any JSC; it is the highest authority, 
where the major plans of the company are made, and where their implementation is monitored.  The 
shareholders of the company are the main component of GMs; they play an important role in the life of 
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the company.  They have a wide range of rights within the GM, which allow them to monitor the 
performance of the company and follow-up the members of the board and the auditors, making sure 
that they fulfil their duties towards the company, such as appointing directors or isolating them; this is 
all in order to achieve the interests of the company. 
 
The law and the constitution of the company grant the shareholders a set of rights and responsibilities 
both inside and outside the GM on the basis that they own company shares; thus, it is they who mainly 
generate the capital.  As a result, the GM is the most suitable body for monitoring the commitment of 
the board of directors and the auditors towards the company and its shareholders.  The shareholders’ 
rights in the GM cannot be exercised in full without attending the first meeting; therefore, the right of 
the shareholder in terms of attendance is one of the most important rights, as it is the gateway to 
exercising other related rights, such as discussing company officers, adding items to the agenda and 
voting, amongst others. 
 
Minority shareholders must have a strong belief that attending a GM is necessary to protect their 
interests and the interests of their company in general.  Participation in the GM delivers their voice to 
the company’s management effectively.  Thus, we must remove all obstacles that prevent them from 
attending and participating in an effective and influential way.  The door should not be left open for 
the board to do everything it wants in the company without any real control preventing it from doing 
so.  
 
It is clear that the role of minority shareholders in KSA is weak; it is true that they are so large in 
number that they cannot be ignored but their influence is minimal.  Therefore, the competent 
authorities should seriously consider this matter in order to activate the role of minority shareholders, 
and should develop legal rules that are more effective and clear.  For example, the shareholders should 
have the right to call for a GM to convene through the courts or the competent authorities in the case of 
the board not responding to their request for a GM.  Also, all JSCs should be in contact with their 
shareholders through modern technology, such as by email or mobile phone SMS, and the shareholders 
should have the right to make agreements among themselves to vote in a certain manner.  
 
Shareholders should have the right to make decisions at all times; the Saudi legislature should allow 
them to vote by post, telephone or the Internet, and all JSCs should facilitate the voting process for the 
180 
 
benefit of shareholders.  Such tools will help to reduce the absence of shareholders at GMs, and reduce 
the domination of the company board on resolutions, allowing the minority shareholder to participate 
in building company policy.  The greater the role of shareholders in GMs, the more effective, credible 
and more attractive the company becomes to local and foreign investors.  Finally, educational bodies 
need to be established to spread investment culture among shareholders and defend their interests. 
 
So far, it should be noted that this study has detailed the fundamental rights of shareholders in JSCs, 
either financial or managerial rights.  When they exercise their rights in the appropriate manner, they 
protect their interests.  The main aim of these rights is to protect the interests of the company and its 
shareholders.  However, this raises certain questions: if the company or its shareholders face harm or 
damage caused by a mistake by the company’s board or by a third party, what is the role of the GM or 
board of the company in terms of compensation?  In this context, given the shortcomings of the GM, 
how can shareholders protect the company from damage or potential damage?  In addition, what is the 
function of company law in protecting the interests of the company and its shareholders, particularly 
the minority shareholders who stand in a weak position against the majority shareholders who control 
and run the company? 
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Chapter 6: Remedies of Shareholders under the SCL1965 
6.1 Introduction  
 
JSCs are considered a legal entity with a legal personality; they must have a normal person to represent 
them when dealing with third parties,
688
 and have the right to bring a claim against the board of 
directors, one of its members, or a third party, if the damages caused to them were due to a fault or 
action made by them.
689
 In addition, company shareholders have the right to bring a claim against the 
directors or third parties that have committed a wrongful act under the name of the company or under 
their own name. In fact, the company directors can incur three principal types of liability: to the 
company, to the company creditors, and to individual shareholders or third parties who have suffered 
harm as a result of a wrongful act committed by the directors.
690
 
The company aims to raise the lawsuit to seek compensation for the harm caused to them and the 
interests of all the shareholders as well. Nevertheless, when the damage is personal, or has affected 
individual shareholders or minority shareholders, they have the right to commence their individual or 
personal claim according to their vested rights and interests.  
However, there are many differences between the company action and the individual shareholder 
claim. The most notable distinction is derived from its purpose: in the company action, the purpose is 
to protect and defend its rights and the rights of all company’s members; this action could be 
commenced by company’s officers or by its shareholders, the indemnity for the damages sustained is 
for the company. On the other hand, the purpose of a shareholder action is the protection of his/her 
personal rights, which are not related to the company, and therefore, the damage affects the 
shareholders in person. 
Against the background of this chapter, the main question is whether and to what extent the current 
statutory remedies and means under SCL 1965 are effective in protecting the minority shareholders’ 
rights and their role in listed companies. To address this, the remedies and means available under SCL 
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1965 to protect the minority shareholders from the controlling shareholders (who look after their own 
personal benefits, regardless the minority’s opinion) will be analysed. Furthermore, this chapter 
examines how minority shareholders can enforce their rights inside and outside the company. This 
chapter argues that the statutory remedies and means under SCL 1965 are not sufficiently effective in 
defending and protecting minority shareholders in listed companies, and consequently, it suggests 
reforms to those provisions. 
The chapter six is divided into four main sections: the first section concerns company action (which 
can be initiated by the company or by its shareholders), and will cover company action and derivative 
action. The second section concerns the personal suit; the third section will concentrate on the statutory 
remedies available to shareholders that can be used without litigation, and the final section will cover 
the penalties under the SCL 1965.  
6.2 Company Action 
 
It has been said that company action is a claim concerned with the protection of its rights and its 
interests, and has nothing to do with the specific harms caused to one shareholder or more; it mainly 
aims to indemnify all the shareholders for the harm done, and results in a waste of company resources 
and may be prejudicial to the financial assets of company.
691
 
The company has a legal representative who is a separate legal entity from the shareholders. Thus, he 
has the right to initiate the claim through the company’s representatives or shareholders but only under 
specific circumstances. The objective of the company action is to protect its rights and interests from 
any harm that may affect its business affairs.  
Such harm takes several forms including damage caused to the company's financial status because of 
gross negligence in the administration, abuse of power, engaging in losing bids, or obtaining a loan 
from the banks with high interest rates, and distributing sham profits to shareholders.
692
 Therefore, the 
liabilities of the company’s directors towards such harms exists under Article 76 of the SCL 1965, 
which states, “1- Directors shall be jointly responsible for damages to the company, or the 
shareholders, or third parties, arising from their maladministration of the affairs of the company, on 
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their violation of the provisions of these laws or of the company’s bylaws. Any stipulation contrary to 
this provision shall be considered non-existent”.693 
Generally speaking, the board of directors represent all shareholders of the company;
694
 therefore, 
directors should perform their duties in a bona fide way and act in a responsible manner for the good 
of the company.
695
 As a general rule, the resolutions of the board should be issued within the 
authorities of the board for the benefit of the company and in good faith.
696
 
It should be noted that the Saudi courts have not yet developed any consistent criterion for assessing 
whether the actions of the board of directors are a form of maladministration or not; it could be argue 
that resolutions of the board should be in accordance with the ‘prudent man rule’697 otherwise it may 
be considered maladministration, In addition, gross negligence could be a solid ground for a legal 
claim against the board of directors.
698
 However, such criterion depends solely on the discretion of the 
judge.  
According to SCL 1965, a corporate is considered a legal personality
699
 starting from the date it was 
founded in the manner prescribed under Company Law, and must complete the procedures for 
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publication in the Official Gazette.
700
 It is not possible for a third party to object to the legal 
personality if the Minister of the MOCI takes a decision that the company has officially established, 
and has announced this to the public. At this time, the company becomes an artificial personality, 
independent from the partners and is entitled to acquire rights and assume obligations, i.e. has 
independent financial assets.
701
 
As discussed previously, the company is considered a legal personality represented by a normal person 
towards a third party, and also before the judiciary; furthermore, the company is obliged to the 
implement the work decided upon by the board of directors, within the limits of its jurisdiction, and 
therefore be asked for compensation for damages resulting from wrongful acts on the part of the 
board,
702
 on the grounds that the board of company represents the company towards third parties. 
Given that the board has wide-ranging powers in the management of the company and represents it 
toward third parties, and on the assumption that the chairman of the board is the one who represents 
the company towards third parties,
703
 the board thus acts on behalf of the company in any lawsuit.
704
  
In fact, there is no article in the Saudi system that refers to this but we can understand, in light of 
Article 73, that “1- With due regard to the prerogative vested in the general meeting, the board of 
directors shall enjoy full powers in the administration of the company. It shall entitle, within the scope 
of its competence, to delegate one or more of its members or others to perform an act or certain 
acts”.705 
However, there is no debate if the wrongful acts have been conducted by third parties; the company 
has the right to start the claim against them by its board or by shareholders in the GM. But, if the 
defendant is within the company itself, such as the board or its members, how is it possible to have the 
right to sue the wrongdoers, and how are the legal proceedings implemented?  
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The legal basis for the company’s action in the SCL 1965 is Article 77, which states, “1) The 
Company may institute an action against (its) directors for wrongful acts that prejudice to the body of 
shareholders, 2) The resolution to institute this action shall be made by regular general meeting, which 
shall appoint a person (or persons) to pursue the case on behalf of the company”. 
When filing litigation against the members of the board of directors or one of them, the company, 
represented by the GM, appoints a representative to proceed with the lawsuit before the competent 
court. The article above does not specify the person who would be deemed most appropriate to initiate 
the lawsuit; it could be the chairman of the board of directors, a director, a shareholder, or a lawyer. 
This person will be acting in accordance with the GM through the resolution adopted by the majority 
voting of the shareholders present or represented in the meeting.
706
 
 
This article has been criticized because it does not indicate the appropriate person to represent the 
company in such a lawsuit. Therefore, it would be better that the Saudi legislator formulate the 
previous article in order to be clearer, and to determine the correct person to represent the company 
before the court.
707
 Moreover, the Saudi legislator mentions only wrongful acts that happened in the 
past or at a previous time, and does not demonstration what the legal stance is regarding the 
misconduct or fault that may occur at the present time or in the future.
708
 
 
However, if the lawsuit is brought against all directors of the board, the GM must appoint a 
representative who is not a member of the board. In the case of the lawsuit being brought against the 
chairman of the board, the GM dismisses him/her and appoints another one. However, if it was 
brought against all the members of the board, then the GM would dismiss them all, and would appoint 
a newly elected board. 
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This is theoretically possible, however, in reality it is unlikely given the power of the majority 
shareholders, who often control the company; therefore, the general rule is that majority shareholders 
mean more dominate in the company.  In addition, it is worth noting that some laws stipulate that the 
decision of the GM to initiate a lawsuit against the board of directors automatically leads, by law, to 
the removal of all the members of the board, or the one against whom the lawsuit of liability was 
filed.
709
 
It is believed that the Saudi legislature should rule out the share of the member of the board of 
directors who is subject to dismissal when voting on the decision of the GM; hence, it is not rational to 
allow the defendant directors to vote in a decision related to the liability action against them, as, if they 
own a major portion of the shares, this could affect the resolution of a claim, or they could ally with 
other directors in order to make the decision fail.
710
 According to the Italian Civil Code, “Directors 
can’t vote on decisions affecting their own liability”.711 
Thus, the GM may not be able to litigate against the board of directors due to majority disapproval. 
The GM may however issue a decision to discharge the board of directors, and shall not prevent a 
lawsuit of liability that has been given consent by a GM in order to discharge the members of the 
board of directors; any lawsuit of liability must be considered within three years of the date of the 
discovery of harm.
712
 
It is interesting to note that, according to the Spanish Company Law, shareholders who hold shares 
without voting rights, as an exception on the general rule, have the right to fully participate in the 
initiation of the action, and also have rights to vote on it. It would be equitable and fair to permit all 
shareholders to protect their interests and rights in the company,
713
 as such statutory provision would 
lead to increasing the protection of minority shareholders; furthermore, it would act as a tool for 
pressuring the directors of the company to be aware to their acts. However, in the Saudi context, such 
legal provision does not exist. The company files a litigation of liability against the board of directors, 
or one of its members, in order to preserve their interests and the interests of all its shareholders. In 
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order to make the GM resolution valid, it must be made by an absolute majority of the shares 
represented at the meeting.
714
 Such matters can be discussed, even if they are not on the agenda of the 
meeting.
715
 
All members of the board of directors bear liability for damages if the resolution was made 
unanimously. However, if the resolution is passed by a majority, then the liability is borne by those 
who voted for the decision; however, a member of the board is not required to state whether he was 
absent from a meeting for legal reasons, and cannot object to it after learning the decision.
716
 In 
addition, the company has the right to institute a liability action against the directors if they have 
resigned in an unreasonable length of time.
717
 This provision does not specify what either 
inappropriate time or unacceptable reason means.
718
 
SCL 1965 does not indicate what the situation is if the company decided to stop pursuing the claim on 
the basis of settlement.
719
 The general rule states that the company that commenced the suit may 
abandon or settle it providing that any indemnities for the settlement or waiver favour the company’s 
interests.
720
 
Generally speaking, in the Saudi context, the controlling majority holds the balance of power in the 
GM. They can ratify the claim of the directors, and can vote against the action resolution. According to 
the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) concerning assessment of corporate 
governance in KSA, no legal suits had been filed against any board members before 2009; generally, 
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policies of liability insurance are not applicable to them.
721
 This means that majority shareholders 
control; therefore, no liability action can realistically be brought against them. Another reason could be 
the failure of shareholders to attend the GM; they choose not to practise their rights vested by the CL, 
unfortunately, most of the shareholders in JSCs in KSA elect to pursue short-term rather than long-
term profits.
722
 
However, this is unsurprising, as the majority of public companies in KSA are owned by families, or 
are state-owned.
723
 This means that the majority shareholders control the company and can therefore 
prevent a liability action from being brought against them. Consequently, their ability to pass any 
action resolution depends on ratification of the majority shareholders. 
In fact, it is normal in listed companies, especially in KSA, for the directors who run and manage the 
company to hold major portions in the company, and they are in a position to ratify the acts that result 
in harm to the company. Lord Buckmaster LC stated that in the case of Cook Appellant v G. S. Deeks 
and Other Respondents: “Even supposing it be not ultra vires of a company to make a present to its 
directors, it appears quite certain that directors holding a majority of votes would not be permitted to 
make a present to themselves. This would be to allow a majority to oppress the minority”.724 
6.3 Derivative Action 
Majority shareholders may infringe, injure and override the interests of minority shareholders and their 
rights through the resolutions of the board of directors.
725
 Thus, the GM is unable to perform its duties 
fully and successfully, due to the control and domination that majority shareholders, often paralysing 
the GM in adopting a resolution to file a lawsuit of liability against the members of the board of 
directors. Therefore, the question that must be asked in this respect is: What is the role of company 
shareholders? Do they have the statutory right to institute action on behalf of the company to sue the 
defendant directors? If so: What is the starting point to make a claim under the name of the company? 
However, these points will be discussed below. 
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In reality, the controlling majority has wide power in the company; however, it is unfair to allow them 
to act as they please, i.e. acting in their own interest regardless of the minority shareholders.
726
 In this 
respect, if the company is unable to bring a claim against its directors of board or one of them for any 
reason, many laws exist that grant minority shareholders the right to commence a company claim 
aimed at the protection of the general interest of the company
.727
 It has been argued that an effective 
legal remedy exists that will protect minority shareholders against expropriation of the board directors, 
namely, a derivative action.
728
 This right is considered as an exceptional right when the company 
cannot defend its rights.
729
 
A shareholders’ derivative suit, claim or action, are interchangeable terms that have one meaning,730 
which refers to the claim made by the shareholders on behalf of the company’s name, “in order to 
protect the interests of the company and obtain a remedy on its behalf”.731 The suit is considered as a 
significant device of corporate governance to promote shareholder’s rights and to protect their interests 
as well.
732
 Knox J. defined the derivative action in the case Smith and Others v Croft and Others as:  
“…a form of pleading originally introduced on the ground of necessity alone in order to prevent a 
wrong going without redress”.733 The shareholders or minority shareholders who have the right to 
claim, on a true analysis vested in the company, are considered in representative capacity for the 
company.
 734
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A derivative action in the UK is a statutory remedy created by the courts to allow the individual 
shareholder or minority shareholders to start suit proceedings against the wrongdoers under the name 
of the company, in other words, to redress the harm done to the company rather than to its shareholders 
personally; and moreover, to enable the courts to bring justice to a company that is controlled by 
directors or majority shareholders.
735
 It strengthens shareholders of the company by granting them the 
opportunity to bring an action on behalf of the company against company insiders for violations in 
circumstances where the company is either unable or unwilling to bring the action.
736
 
Furthermore, derivative action has emerged from common law; it refers to the well-known and old 
principle that is commonly known as, “the rule of Foss v Harbottle”.737 The principle states that the 
individual shareholder or minority shareholders are not allowed to litigate or make a complaint for 
alleged damages. Consequently, the correct plaintiff to sue is the company itself, to enforce its rights; 
thus, courts are not allowed to interfere in the company’s internal affairs.738 
In fact, the ability of a shareholder to commence derivative proceedings on behalf of the company 
under common law is obscure and complex; the procedure is considered lengthy and costly.
739
  It is 
important to note that these exceptions were developed by the courts to ensure that justice could be 
brought to cases when needed.
740
 However, these exceptions, according to the Law Commission, are 
rigid, out of date and unclear.
741
  
With the high growing realisation that corporate activity has become of more public concern, and the 
resulting trend towards greater recognition of individual shareholders’ rights, the derivative action 
became a statutory remedy under the CA 2006; it is now introduced under sections 260 to 264.
742
 CA 
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2006 presented the new statutory remedy for minority shareholders to allow them to bring an action on 
behalf of the company more openly than in the common law, according to the recommendations of the 
Law Commission, in order to make,
743
 “[a] new derivative procedure with more modern, flexible and 
accessible criteria for determining if a shareholder can pursue an action”.744  It has been argued that the 
codification of derivative action will enhance the position of minority rights in the company, and will 
ensure their rights against the corporate officers; however, on the other hand, the procedures of 
commencing this claim are extremely rigorous and several hurdles must be overcome.
745
  
 
Minority shareholders can bring a derivative suit, “only in respect of a cause of action arising from an 
actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a 
director of the company”.746 Under CA 2006, shareholders can initiate such an action, which will cover 
a more extensive range of conduct and circumstances than currently exist under common law.
747
 As 
such, a derivative proceeding can be brought in respect of an alleged breach of any of the directors’ 
general duties under Part 10, “A company’s directors” in the Act, which includes the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence; the inclusion of negligence means that any instance of a director’s 
breach of his duty of care and skill can be prima facie.
748
 In fact, a derivative action can be initiated 
against any director, including a former director or a shadow director, and may be against any 
company official.
749
 They can also claim against third parties implicated in any breach, in the 
company’s name, such as auditors.750 
Furthermore, initiating the derivative action must be made by a member of the company at the time of 
the proceeding and no minimum number of shareholders is required.
751
 A member of a company 
includes any person who is not a member but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or 
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transmitted by operation of law.
752
 An example of this is when a trustee in bankruptcy or a personal 
representative of a deceased member’s estate acquires an interest of a share as a result of the 
bankruptcy or death of a member.
753
 
There are no certain provisions under CA 2006 related to the cost of the derivative action;
754
 therefore, 
due to the derivative and representative nature of the derivative action, the indemnity will be directed 
to the company itself, and the claimant shareholder in a derivative action will not directly benefit from 
the action. If the claimant shareholder has to bear the costs, while at the same time not being able to 
benefit directly, he may not be willing to initiate a derivative action.
755
 Lord Denning, in the case 
Wallersteiner v Moir, indicated: “Minority shareholders, being an agent acting on behalf of the 
company, are entitled to be indemnified by the company against all costs and expenses reasonably 
incurred by him in the course of the action. This indemnity does not arise out of a contract explicit or 
implied, but it arises from the plainest principles of equity. But what if the action fails? He should 
himself be indemnified by the company in respect of his own costs even if the action fails”.756 
This means that it would be just and equitable to the plaintiff shareholders to have the right of 
indemnity for any costs paid under this action against the company, regardless of whether the action 
succeeded or failed, as long as the goal of the plaintiff shareholders is the company’s interests and the 
enforcement of its rights, and not simply a personal interest. However, in this respect, discretion of the 
court plays a major role in this matter.
757
  
In the new statutory framework, the applicant shareholder who wants to bring a derivative action has 
to apply to the court to obtain permission to continue with it.
758
 Furthermore, due to new reforms on 
the Act, petition to the court to initiate statutory derivative action has become easier now than in 
                                                          
752
 S. 260 (5c) of the UK CA 2006. 
753
 Reisberg Arad, Derivative Claims Under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About Nothing? Rationality in 
Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice, J. Armour, J. Payne, eds., Hart Publishing, 2009; University 
College London Law Research Paper No. 09-02. P: 11.   
754
 Brenda Hannigan. Company Law. 2
nd
 Ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2009. pg. 459. 
755
 Xiaoning Li, A Comparative Study of Shareholders' Derivative Actions: England, the US, Germany and 
China. Kluwer Publishing. 2007. P: 74. 
756
 [1975] QB 373 
757
 The law commission recommended respect of costs of indemnity orders “that the court’s power to make 
costs indemnity orders in derivative actions should remain unchanged and this view received virtually 
unanimous support on consultation”. Law Commission Consultation Paper, Shareholder Remedies: A 
Consultation Paper, UK, 1996. P: 7. Available at<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/publications/shareholder-
remedies.htm> accessed 28 May 2012. 
758
 S. 261(1) of the UK CA2006. 
193 
 
common law.
759
 Thus, the applicant is not required to prove that the directors engaged in wrongful acts 
dominate most of the shares.
760
  In fact, the court has wide discretionary powers for giving the plaintiff 
permission to continue the proceeding on such terms as it thinks fit; it can refuse permission and reject 
the application, or, it can adjourn the proceedings, and it can give direction as it thinks fit.
761
 
Furthermore, the court has to consider certain factors when deciding whether to give the permission 
such as: the shareholder is acting in good faith; the action is in the interests of the company; the 
shareholder seeks the success of the company; the company decides not to pursue the action.
762
 
However, the court may consider any other relevant factors.
763
 
6.4 What is the stance of the derivative suit under SCL 1965? 
Generally speaking, the derivative claim is intended to protect the interests and rights of the corporate; 
in this respect, does the Saudi system grant the minority shareholders the right of suing the wrongdoers 
on behalf of corporate‘s name if their acts have caused damage to the company? Unfortunately, SCL 
1965 does not provide a shareholder or minority shareholders the right of bringing a claim against the 
board of company or its members on behalf the company or third party,
764
 which is available in 
neighbouring countries, such as, Jordan, Egypt, and in developed countries, for example, the UK, the 
USA and Canada.
765
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SCL 1965 and especially article 77 does not indicate what the procedure is if the GM fails to issue a 
decision to sue the wrongdoers or whether the shareholders have the right to bring a derivative action 
on behalf of the company or not.
766
 In this respect, minority shareholders are not allowed to commence 
action on behalf of the company as an exceptional right for any circumstances.
767
 From a practical 
perspective, Al-Ibrahim stated that there are no liability claims that have been brought by minority 
shareholders under the name of company; they can only ask the MOCI to do investigation on the 
affairs of the company.
768
 
 
Article 78 of SCL1965 states: “…A shareholder shall have the right to institute action against the 
directors a liability case determined for the company, if their fault causes him personal damage ....The 
shareholder may institute such action only if the company’s right to institute it is still valid. The 
shareholder must notify the company of his intention to file the case…Shareholder shall be adjudged 
(compensation) only to the extent of the damage caused to him”. 
In accordance with Article 78, damages caused to the shareholder is due to a fault of one or more of 
the board of directors, either because they violated the law or the company’s articles; this article 
stipulates that the shareholder has the right to file a suit under the following conditions, namely: 
1. The shareholder is entitled to raise his claim if the directors caused harm to his personal                   
interests. 
2. The shareholder cannot initiate the lawsuit unless the company has the right to litigation. 
3. The shareholder must inform the company of its intention to raise the lawsuit. 
4. The compensation shall be for the petitioner shareholder. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
on behalf of the company; “The Controller, (General Controller of Companies - Companies Control 
Department) the Company and any shareholder therein shall have the right to file a case with the Court …”. See: 
Egyptian Company Law. No. 159/1981 Article 102 (3), & Jordanian Company Law No. 22 of 1997 Article 160. 
766
 Article 77states that “1) The Company may institute an action against (its) directors for wrongful acts that 
prejudice to the body of shareholders, 2) The resolution to institute this action shall be made by regular general 
meeting, which shall appoint a person (or persons) to pursue the case on behalf of the company”. 
767
 Mansour S. T.  Al Anazi, Minority shareholders: improving their protection to attract foreign Investment in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, LLM. 2008. P: 49. 
768
 Tariq AL Ibrahim, Claims of liability in Joint stock Companies, Journal of Law, Dar Tariq AL Ibrahim for 
publication, 2010. P: 22. 
195 
 
However, there are a number of criticisms, ambiguities and uncertainties in the above Article, and 
there is considerable confusion between shareholder personal suits and derivative action.
769
 
Furthermore, this Article does not clarify which type of lawsuits it addresses; is it an 
individual/personal or a derivative action? Consequently, it could be argued that Article 78 designates 
the right of shareholders to sue the directors of the board on behalf of the company.  
However, it could be said that, in light of the wording of Article 78, this refers to the claim on behalf 
of the company, but in fact the Saudi Legislature did not intend to establish derivative action as it 
exists in other countries.
770
 Furthermore, the problem with this Article is that it could lead to the risk of 
multiple actions and vexatious actions, and it unreasonable for the law to give all shareholders the right 
to claim on behalf of the company at one time; such legal process should be regulated in detail. 
Moreover, it was not possible to find any articles regarding derivative action in Saudi academic 
literature. Moreover, many lawyers and legal lecturers at Saudi universities agree that there is no 
derivative action under SCL 1965.  
Nevertheless, the lawsuit indicated in Article 78 aims to recover the damages done to the shareholder 
alone; furthermore, this article mentions that the compensation adjudged is for the petitioner 
shareholder, whereas the compensation in derivative action is for the company. However, the purpose 
of the legal suit in this article, and the indemnity of the damages are absolutely contrary to the 
objectives and purpose of the derivative suit. 
It is believed that the Saudi legislature was unsuccessful in the formulation of Article 77 and 78 of 
SCL 1965, where the personal suit and the derivative action were combined; each lawsuit requires a 
separate legal provision, in order to avoid confusion between each suit, as well as to remove any 
ambiguity in the article, as this may be the cause of harm to shareholders or can lead to a loss of their 
interests because of a lack of clarity in the legal provision. It is advisable that minority shareholders 
should have the right of suing on behalf the company if the GM cannot initiate a liability action, 
thereby protecting the company’s interests as well as its shareholders.771 
                                                          
769
 Ibid.  
770
 Mansour S. T. Al Anazi, Minority shareholders: improving their protection to attract foreign investment in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, LLM. 2008, p. 48 
771
 According to the Spanish Company Law, Minority shareholders who hold at least 5% of shares of the capital 
can bring the Derivative action, and they should request to call for general meeting to decide to initiation the 
liability action or not, the directors of the board are not allowed to vote, the GM could not commence the 
liability action. Cited in: Christian T. Campbell, International liability of corporate directors, Vol. 2. Yorkhill 
Law Publishing, 2007. P: 274. 
196 
 
The right of shareholders to use the derivative action should be stated in Article 108 in SCL 1965, 
which provides some of the rights of the shareholders in listed companies, such as the right to initiate a 
liability action against the wrongdoers, and the right of to nullify any resolution issued by the GM or 
the corporate board, that violates public order, CL, or the company’s bylaws.  
Shareholders under the Saudi legal system do not have the right to bring a derivative action against one 
or more of the company’s officers or third party. Similarly, shareholders under SCL 1965 do not have 
the right to bring such an action against the founders of the company. If they commit any offence 
against their company or its interests before the first election of the company’s board, the law gives the 
shareholders the right to sue the founders of the company under their names only.
772
 
In addition, when a company goes into liquidation, Article 77 of SCL 1965 states that the liquidator 
has the legal power to initiate and commence lawsuits against the company’s officers. If they have 
caused any damages that are the result of their mismanagement of the company, this is considered to 
be in violation of the provisions of this law or articles of association. The liquidator should obtain the 
approval of the GM to bring this action.
773
 
Consequently, when a company is in the stages of liquidation, the derivative action can be brought by 
the liquidator, who is considered the legal person authorized to do so, on behalf of the company. 
Thereby, the liquidator has the statutory power to sue the wrongdoers under the name of the company 
in order to protect the company’s assets and its interests. However, the question that should be 
presented here is: Do any shareholders under SCL 1965 have the right to bring an action under the 
name of the company if the liquidator(s) cannot commence the company action for any reason?  
When the company goes into liquidation and the liquidator is unwilling to bring the action, the GM 
then has the right to sue the liquidator(s) if his action has caused any damage or harm to the 
company.
774
 However, unfortunately, under SCL 1965 there is no article that gives the shareholder the 
right to bring a derivative action under the name of the company when the liquidator is unwilling to do 
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so. In spite of this, shareholders are still not allowed to bring a derivative action under any 
circumstances. 
In the UK context, a derivative action cannot be brought by a minority if the company has been put 
into liquidation.
775
 If the liquidator is unwilling or refuses to commence the suit on behalf of the 
company, the shareholders have the right to pursue the derivative suit; moreover, they have the right to 
request a court to order and instruct the liquidator to initiate the shareholders’ derivative suit against 
the corporate officers in the name of the company.
776
 
On that point, it is strongly recommended that the Saudi legislature grants the shareholders the right to 
bring a derivative action, which will promote the position of the minority shareholders in the company, 
as well as contributing to increased oversight on the part of all shareholders over the affairs of the 
company; furthermore, it would remedy any irregularities that could cause harm to the company. On 
the other hand, granting the shareholders this right would result in various benefits; any employee in 
the company, such as, the founders and board members would be forced to protect the interests and 
funds of the company on the basis that the shareholders have the legal right to sue them if they breach 
their duties towards the company. 
It has been argued that permitting the minority shareholders to litigate against the corporate officers 
under the name of the company will decrease the control of the majority of shareholders in the GM, 
which is currently controlled by the directors of the board; consequently, the shareholders can practise 
the derivative action without obtaining permission from the GM, which will give the shareholders a 
strong voice within the company.
777
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 The Saudi legislature should give minority shareholders this right by reforming Articles 77 and 78. To give 
an example; in order to grant effective protection for shareholders, the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
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As we have seen in the earlier context, individual shareholders or minority shareholders should have 
the right of entitlement of the derivative claim as an exception on behalf of the company. This will 
reflect positively on the company itself and its interests. Moreover, it will limit excesses on the part of 
the members of the board of directors and managers. In addition, the use of the action will increase 
closer monitoring of the company’s performance by the minority shareholders, thereby preventing any 
abuses that may affect the interests of the company and its shareholders at the same time. 
It is here submitted that offering a derivative action to minority shareholders will strengthen the 
position of the shareholders in the company, and will make their voices heard. Therefore, in order to 
enhance the protection of shareholders, Saudi Legislature should grant more legal means and 
mechanisms for shareholders to strike a balance between the interests of majority and minority 
shareholders. This does not mean that shareholders can exercise the derivative action in the broadest 
sense; however, using this right under particular conditions and on a restricted scale will ensure that its 
use is serious, effective, and far from any excessive litigation. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that giving shareholders such a right could lead to disruption or instability 
within the company, and may result in multiple litigations, which would undoubtedly affect the 
business affairs and reputation of the company.
778 It is worthy of mention that shareholders should be 
granted the derivative action within specific limits. The Saudi legislature can place a number of 
restrictions on its use when shareholders plan to sue the wrongdoers in the name of the company, in 
order to prevent this legal action being abused or damaging the company; for example: 
Firstly, plaintiffs seeking to initiate the derivative claim should be members of the company. In 
addition, the relevant state departments may have this right in special circumstances.   
Secondly, the right of shareholders to use this lawsuit is an exceptional right; therefore, they cannot 
practise this unless the GM or the company’s board have failed or rejected issuing such a decision. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(SABIC),
777
 is a public shareholding company where the state owns more than 70% of the capital; therefore the 
Saudi Government has a great deal of influence on the decisions of the GM of the company. If we assume that 
the GM is unwilling to bring an action against the members of the board for any reason, then, the minority 
shareholders cannot bring the derivative action in any circumstances under the current provisions of CL, in the 
sense that, minority shareholders cannot protect the interests of the company and their interests as well. SCL 
1965 should provide effective legal mechanisms such as this to shareholders when the GM is unable to sue the 
board of directors, and aim to rectify any act that could affect the company and its shareholders. For more 
information see Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). See<www.tadawul.com.sa> accessed 8 October 2012. 
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 Thirdly, the law should clearly identify the circumstances when shareholders can begin a derivative 
action, such as infringement, breach, oppression, abuse, fraud, misuse and expropriation.   
Fourthly, the shareholders must notify the GM of the company about their intention to use the 
derivative claim, and must wait for a reply from the company, as it could be that the company wishes 
to initiate the lawsuit instead of the shareholder.   
Finally, courts should have wide discretionary powers as to whether to accept the application or not; 
therefore, the courts would play a greater role in ensuring the validity of the claim, and that it is in the 
company’s interest to do so. 
 
6.5 The Personal Action  
 
Shareholders in the listed company have right to defend their rights and interests; this right is derived 
from the shareholder agreement, company articles, or from statutes that should be provided to 
shareholders as an effective means to protect these rights.
779
 The personal claim right is also provided 
in SCL 1965 and the SCGRs,
780
 which is considered one of the most fundamental and important 
precautionary rights for shareholders in the company.
781
  
The board of directors, one of its members, or a group of company employees may cause damage to 
the interests of one or a group of shareholders; for example, if the wrongful act is contrary to the law, 
the company’s bylaws, or is the result of an act of fraud or abuse of power. The shareholder is entitled 
to the right to raise a lawsuit based on omissive responsibility against the wrongdoer; thus he/she is 
entitled to file his/her personal suit when  the shareholder’s interests are directly caused by the 
members of the corporate, or he/she is deprived of a benefit, because of the direct effect of the 
committed fault;
782
 such as, preventing the shareholder from voting in the GM; depriving one or a 
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group of shareholders from attending a GM and seeing the minutes of the meeting; or not giving a 
shareholder his/her share of the profits.
783
 
This right is one of the fundamental rights that cannot be restricted, or prevent the shareholder from 
using it. If any conditions restricting this right exist in the company’s articles, they are considered void 
by virtue of law. Thus, if a decision is made by the GM to prevent the shareholder from raising his 
personal claim, then it has no value, because the shareholder’s right here is to claim compensation for 
personal damages caused to him, not to the company. It is worth noting that the responsibility of the 
members of the board of directors could be jointly or individually responsible.
784
 The period in which 
the suit can be heard is three years from the date of discovery of the harmful act.
785
 
It has been argued that the goal of the personal lawsuit is to seek compensation for damages caused to 
a shareholder’s personal interests in the company. Shareholders have the right to demand 
compensation for personal damages caused to them before the judicature; they file their claim in their 
own names, not in the company’s name, based on omissive responsibility.786  
However, it could be argued that Article 76 again puts the shareholder in a stronger position than he 
would be in the UK in taking action against a director. However, it is believed that such action in 
reality is often impractical; it is difficult to file a suit against specific member(s) of the company's 
board due that all the resolutions of the company issued under the name of the company, and the 
claimant shareholders must have strong evidence confirming that any damage sustained was a direct 
result of some act by the director. It can be said that Article 76 gives rise to the risk of multiple actions 
and vexatious litigation, and consequently such claims are not common in KSA. 
6.6 Statutory Protection for Shareholders under the SCL 1965 
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The shareholder’s GM is the supreme authority in JSCs, because of its broad powers of decision-
making in the company’s affairs; it enjoys this authority within the limits prescribed by law and the 
company’s articles. If it acts against these, such decisions become violations of the provisions of the 
law and regulations, and may damage the interests of both the company and the interests of its 
shareholders, which leads to the infringement of the rights of shareholders. It has been argued that GM 
resolutions are often taken by dominant shareholders who own a large amount of shares, which allows 
them the right to many votes.
787
  
The majority are not considered to have power over the other shareholders (opponents or absentees); 
the basis for this is that the majority has an ethical obligation towards the company and its 
shareholders and each one has an interest. The dominance of the majority within the company is not 
necessarily deleterious as long as their acts are motivated to be in the interests of the company and 
shareholders. However, there are cases in which the GM takes decisions that are contrary to the 
provisions of the company’s articles and the law, or that the decisions are correct but marred by abuse 
on the part of the majority in order to achieve their own interests. The question to be raised here is: 
what are the statutory rights and remedies within SCL 1965 for the minority shareholders, which they 
can use at the GM (or outside) in order to prevent any oppression by the controlling majority? 
 
Most legislations accord the shareholders in listed companies a set of rights and means to protect their 
interests, and to defend them and as a guarantee for them against the controlling shareholders, such as 
the right to request a GM to discuss important company affairs, to refuse to add any new commitments 
to the shareholders, to assert the invalidity of a GM decision, to request an inspection of the company 
by the competent authorities, and to seek the dissolution of the company amongst others. The OECD 
stresses, “Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, 
controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of 
redress”.788 
In SCL 1965, there is certain set of statutory provisions designed to give legal protection to the 
shareholders’ rights and interests, and therefore, this section discusses these provisions in order to 
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determine whether or not they are sufficient. 
 
According to Article 87 of SC L1965, shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital may call for 
the GM.
789
 Also, a number of shareholders representing at least 2% of the capital may request the 
MOCI to take a decision obliging a GM to be convened if a period of one month has passed since the 
date designated for the session, without any call. 
In addition, Article 94 of SCL 1965 states the right of shareholder to ask questions at the GMs of all 
members of the board of directors as well as auditors; the directors or auditors are obliged to answer 
the questions as long as they do not harm the company’s interests, and if the shareholder is not 
satisfied with the answers, then he has the right to refer the matter to the GM, which may then decide 
on this.
790
 However, it is argued that the ‘harm standard’ is not clear; it can differ from one person’s 
perspective to another. Consequently, the shareholder cannot do anything against the board or auditors 
because the law actually allows them not to answer the question. 
The right to vote at a GM is one of the basic rights of the shareholder, and thus, this right should not be 
restricted by any condition.
791
  The company must enable shareholders to exercise that right 
effectively, and any prior agreement that results in the shareholder being unable to vote will be 
considered null and void.
792
 
SCL 1965 also states the minority’s right to have access to the company’s documents in order to assist 
him in making decisions relating to his share in the company; there is also the right of the shareholder, 
within 25 days prior to the ordinary AGM, to have access to the agenda of the meeting.
793
 The current 
form of SCL 1965 also gives the shareholders who own at least 5% of the shares in the company the 
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right to add one or more subjects to the agenda of the GM during its preparation.
794
 The rights of the 
shareholder, in accordance with Article 108 of SCL 1965, guarantee permanent access to the 
company’s documents and books, which will inform him of the company’s condition and which will 
enable him to take appropriate decisions.
795
 
One of the fundamental legal means given by SCL 1965 for shareholders is the right to request an 
inspection of the company, which can be considered a form of external oversight.
796
  The aim of such a 
request would be to verify the commitment of the company officials to the law, and non-violation of 
the company’s articles.  
In accordance with Article 109 of SCL 1965, the shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital is 
entitled to request an investigation of the company; this may occur should they have suspicions over 
the behaviour of the members of the board of directors or the auditor. In such a case, they are entitled 
to apply to the Commercial Courts
797
 to conduct investigation into the company’s affairs, and to 
identify violations on the part of members of the board of directors or auditors.
798
  
The Courts
 
has the right to request a bank guarantee form the applicants to ensure they are serious; this 
is not mandatory, but subject to the Court’s discretion. The Courts will appoint an inspector with 
jurisdiction in such matters; he shall have broad powers, such as questioning the members of the board 
of directors and the auditor in private meetings, and being granted access to all documents and records 
relating to the company. 
If the investigator is satisfied that the applicants’ suspicions are well founded, the Courts can take the 
appropriate and necessary measures, such as seizing all company documents. In extreme cases, the 
Court has the right to call an EGM to discuss and take decisions on the matter, possibly resulting in a 
lawsuit against the members of the board of directors or the auditors; the EGM may decide to dismiss 
them and appoint a new director with specific tasks for a certain period.  
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In this context, the Board of Grievance on 8
th
 February, 2001 issued the first judgment stating the 
shareholder’s right to request an inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 109. This 
judgment also confirmed the shareholder’s right to engage an accredited accountant to inspect the 
company’s affairs and management expenses. However, it is noted that the period of litigation in this 
case lasted a great deal of time (over 8 months); such claims need to be expedited as quickly as 
possible because listed companies are financial institutions consisting of a great many shareholders 
who invested in it for profit, and any litigation is likely to result in some financial loss, which will 
reflect negatively on the interests of the shareholders and third parties.
799
 
However, it could be said that the inspection right under the SCL 1965 is not a workable method for 
minority shareholders; indeed, it may be defective. This is for various reasons; first: the above article 
does not mention a few important points that should have been provided for in any inspection request, 
such as: 1) the right of the competent authorities to inspect the companies (such as the MOCI, 
CMA),
800
 2) the need to mention the reasons for the inspection in the inspection request, and 3) the 
need to protect the shares of the applicants pending a ruling on the lawsuit.  
Second: Article 109 has also been criticized for its requirement to provide a financial guarantee 
designed to ensure the credibility of the applicants; it is supposedly designed to protect the company, 
its activities and reputation from any unwarranted action.  Additionally, this article is criticized for 
being loose and too broad in its statements pertaining to the concept of doubt or suspicion on the part 
of the applicants. It does not specify, for example, the situations in which a request may be filed; also, 
it does not clarify whether or not it is possible to re-elect any isolated board members or to re-appoint 
the auditors. 
Third: in the case of a request failing, SCL 1965 does not mention any procedures to be followed, such 
as the right of the company to seek compensation if any damage has been caused to the company and 
its interests. However, it does provide for the rehabilitation of members of the board or auditors who 
had been accused, stating that the result of any inspection be published for the public’s information 
through the media; everyone who is entitled to request compensation also has the right to do so. 
Moreover, the article does not clarify the legal status of the inspector should he commit any breach of 
his remit, which may affect the result of the inspection. 
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It has been concluded that, despite the importance of inspections for shareholders, they are not as 
practically effective as they could be because of the lack of clarity in the legal text under Article 109. 
There are also too few means of communication for the minority of shareholders who may need to 
discuss the affairs of the company and to prepare an inspection request; further, Article 109 states that 
they must do so through completion of the required quorum. Thus, the investigation method should be 
reformed to improve the position of shareholders and to enhance the protection of investors in listed 
companies in general. 
The investigation method for companies in the UK is more detailed and comprehensive than in KSA; 
all investigations are conducted through the Companies Investigation Branch (CIB),
801
 which has the 
power to assign an inspector (or more if needed) to investigate the company’s affairs. However, there 
must be reasonable cause to suspect fraud, serious misconduct, material violations, or important 
irregularity in the affairs of the company to initiate an investigation.
802
 
The CA 2006 also confers the Secretary of State the power of investigation of a company’s affairs; and 
has right to appoint an inspector (s) (a barrister and an accountant)
803
, depending on the situation, and 
they will report the results of the investigation directly to the Secretary of State.
804
 Also, an 
investigation order may be requested by a number of company’s members not less than 200, or by 
members who hold not less than one-tenth of the issued shares.
805
 
The Secretary of State has the power  under CA 2006 to investigate a company for a number of 
reasons, which are mentioned under this Act; the Secretary can appoint an investigator in the following 
situations:
806
 if anyone is suspected of intentionally working to defraud the company’s creditors or the 
creditors of any other person, or for any illegal goal; if anyone is suspected of abusing the company’s 
affairs in a way that is unfairly prejudicial to some of its members; when an action by the company is 
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considered prejudicial, or when the company was formed for an illegal purpose, or the concerned 
persons in the company’s formation or its affairs have been guilty of fraud, or other misconduct 
towards it or its members; and when the company’s members are not being supplied with all the 
information relating to its affairs that they may logically expect. The courts may also order an 
investigation. 
To apply for an investigation, there needs to some evidence; the Secretary of State may wish to 
establish that the applicant has good reason for requiring the investigation.
807
 Accordingly, any 
application should be supported by evidence submitted by the complainant shareholders, in order to 
confirm the validity of their complaint. This evidence should confirm there are some doubts or 
irregularities over the company’s behaviour, and that there are reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, 
serious misconduct, materially wrongful behaviour or serious irregularity in the company’s affairs. 
Furthermore, the inspections are confidential.
808
 
Following this, the Secretary of State may decide that there are good reasons for the requested 
investigation and that it would be in the public interest; accordingly, the Secretary will appoint 
investigators or decide that there is insufficient basis for the investigation.
809
 When the investigation is 
decided by the Secretary of State, s/he will appoint one or more inspectors; they will perform their 
duties in accordance with the wide powers granted in the Act. Therefore, they have the authority to 
meet all officers and agents of the company, and all officers and agents of any other corporation to 
attend before the inspectors whenever they are required to do so; the inspectors have the right to place 
the interviewees under oath.
810
 Also, officers in the company must show the inspectors all books and 
documents relating to the company.
811
 Further, the inspectors have the power under the Act to 
investigate a company’s affairs even when the company is already under investigation by another 
body.
812
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In addition, under CA 2006 Section 1037, the Secretary of State may give investigators the power to 
gather information from a former investigator, who may have been appointed as an investigator but 
resigned, or whose appointment has been revoked.
813
 Investigators can also ask any person involved in 
the company or any third party to provide documents, explanations of the documents, or any other 
information relating to the company; such questions can be of a wide range and those being asked the 
questions are obliged by law to provide answers, moreover, investigators have the power to enter and 
search the premises of the company, to look for any documents or books relating to the 
investigation.
814
 
However, if any corporate official or anyone involved in the investigation refuses to respond positively 
to their demands, the inspectors may apply to the courts, and the court may punish the offenders in an 
appropriate manner (as if he had been guilty of contempt of the court);
815
 the punishment may be a fine 
or imprisonment or both.
816
 The authorities of the Secretary of State in an investigation have been 
strengthened by the Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprise Act 2004.
817
 
At the end of an investigation, the results of the final report may lead the Secretary of State to do one 
of the followings: submit a petition to the courts to find a solution for the shareholders in the company 
on the basis of unfair prejudicial conduct;
818
 apply to the courts to order a compulsory liquidation of 
the company in the public interest;
819
 or present a petition to the courts to request disqualification of 
the directors or shadow directors of the company (directors can be disqualified for a period of up to 15 
years).
820
 
It has been argued that Common Law countries offer a good level of protection to shareholders; this 
can be seen in the UK, which provides a package of laws to protect minority shareholders.
821
 The 
statutory protection under CA 2006 for individual and minority shareholders is broader and more 
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comprehensive; actually, it is more modern than SCL 1965 in terms of protection for shareholders. 
Any shareholder has the right to request from the company a copy of the company’s articles, or a copy 
of the company’s constitution.822 In addition, shareholders have the right to receive from the company 
a copy of its annual accounts and reports for each financial year,
823
 and the company must send copies 
to the shareholders at least 21 days before the date of any relevant accounts meeting.
824
 Moreover, 
shareholders have the right to inspect and require copies of the register and index of members, without 
charge. The company has the right either to comply with such requests or to go to court to refuse a 
request within five working days.
825
 However, the court may order the company to comply (or 
otherwise) at its discretion.
826
 
It is interesting to point out that shareholders have the power to require the company to publish on its 
website any material relating to the audit of the company’s accounts, or any circumstances connected 
with an auditor of the company ceasing to hold office since the previous accounts meeting.
827
 
Under the Section 314 of the UK CA 2006, members who represent at least 5% of the total voting 
rights have the right to request the company to circulate a statement regarding any matters related a 
proposed resolution or business affairs; this statement should not exceed 1,000 words. The company, 
on receiving such a request, must do so,
828
 as any proposal will be excluded if the statement is deemed 
ineffective, defamatory of any person, or frivolous or vexatious.
829
  
On the other hand, with respect to statutory protection for shareholders, does SCL 1965 provide 
minority shareholders with the right of petition to the judiciary to wind up the company? Also, is the 
shareholder granted the right to demand the company be wound up in the case of the company’s affairs 
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being, or have been conducted in an unfair prejudicial manner, against the interests of the company 
itself and its shareholders? 
 
Actually, under SCL 1965, there is no provision granting minority shareholders the right to demand 
the winding up of the company by the court; thus, there is no legal right for the court to accept a 
request for the dissolution of the company, except in certain cases. These cases are, firstly, where the 
losses of the company reach three-quarters of the company’s capital, and in this case, the board must 
call for EGM to consider the dissolution (or otherwise) of the company; and secondly, if the board 
neglects to call an EGM, or it has been impossible to issue a decision in this regard, then it is possible 
for everyone in the company who has an interest to appeal to the court to wind up the company.
830
 
Based on the above, it has been argued that if the shareholder were given the right to wind up the 
company through due judicial process on the basis of harmful action, it would be considered one of the 
most important and fundamental rights ensuring the protection of his interests in the company. 
Unfortunately, there is no such right in SCL 1965; on this point, the judiciary has the power to accept 
or refuse an application, in order to avoid arbitrariness on the part of the shareholder, which could 
possibly harm the interests of the company or its reputation. This right to accept or refuse an 
application is subject to certain limitations, such as proof of a harmful act or the inability of the 
company to continue in business, and a financial guarantee must be provided until the completion of 
the lawsuit. 
 
In the UK, minority shareholders have the right to present a petition to the court to wind up the 
company. This is a statutory remedy conferred under the Insolvent Act 1986, S. 122 (1) (g); any 
petition to the court must be on just and equitable grounds.
831
 The winding up of the company can be 
decided by the court; however, the court can reject a winding up order when an alternative remedy is 
available to the petitioner (such as CA 2006, S. 994), or that there is some evidence of unreasonable 
behaviour behind this order, i.e. that there is an alternative remedy.
832
 However, winding up the 
company as a statutory remedy will lead to the demise of a solvent company and result in the loss of 
jobs, and most minority shareholders will not profit from this.
833
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It is argued that a winding-up order under the Saudi system would be effective and beneficial as a 
statutory remedy for the protection of minority shareholders; however, it is argued that such a remedy 
could be a powerful weapon, and certain parties may abuse it. Also, granting the minority this right 
could lead to disruption of the smooth running of many corporations.
834
 
Thus, it is believed that the winding-up right could be too severe a remedy and that granting 
shareholders such a right could adversely affect the business affairs of the company. However, such 
concerns are largely unrealistic, given that this right would only be granted under the condition that a 
certain number of shareholders demand it. On this point, the court would have discretion in accepting 
or dismissing the winding-up application, and the court would only order the winding-up of the 
company as the only available remedy. 
In fact, the most important statute remedy for shareholders under CA 2006 is the ability of members to 
petition the court for relief on the basis that the company’s affairs have been conducted in a manner 
that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the shareholders in general or of some portion of them.
835
 
To establish a claim under the S. 994, the aggrieved shareholders must demonstrate that: the affairs of 
the company in question have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
the petitioner.
836
 In order to present petitions for relief on the unfair prejudice ground, a petitioner must 
have the locus standi prescribed by S. 994; “The provisions of this Part apply to a person who is not a 
member of a company but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted by 
operation of law as they apply to a member of a company”.837 
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The court should be satisfied that the petition is well founded, it may order any such remedy it thinks 
fit for giving relief regarding the matters complained of;
838
 it may order the conduct of the company’s 
affairs to be regulated in the future; require the company not to do the act complained of; authorise 
civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person or persons, 
and on such terms as the court may direct; require the company not to make any specified alterations in 
its articles without the leave of the court; provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members or by the company itself; and order the reduction of the company’s capital 
accordingly if the company itself purchases.
839
 
In general, the court is not prepared to grant a petitioner the permission to continue derivative 
proceedings where remedies under S. 994 still exist, such as purchasing the shares, where the shares 
purchase order almost invariably requires a majority to buy out a minority.
840
 
 
On the other hand, do the minority shareholders under SCL 1965 have the right to prevent or nullify 
decisions taken at the GM that are marred by abuse of power or are deemed oppressive through the 
actions or decisions of the controlling majority within the board of directors or in the GM? Article 97 
SCL 1965 regulated the provisions for objection; “… all resolutions adopted by the shareholders’ 
meeting contrary to the provisions of these Regulations or of the company’s bylaws shell be 
considered null and void. The GAFC and any shareholder who has recorded his name in objection to 
the resolution in the minutes of the meeting or who was absent from the meeting for an acceptable 
reason, may request to invalidate a resolution… Nevertheless an action of invalidation (of the 
resolution) shall be barred after the lapse of one year from the date of such resolution”.841 
 
According to the provision, the shareholder is entitled the right to object to the resolutions of the GMs 
if they contrary to the law or the articles of association, on condition that the shareholder attends the 
meeting and object in the minutes of the meeting. If the shareholder does not attend the meeting, 
he/she shall not be entitled to object unless there is an acceptable reason preventing his/her attendance. 
It is argued that the objection is criticized because it does not give effective guarantees to minority 
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shareholders. An example of this is: the shareholder who has agreed to the resolution and then found 
out later that it was null for some reason; in this case, the above text does not explain if he/she is 
allowed to object to the resolution or not; also, it does not explain if is it necessary for the shareholder 
in order to object to the resolution to attend the meeting, which is practically impossible due to the 
large number of shareholders in JSCs. Also, the above article does not explain the case of shareholders 
who did not attend the meeting because they had received an invitation from the company, or their 
name had been dropped from the invitation list by mistake.
842
 However, such objection shall not be 
heard a year after the date of the resolution.
843
 In addition, if the resolution is adjudged invalid, it will 
benefit all shareholders, regardless of the resolution being passed or not.
844
 
 
Unfortunately, in either SCL 1965 or in the SCGRs, there is no provision that regulates the right of 
minority shareholders in objecting to the resolutions issued by the GM on the basis of oppression by 
the majority, discriminatory behaviour, abuse of power or unfair prejudice. In fact, most shareholders 
are unable to determine whether or not the resolution is true or void.   
However, it has already been mentioned that most resolutions are made by the majority that controls 
the company’s management, and their interests are usually above or at the expense of the minority. A 
further criticism that is directed at SCL 1965 is that it does not assign any role to the minority within 
GMs; indeed, it does not give this subject any attention. It could be suggested that SCL 1965 should 
add a new set of rights for minority shareholders, in order to protect their interests as well as the 
interests of the company. 
 
To sum up this section, redress mechanisms for individual shareholders are present in SCL 1965 to 
allow for filing a liability action against the company; however, no particular regime is specified in the 
law or the regulations for minority shareholders.
845
 As well, SCGRs, which were issued in 2006, do 
not cover the problems that the minority shareholders suffer from directors; however, they should 
serve to empower their position against oppression of majority. SCL 1965 and more particularly 
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Article 76 & 78 do not provide efficient protection to minority shareholders against abuse or 
oppression by the controlling shareholders. Moreover, most provisions of SCL 1965 need 
comprehensive amendment to give minority shareholders extensive protection, as they are not 
protected because of deficiencies in the current law. 
 
6.7 Punishments as Additional Protection of Shareholder 
 
In order to be respected and followed by others, the law has to include a range of penalties which apply 
to any person who contravenes the provisions of law. Such punishments are considered, in the world of 
listed companies, as a kind of protection for shareholders, partners, and all of those who have interest 
in the company. It aims to not violate relevant laws of companies, and thus will force every officer in 
the company (founders, members of the board of directors, the auditor ...) to comply with the law in 
order to protect the interests of shareholders and the interests of other groups in the company; in 
addition to contributing to the prevention of assaults against the company and minimize them. 
 
There are only two articles describing punishments (229 & 230), and unfortunately they overlook 
many important breaches. SCL 1965 regulates (in the two articles) a limited range of punishments; 
they require imprisonment from three months up to one year, or a fine of 1,000 SAR up to 20,000 
SAR,
846
 or a combination of both, with no violation of the provisions of Islamic law. It can be said that 
the punishments provided in the current SCL 1965 are very lenient and are not rigid, and certainly 
there is no fit between them and the gross faults caused to the company and its shareholders. As a 
result, the aim of these punishments will not be achieved. Also, when the offence is repeated by the 
same person, the punishment is doubled.
847
 
Article 229 of SCL 1965 criminalizes with imprisonment from 3 months up to a year, or a fine of 
5,000 up to 20.000 SAR, or a combination of both: 
1- Any person who deliberately enters false information, or violates the provisions of the law in 
the documents of the company, such as the constitution of the company, or the prospectus, or in 
the application for authorization to incorporate it, and the one who signed in such a manner 
shall be also punished (this also applies to anyone who was involved in distribution if they 
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knew about it).
848
 In addition, the article criminalizes anyone who arranges for the public 
subscription of shares or bonds if it is done so contrary to the provisions of SLC 1965.
849
 
2- Any person who offers shares, or who evaluates the in-kind shares exaggeratedly and 
unfairly.
850
 
3- Any director of the company, or a member of board of directors if he acquired sham profits or 
distributed them to the partners.
851
 
4- Any person who willfully gives false statements in the company’s budget or the accounts for 
profit and loss, or in reports of the GM or its partners, or anyone who conceals the company’s 
financial condition by hiding any such false statements in the reports (whether directors, 
managers, auditor or liquidator).
852
 
5- Any person who discloses the company’s secrets to others by virtue of his work. 
6- Any officer in the company who does not apply the binding rules according to the regulations 
and decisions of the competent authorities; also, anyone who is deemed to be in non-
compliance with the instructions of the MOCI, with respect to the obligations of the company 
in allowing the MOCI delegate to access the company’s documents. 
 
The fines for any breaches by the board members are collected from their remuneration; in fact, it can 
be noted that the fines tend to be small, as the members of the board of directors enjoys large bonuses 
and allowances. Therefore, the violation is not commensurate with the punishment. 
 
Article 230 of SCL 1965 awards some punishments through fines only, from 1,000 SAR up to 5,000 
SAR for each perpetrator of the following; 
1- Any person who contravenes the provisions of Article 12,
853
 which stipulates that it is 
imperative to issue company papers in a manner that indicates their character, such as in terms 
of name, type and central office; if the company is under liquidation, this too shall be 
indicated.
854
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2- Any person who issues shares, debentures, subscription receipts or interim certificates, or who 
offers them for circulation, is considered contrary to the provisions of SCL 1965.
855
 
3- Any member of the board of directors, or director, who neglected to send documents as 
stipulated in SCL 1965 to the GAFC as well as anyone who hampered the work of the 
auditor.
856
 
 
In contrast, in the UK, CA 2006 contains a remarkably large number of criminal offences; most of 
them are designed to punish misconduct by companies and directors but some address the conduct of 
shareholders and even third parties; the offences are spread across a wide range of provisions.
857
 The 
offences in CA 2006 are comprehensive and more modern; they consist of fines and terms of 
imprisonment, or both of; for example: 
1- The directors of a company must not exercise any power of the company to allot shares 
in the company, except in accordance with authorization by that company;
858
 any director who 
knowingly contravenes, or permits or authorizes a contravention commits an offence;
859
 a 
director guilty of an offence shall be liable, on conviction or indictment, to a fine.
860
 
2- The company and its officers guilty of an offence shall be liable to a fine of no more than 
£1,000 if they: 
I. Failed to send a copy of amended articles to the registrar not later than 15 days after the 
amendment takes effect.
861
 
II. Failed to forward the resolutions or agreements to the registrar within 15 days after they 
have been passed or made.
862
 
III. Failed to give the registrar notice of changes made to the company’s constitution by court 
order, not later than 15 days after the enactment comes into force.
863
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3- The company and its officers guilty of an offence will be liable to a fine of less than £5,000 if 
they fail to comply with the directions of the Secretary of State regarding the requirements 
pertaining to the appointment of directors.
864
 
4- The register of directors must be available for inspection; otherwise, the company and its 
officers (including the shadow director) will be liable for a fine of no more than £1,000.
865
 
5- If the company and any officers fail to send the annual accounts and reports for each financial 
year to every person who is entitled to receive one, they will be liable to a fine.
866
 
6- Where a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a transaction 
or arrangement that has been entered into by the company, he must declare the nature and 
extent of that interest to the other directors.
867
 Any director who fails to comply with this 
commits an offence, and will be liable to a £5,000 fine.
868
 
7- If a company or/and its officers fail to comply with the duty to keep accounting records, they 
will be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.
869
 
8- Any director who gives false information about himself to the company as required by the 
Secretary of State, or who fails to give such information, is liable to a fine or imprisonment, or 
both.
870
 
9- Every company must keep recorded minutes of all proceedings at the meetings of its directors. 
If a company fails to comply with this, an offence is committed by every officer of the 
company. A person guilty of such an offence is liable to a fine.
871
 
10- Company’s members have the right to circulate a note for the next general meeting; if any 
officers in the company fail to do that, they may be liable to a fine.
872
 
11- The company’s officers are guilty and will be liable to fine if they prevent the company from 
publishing any poll taken at a GM on its website.
873
 
It could be said that the main objective of these punishments (financial, imprisonment or both) is not 
just to inflict punishment on the offender or violator; rather, it reaches beyond that, as the punishments 
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are intended to deter anyone from attempting to commit such offences in the future, or any offence that 
damages the company’s reputation or the interests of its shareholders. Unfortunately, such an objective 
is apparent in the current SCL 1965, which includes only a limited set of offences with relatively weak 
punishments; the punishments have no practical effect on the violator, and they need to be reviewed 
with urgency. 
 
In fact, a great deal of criticism has been levelled at the punishments mentioned in SCL 1965 on the 
grounds that they are too few and too lenient, and that the law does not include other important 
violations. The punishments are not commensurate with the violations; in addition, these punishments 
need, from time to time, to be updated (or cancelled) in line with reality.  
 
It is proposed that these two articles be amended to increase the fines and imprisonment periods, in 
order to make them more of a deterrent; also, a set of serious violations (not mentioned in the current 
SCL 1965) should be added, and these violations should be phrased as examples. To regulate such 
violations, a comprehensive study should be conducted by a specialized team. The goal of these 
amendments and additions should be to ensure the protection of the interests of the company, the 
shareholders and all of those who have interests in it. It could be said that such protection needs strong 
punishments, ones that make the offender think before committing such offences.  
 
Thus, this study proposes amendments and the addition of other offences that need to be mentioned in 
law. Offenders should be punished with imprisonment for not less than 1 year and up to 5 years, or 
with a fine of not less than 100,000 SAR and up to 3 million SAR, or both, as follows: 
1- Every officer or member of the board (or manager using company funds) who knows that it is 
against the interests of the company, whether directly or indirectly. 
2- Every officer or member of the board (or former employee) using the powers granted to him by 
law or the constitution of company, with the knowledge that it is against the interests of the 
company, in order to achieve personal benefits, whether directly or indirectly. 
3- Every officer, member of the board or auditor (or former employee) who does not inform the 
GM of the company or shareholders, upon becoming aware of the company’s losses reaching 
50% of its capital, or does not announce such a loss to the public. 
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4- The use of funds of the company, its assets and its rights to third parties by the auditor knowing 
that it is contrary to the general interests of the company, or might intentionally cause harm to 
the creditors or partners, in order to achieve personal benefits, directly or indirectly. 
5- Any person appointed to investigate the company who intentionally makes false reports of the 
events, or intentionally omits core facts that influence the result of the investigation; and all 
those who intentionally include false statements or ones contrary to the law, in the constitution 
of company, in the other documents of the company, in the application for a license for 
establishing the company, or in the documents accompanying the application of establishment, 
and anyone who signed or distributed those documents, with knowledge of it. 
6- Any person who impersonates a shareholder or partner, and who then votes at a GM for 
shareholders or partners, whether personally or through another person. 
7- Any director who causes deliberately to disable the call for a GM to be held or not be held. 
8- Any person who neglects to perform his duty in inviting the GM of shareholders or partners to 
convene within the prescribed period in accordance with the law. 
9- Anyone who intentionally prevents a shareholder or partner from participating in a GM for 
shareholders or partners, or prevents him from enjoying the right to vote in accordance with his 
shares or quota, or as a partner, contrary to the law.  
10- Anyone who so charged does and write down the minutes of the meetings in accordance with 
the law. 
11- Anyone who accepts to undertake the task of auditor, or who continues doing this, knowing 
that there are reasons preventing him from performing those tasks in accordance with the law. 
12- Anyone who accepts appointment as a member of the board of directors in the company, or a 
member named to manage it, or still enjoys its membership contrary to the provisions 
prescribed herein, and each member of the board of company that witnesses these offences if he 
knew about them.  
13- Each member of the board of directors who receives a guarantee or loan from the company in 
contrary with the provisions of law, as well as the chairman of the board of directors if he 
knows about such violations. 
14- Anyone who does not make all of the necessary documents available to the shareholders or 
partners in accordance with the law. 
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15- Anyone who deliberately hinders those who have the right to inspect the company’s papers and 
documents, accounts and books, by the virtue of the law and constitution of the company; or 
anyone who causes such hindrance. 
16- Anyone who gains personal benefit in return for voting in a particular direction, or not 
participate in the vote, as well as the one who offers that benefit. 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
Chapter Six has focused on the protection of shareholders’ rights in terms of jurisprudence; this 
chapter has highlighted the rights of shareholders in seeking to defend their interests and the interests 
of the company, and to protect them from harmful acts committed by third parties or employees of the 
company, through the legal means and remedies available in SCL 1965. As already discussed, the 
greater bulk of the shareholders in listed companies in KSA are small shareholders. This minority 
should have the right to preserve the interests of the company against any assault that may affect their 
interests and the company as well. 
 
Unfortunately, in accordance with SCL 1965, the company is entitled to maintain its interests and the 
interests of shareholders against any detrimental act, whether from within the company or from 
without; if the company does not file a liability suit against the aggressor through the GM, the 
shareholders have no right to file a liability claim on behalf of the company and for the company itself. 
This is considered a violation of the rights of shareholders, and it weakens their position in the 
company; further, it enables the majority shareholders to control the process of making important 
decisions in the company. 
  
It was found that there is a flaw in the Saudi system, where the Saudi legislature has clearly combined 
company suits and individual shareholder suits, despite the differences in their relative positions and in 
the effects of such suits; it is hoped that the Saudi legislature will reconsider its approach in this 
regard. SCL 1965 does not give a shareholder the right to file a lawsuit on behalf of the company in 
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the event of a GM objecting to raise any case in question. It is also hoped that the Saudi legislature will 
provide clear provisions on a shareholder’s right to file a suit on behalf of the company, in order to 
defend the company and its interests; this would definitely raise the level of protection for all 
shareholders. 
 
Meanwhile, SCL 1965 gives the shareholder who owns 5% or more of the capital of the company the 
right to request the MOCI for an inspection of the company’s affairs if he has suspicions of fraud or 
incompetence. This right is an important guarantee for the protection of shareholders; however, it is 
suggested that the inspection system needs to be amended in its legal provisions to grant more than 
200 shareholders the right to request an inspection when they have strong evidence of the existence of 
fraud within the company; certainly, it would remain the court’s power to accept or reject the 
application. Furthermore, it is believed that it is the duty of the Saudi legislature to provide for this 
right at all times, and to give the investigators all necessary powers to run the investigation as they see 
fit in order to prove a case or reject it, to determine the truth of the matter, and to report to the MOCI 
to decide on any appropriate action within its remit. 
 
Generally, a GM will object to a shareholder filing a suit if it is deemed to threaten the influence of the 
controlling shareholders who, de facto, manage the company. The current law does not provide any 
guarantees for minority shareholders against any excessive behaviour on the part of the major 
shareholders in the company, or against their being prevented from exercising their rights. For 
example, minority shareholders cannot file to liquidate the company before the courts should they find 
that the company is being managed only to achieve the interests of a particular class. In this context, 
the competent court should be given full authority to consider or refuse the case from the beginning. 
The court must have a greater role in protecting the rights of shareholders, such as the right to modify 
the memorandum of association, to order the company to purchase the shares of disgruntled 
shareholders at a fair price, and to dissolve the company should it see fit, amongst others. Again, the 
Saudi legislature clearly mingles company suits with individual shareholder suits in spite of their clear 
differences. Accordingly, this study suggests that the Saudi legislature reconsider its approach in this 
regard in order to allow shareholders the right to protect the company on its behalf in certain cases. 
Moreover, minority shareholders play only a limited role within the GM, and are largely unable to 
prosecute the members of the board of directors on the basis of abuse or misuse of power; this matter 
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is not mentioned in SCL 1965. This is one of the disadvantages of the company law, which has failed 
to protect minority shareholders. It urgently needs to be rewritten in order to keep pace with the 
modern commercial era. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
This study has focused on shareholders’ rights in JSCs under SCL 1965. It is one of the few studies 
dealing with equity within JSCs in KSA in a comprehensive manner; in fact, one of the main reasons 
for choosing this topic is the importance of highlighting the rights of shareholders, particularly 
minority shareholders, of protecting them, and of contributing to the dissemination of an investment 
culture among shareholders. 
As we have seen, the shareholders are the owners of the company’s shares; the company is a legal 
entity that is entirely separate from them. The company is the original owner of its assets, and once a 
person receives shares in the company, he is accorded a set of rights and obligations, which are 
directly associated with the ownership of those shares, and when he rid himself of them, he frees 
himself of those rights and obligations.  
The shareholders in the company are considered a source of finance in generating the company’s 
capital. Therefore, they deserve profit but must bear loss in proportion to their ownership of the 
capital. Also, shareholders are entitled to participate in the management of the company as well as in 
the general policies of the company; these are effected through GMs. GMs are considered one of the 
most important organs of the company along with the board of directors; each of them has a specific 
set of authorities as per law or the company’s articles, and their goal is to achieve the company’s 
interests, including the interests of shareholders. If the company is liquidated, the shareholders have 
rights to the assets of the company as a percentage of their ownership. Thus, shareholder’s rights exist 
from the establishment stage of the company until its dissolution stage. 
Moreover, this study has identified the shareholders’ rights in JSCs that they should enjoy in 
accordance with the provisions of SCL 1965. In this study, we tackled the provisions of company law 
in a comparative manner; the most important comparison was made with CA 2006 of the UK. We did 
this in order to assess the coverage and the existing legislative shortcomings within SCL 1965, and to 
find appropriate solutions to the problems relating to the rights of shareholders. 
In this conclusion, we focus on the most important points that we have discussed in this study in 
relation to the rights of shareholders, and make some appropriate recommendations in order to 
promote the protection of shareholders’ rights within JSCs vis-à-vis SCL 1965. 
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In the second chapter, the research described the Saudi State, and mentioned how KSA’s legal 
system functions; this necessitated describing the purposes and mechanisms of the three authorities of 
state. It found that there are, alongside these authorities, additional powers, principally the authority of 
the Royal Order. It also showed how some legislations are issued by the Council of Ministers, which 
has both executive and legislative authority at the same time; this authority in the state is second only 
to the King. In addition, SCL 1965 was tackled, describing how it was drafted, its position with respect 
to the legal protection of shareholders in JSCs, and the importance of protecting shareholders and 
investors within JSCs. Then, it explained how a JSC is established according to the Saudi system, the 
most important bodies in this, the roles of the board of directors and GMs, and finally how companies 
are liquidated. 
 
Moreover, in this chapter we reviewed the experience of modern corporate governance regulations in 
KSA, and found that they have not generally achieved the desired aims. Actually, the SCGRs have 
been criticized a great deal, and the most important point is they sometimes conflict with the 
provisions of SCL 1965. On the other hand, many of its provisions are intended as guidelines only, 
although some of them have been issued in the form of orders/decrees. As for protecting the rights of 
shareholders, the SCGRs did not introduce anything new, as many of the rules were copied from SCL 
1965. Thus, we would encourage the Saudi legislature to reconsider the SCGRs, and to address the 
shortcomings of SCL 1965, in order to make the protection of shareholders’ rights more powerful and 
effective than it currently is. 
 
On the other hand, many shareholders are unfamiliar with the term CG; there is a general weakness in 
spreading the concept of CG, and the functions of the CMA in terms of educating investors are limited. 
Also, there is a need to include other organizations in the dissemination CG; for example, public and 
private universities in KSA should adopt teaching CG, as the number of academic studies on this 
subject is very low. This interest in the subject of CG is found in many countries around the world, for 
example in the UK, where we find many universities teaching CG, emphasizing its importance and the 
benefits that can flow for the national economy; many academic studies are published every year in 
these countries, adding new information to benefit their business communities. 
 
Such attempts would definitely contribute to the dissemination of investment culture among 
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shareholders, and increase knowledge of their rights within the company, which would then result in 
the exercise of those rights in an efficacious manner. Their observation of the deeds of board of 
directors would also increase and, in general, this would contribute to improving the legal and 
commercial environment in KSA. 
 
The aim of this chapter was to give the reader a comprehensive overview of KSA, as every country is 
different in terms of establishing companies, the legal system of the state, and how the state authorities 
function. All of these are directly or indirectly relevant to the subject of this study. 
 
The third chapter included a discussion on the various company theories; it sought to determine 
whether a company is based on contractual theory or institutional theory. The importance of this point 
is that it relates the position of shareholders and their role within JSCs; however, it was found that 
there is no easy answer.  
Contractual theory believes that a company is merely a contract organized by certain parties, between 
multiple people who have the freedom to create it; it argues that a company is a private contract and 
that the state is not entitled to interfere, except in terms of certain organizational aspects. This is why 
those people are the actual owners of the JSC.   
On the other hand, institutional theory considers a company to be a project established in accordance 
with a resolution by the relevant governmental authority (through certain procedures); i.e. the state has 
a great role in the establishment and functioning of the company. The role of state in JSCs thus 
increases under this theory, and shareholders are merely the suppliers of capital. 
However, it can be said that a company is not solely a contract, giving the contracting parties complete 
freedom in organizing it without having to follow the rules established by law. Thus, a JSC cannot be 
solely a private contract; that is to say, the contracting parties should take into account the rules laid 
down by the legislature, and cannot ignore the rules of common law, which are mandatory; such rules 
are found in all legislations due to their importance of regulating the activities of companies 
(especially JSCs) within the state. 
 
A company is actually a set of contracts between it and its stakeholders; the concept of contractual 
theory completely disappears in a corporation. A corporation operates according to multiple contracts 
with several parties, such as creditors, customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers and others. This 
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is found clearly in the first article of SCL 1965, which stipulates that a company is a contract whereby 
two or more people commit in a project to provide a share in cash or in kind in order to generate 
profits, and to distribute those profits and to bear any losses resulting from the project.  
We find a clear example of state intervention in the establishment of a company under Article 52, 
which stipulates that it is not permissible to establish a JSC without a license issued by the MOCI. As 
we have seen, protection is the demand of all stakeholders (not just shareholders) in a company, and in 
fact, the legislature interferes in the activities of a company (through mandatory provisions) in order to 
protect investors and the wider community. JSCs also have minority shareholders, and severe damage 
could be done to the country’s economy as well as individual shareholders if a company is not 
established and operated in accordance with the law. On this point, the legislature may intervene 
heavily in order to protect the public interest as well as individuals in JSCs. We find such intervention 
on the part of the Saudi legislature through several legal provisions in SCL 1965 and in the CML and 
implementing regulations; these give the MOCI and the CMA a major role to play in the formation and 
dissolution of JSCs. 
 
Once the license to establish a JSC has been issued, the company becomes a legal person independent 
from the shareholders, and be the actual owner of its assets; the shareholders are owners of shares in 
the capital of the company only, and are not owners of the company. In obtaining a share, the owner 
becomes entitled to a set of rights and obligations associated with the share. However, possession of 
the company’s assets may only be transferred to the shareholders following the liquidation of the 
company and the fulfilment of all its obligations and debts. After that, the shareholder has the right to 
retrieve his portion in accordance with his share in the capital of the company. 
 
Also in this chapter, we defined shareholder and share as well as its features. The ownership of a share 
means ownership of the rights associated with it; the legislature has divided shares into two types only: 
ordinary shares and premium ones. The shareholder shall exercise those rights within the company 
under the law and the company’s bylaws. A shareholder shall not be prevented in any way from 
exercising the rights relating to the share, but those can be restricted in certain circumstances. SCL 
1965 does not give any definition for share or shareholder, or even for JSC, even though such 
definitions are important for removing any confusion that may appear. No detailed provisions are 
available for premium shares; they are only mentioned briefly. This criticism is in addition to others 
levelled at SCL 1965, one of which is with regard to the article 68 that stipulates that a member of the 
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board who is also a shareholder in the company is required to provide shares to ensure the performance 
in the company; and it is a fault that the legal article stipulates that the value of share is very low 
because it can't deter the member in case of violation. However, there should be a balance between the 
punishment and the offending act. 
 
The fourth chapter was on the theme of shareholders’ financial rights, including the right to dispose 
of the share (sale, gift, mortgage, etc.), the right to profits, priority in subscribing for new shares, and 
the right to the company’s assets upon liquidation. The shareholder’s right is considered an inherent 
right that cannot be, in any way, prevented from being exercised; the company has no power to prevent 
the shareholder from disposing of his shares, but some restrictions may be imposed to prevent the 
disposition of shares for a temporary period.  
Having said that, SCL 1965 imposes a set of restrictions in the public interest as well as in the interest 
of shareholders; also, the company has no right to provide that the shareholder shall not dispose of 
their shares absolutely. Financial rights are the main reasons for people investing in these companies. 
Another criticism levelled at SCL 1965 is that it allows Company’s board to put new restrictions 
without stipulating any particular regulations on this matter, which could be extremely dangerous to 
minority shareholders’ rights, on the grounds that this could constitute a motive for controlling 
shareholders and the board of directors to include such restrictions in the company’s articles without 
criteria controlling their powers. This is on the one hand, and on the other, these restrictions in SCL 
1965 undermine the foundations upon which JSCs in particular are based; the most distinctive feature 
of JSCs is the freedom to trade shares.  
We also discussed in this chapter one of the more important financial rights for shareholders, as 
stipulated in SCL 1965, which is the right of priority in subscribing to shares in the new company 
before third parties. The company must offer any new shares to shareholders before any other party in 
order to maintain the balance of power within the company. This right is explicitly stipulated in Article 
136  but unfortunately, in the same article, it stipulates that the company’s articles may waive or 
restrict this shareholder right,; i.e., the board of directors are entitled to issue new shares without 
offering them to current shareholders first. Actually, SCL 1965 should have been striven to guarantee 
this shareholder right unless the shareholder himself surrenders it on his own accord. 
As for the company's financial reserves, SCL 1965 permits the board of directors in a JSC to create 
optional reserves at any time it sees fit; we explained in this chapter the types of reserves and their 
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importance in the company’s financing, as well as in the company’s defence against future challenges. 
Expansion in creating other reserves could result in the board of directors expanding and achieving its 
interests at the expense of other shareholders, which may then endanger shareholders’ interests in the 
company; it is the duty of the legislature to clarify this matter in order to protect the weaker parties in 
the company. 
 
Following this, we discussed in this chapter the most important rights relating to the ownership of a 
share, which is the shareholder’s right to annual profits, and we defined the term profit. However, SCL 
1965 has been criticized for not defining the term profit clearly in spite of its importance. The annual 
profits are divided according to the provisions of the law and company’s articles; the board of directors 
recommends the pro rata distribution of profits to the shareholders, which is then approved or rejected 
at the GM (shareholders may demand an increase).  
As indicated in Article 127 of SCL 1965, the shareholder shall receive his share of the profits as soon 
as the decision regarding the distribution has been issued at the GM; however, a question arises here, 
which is: what timeframe is acceptable for sending dividends to their rightful owners? The board of 
directors has the power to determine the date for the distribution of dividends to shareholders but it 
may delay that distribution for any reason that it sees fit without consulting the shareholders. This is 
regarded as a serious legislative shortcoming, which needs addressing; the board of directors should 
not be given the authority to determine the date for the distribution of profits to suit its own purposes. 
Rather, a specific timeframe should set in the law, to which the board must refer, and in the case of any 
delay, the board will be liable to legal accountability. 
 
In relation to the illegal distribution of dividends, we discussed the attitude of SCL 1965 towards the 
question of distributing ‘false’ profits to shareholders, wherein the board of directors recommends the 
distribution of a ratio of profits to shareholders, and then deliberately distribute dividends to 
shareholders even though the company has not achieved any real profits in the fiscal year in question. 
Such monies are actually taken from the capital of the company, which represents considerable 
damage the interests of all stakeholders. On this issue, SCL 1965 needs to give more detail; there is 
only one article, which is No. 8, and the stated penalty for the distribution of illegal profits is weak and 
is not commensurate with the violation, i.e., it needs to be reformulated. 
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As for the auditor, he is considered one of the major parts of a company, and plays a significant role in 
protecting its interests and its shareholders; that is why he must be independent in his work. He must 
not be subjected to any pressure from within the company, in particular from the members of the board 
of directors who may be seeking to recommend a certain distribution of profits to shareholders, which 
they know will be approved or rejected at the GM on the basis of the auditor’s report (indeed, the 
shareholders may demand an increase). The Saudi legislature has emphasized in CL the importance of 
the auditor and his functions; unfortunately, it gives authority over recommending the distribution of 
profits to the board of directors. The board of directors has extensive powers at its disposal in selecting 
or isolating the auditor, and thus he is under the influence of the administration. Therefore, the 
provisions relating to auditors must be reconsidered in detail, in order to enhance the independence and 
effectiveness of the auditor. 
 
The last question reviewed in this chapter is the right of the shareholder to the company’s assets upon 
dissolution or liquidation of the company. The JSC is a legal person that has its own property, but as 
soon as it enters the liquidation phase, its possessions are transferred to its stakeholders, including 
shareholders. Therefore, a shareholder shall not be deprived from his right to the assets upon 
liquidation. Also, the company’s assets are distributed according to priority; creditors take their shares 
before any third party, and then the shareholders, who receive monies in accordance with their stake in 
the capital (if any funds remain). 
 
In the chapter 5, we focused on the position of shareholders and their rights at the GM, and the 
importance of shareholders exercising their rights. In attending GMs, they exercise the right of 
supervision and control over the actions of the board, the right to participate in the development of 
company policy, and the right to vote and object. Undoubtedly, the attendance of shareholders at GMs 
is a significant issue, as it is only through these meetings that the voice of the shareholders is heard 
within the company; they can meet the members of the board, question them, and vote for or against 
their resolutions, as well as object to any other decisions that may affect their interests. The current 
form of SCL 1965 is criticized for stating the condition that a shareholder shall have at least 20 shares 
to attend the GMs; it would be better to give each shareholder the right to attend even if he has only 
one share. The law gives the shareholder the right to attorney, and if he is unable to attend, he may 
delegate another person, provided that the representative shall be a shareholder but neither an 
employee of the company nor a member of its management. Actually, the requirement that the 
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representative shall be a shareholder is onerous and problematic, as the shareholder may not know 
anyone else in the company. 
 
Many shareholders do not attend their GMs, and most shareholders have little enthusiasm when they 
do attend; this undoubtedly leaves the door open to the board of directors to manage the company as it 
deems appropriate, and where there is poor supervision by the GM, the weaker the GM, the stronger 
the board of directors. 
Most studies in this regard indicate that the absence of a shareholder is attributable to various factors, 
but the main reason is that shareholders find it useless to attend. This is largely due to the acquisition 
by a small group of shareholders of a large portion of the company, giving them a strong influence at 
the GMs, resulting in the votes of minority shareholders being ineffective. Another reason is the large 
number of shareholders who, for quite simple logistical reasons, are unable to attend the GM on a 
certain date or at a particular time. In addition, attendance can cost the shareholder significant amounts 
of money and time. This should engender the use of modern technology in order to facilitate the 
participation of greater numbers of shareholders, through the use of the Internet. However, listed 
companies in KSA have largely rejected the application of remote voting systems, and they have done 
so because there is no provision for remote voting in the law. Therefore, SCL 1965 should to stipulate 
some provision for the application of remote voting; however, the truth is that many dominant 
shareholders inside the companies evade the application of remote voting to continue managing the 
company as they want. 
 
It could be said that one of the best solutions to the problem of shareholder absenteeism is to spread 
investment education among shareholders, and to establish bodies especially for shareholders where 
they can take care of their affairs and communicate with others. In this regard, the company should 
facilitate the establishment of shareholder groups so that they can, through acting together, represent a 
force within the company. 
 
Moreover, SCL 1965 stipulates the right of shareholders to question the members of the board and the 
auditors, and to discuss any issues of concern. Therefore, according to the law, a member of board and 
the auditor is obliged to answer questions put to them directly, and to support their answers with 
adequate and convincing evidence. Their annual reports might be issued in ambiguous terms, 
necessitating clarification for the shareholders during the AGM. In fact, SCL 1965 does not provide 
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much detail on this point, in particular when directors or the auditor refuse to answer on the grounds of 
the confidentiality or commercial sensitivity of the information. On the other hand, it is the duty of 
SCL 1965 to give shareholders the right to send their questions and queries to the company prior to 
any GM, to be included in the meeting and to be answered in an orderly fashion; this is intended not to 
waste time at the meeting with repeated questions, or in engaging in irrelevant discussions. 
 
The right to vote is an important shareholder right; when a person owns a share, he is entitled to vote at 
GMs. All key decisions pertaining to the company are taken through shareholder voting, and as the 
company cannot prevent a shareholder from exercising his right to vote, any shareholder may file a 
suit against the company. Also, shareholders are entitled to make conventions among themselves in 
order to vote in an agreed direction on a specific resolution. Such agreements are important to 
shareholders; they unite their votes and make them more effective in achieving their interests, which in 
the long run are the company’s interests. On this point, SCL 1965 does not make any reference to 
shareholders’ rights in making such agreements; provisions should be regulating this case to achieve 
the interests of the company and all of its shareholders. A strong regulatory framework would act as a 
barrier against any undue pressure being applied by the directors, who may seek to exploit any 
weakness on the part of minority shareholders; the votes of the latter party would have little effect 
unless there were some form of cooperation and coordination among them. 
 
As for disclosure of information, this is considered an important right for shareholders and 
stakeholders. SCL 1965 gives shareholders the right to obtain copies of the reports of the board and of 
the auditor, and to receive an invitation to a GM together with its agenda; these are briefly described. 
Unfortunately, SCL1965 does not provide a mechanism for ensuring that the information the 
shareholder receives is a true and accurate reflection of the real status of the company. Shareholders 
cannot be expected to play their part in the company’s affairs effectively if they are not given the 
whole and true picture. Accordingly, this matter should be reconsidered within SCL 1965 and the right 
of shareholders to access all reports and any other information should be reaffirmed, as long as such 
information does not harm the company; this right should also be free of charge. 
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In the Chapter Six has focused on the protection of shareholders’ rights in terms of jurisprudence; 
this chapter has highlighted the rights of shareholders in seeking to defend their interests and the 
interests of the company, and to protect them from harmful acts committed by third parties or 
employees of the company, through the legal means and remedies available in SCL 1965. As already 
discussed, the greater bulk of the shareholders in listed companies in KSA are small shareholders. This 
minority should have the right to preserve the interests of the company against any assault that may 
affect their interests and the company as well. 
 
Unfortunately, in accordance with SCL 1965, the company is entitled to maintain its interests and the 
interests of shareholders against any detrimental act, whether from within the company or from 
without; if the company does not file a liability suit against the aggressor through the GM, the 
shareholders have no right to file a liability claim on behalf of the company and for the company itself. 
This is considered a violation of the rights of shareholders, and it weakens their position in the 
company; further, it enables the majority shareholders to control the process of making important 
decisions in the company. 
  
It was found that there is a flaw in the Saudi system, where the Saudi legislature has clearly combined 
company suits and individual shareholder suits, despite the differences in their relative positions and in 
the effects of such suits; it is hoped that the Saudi legislature will reconsider its approach in this 
regard. SCL 1965 does not give a shareholder the right to file a lawsuit on behalf of the company in 
the event of a GM objecting to raise any case in question. It is also hoped that the Saudi legislature will 
provide clear provisions on a shareholder’s right to file a suit on behalf of the company, in order to 
defend the company and its interests; this would definitely raise the level of protection for all 
shareholders. 
 
Meanwhile, SCL 1965 gives the shareholder who owns 5% or more of the capital of the company the 
right to request the MOCI for an inspection of the company’s affairs if he has suspicions of fraud or 
incompetence. This right is an important guarantee for the protection of shareholders; however, it is 
suggested that the inspection system needs to be amended in its legal provisions to grant more than 
200 shareholders the right to request an inspection when they have strong evidence of the existence of 
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fraud within the company; certainly, it would remain the court’s power to accept or reject the 
application. Furthermore, it is believed that it is the duty of the Saudi legislature to provide for this 
right at all times, and to give the investigators all necessary powers to run the investigation as they see 
fit in order to prove a case or reject it, to determine the truth of the matter, and to report to the MOCI 
to decide on any appropriate action within its remit. 
 
Generally, a GM will object to a shareholder filing a suit if it is deemed to threaten the influence of the 
controlling shareholders who, de facto, manage the company. The current law does not provide any 
guarantees for minority shareholders against any excessive behaviour on the part of the major 
shareholders in the company, or against their being prevented from exercising their rights. For 
example, minority shareholders cannot file to liquidate the company before the courts should they find 
that the company is being managed only to achieve the interests of a particular class. In this context, 
the competent court should be given full authority to consider or refuse the case from the beginning. 
The court must have a greater role in protecting the rights of shareholders, such as the right to modify 
the memorandum of association, to order the company to purchase the shares of disgruntled 
shareholders at a fair price, and to dissolve the company should it see fit, amongst others. Again, the 
Saudi legislature clearly mingles company suits with individual shareholder suits in spite of their clear 
differences. Accordingly, this study suggests that the Saudi legislature reconsider its approach in this 
regard in order to allow shareholders the right to protect the company on its behalf in certain cases. 
Moreover, minority shareholders play only a limited role within the GM, and are largely unable to 
prosecute the members of the board of directors on the basis of abuse or misuse of power; this matter 
is not mentioned in SCL 1965. This is one of the disadvantages of the company law, which has failed 
to protect minority shareholders. It urgently needs to be rewritten in order to keep pace with the 
modern commercial era. 
 
In conclusion, this study has found that the rights of shareholders, even in accordance with SCL 1965, 
are weak; this law does not provide shareholders with all the rights that they should enjoy. Thus, 
minority shareholders are often subject to the control of majority shareholders, who are generally in 
charge of the company’s management. As a result this, shareholders either do not exercise or do not 
enjoy certain rights, and they therefore forfeit their natural and intended role, which is to control the 
activities of the board of the company, and defend their interests. Despite the Saudi government 
intending to conduct a range of reforms, particularly in the field of trade, SCL 1965 has not been 
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modified to any significant degree; it is still not sufficiently effective, and does not address many 
important points relating to shareholders’ rights in listed companies. Therefore, there is a need to 
develop a new company law, one that is modern and compatible with the present era.  
 
This study has focused on the rights of shareholders in listed companies in accordance with SCL 1965; 
it is hoped that the new law (still under development) will consider the following set of 
recommendations, which address issues that are lacking in the current form of the law: 
 
 Recommendations for CL bill 
The new company law must be comprehensive, and covers all details however minor; the best example 
is CA 2006 of the UK. All relevant persons, governmental departments, shareholders, the business 
community, competent courts, university professors, lawyers and others must be invited to participate 
in its development. 
 
 
 Recommendations on Saudi Corporate Governance Regulation 
It has been said that the objective of the Corporate Governance framework is to provide a general 
guideline of best practice for listed companies and their shareholders; this was meant to increase the 
level of protection for all shareholders, especially the minority ones, and it should serve to empower 
their position against oppression of majority. 
In fact, it has been argued that reforming the laws concerned with investor protection and improving 
judicial quality are quite difficult, lengthy, and require the support of politicians and relevant bodies; 
especially on KSA. However, improving corporate governance at the firm-level seems to be a feasible 
goal. In this context, Saudi legislature have to reconsider the SCGRs, and to address the shortcomings 
of SCL 1965, in order to make the protection of shareholders’ rights more powerful and effective than 
it currently is. 
Therefore, CMA has the greatest opportunity to adjust the SCGRs and to change its status from being 
‘comply or explain’ to being obligatory, particularly given that reforming the CL has taken longer than 
expected.  Such attempts would definitely contribute to the dissemination of investment culture among 
shareholders, and increase knowledge of their rights within the company, which would then result in 
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the exercise of those rights in an efficacious manner. Their observation of the deeds of board of 
directors would also increase and, in general, this would contribute to improving the legal and 
commercial environment in KSA. 
 
• Recommendations for MOCI & CMA  
 
There must be an active and significant role for the MOCI and CMA through monitoring listed 
companies, inspecting their administrative aspects and financial reports, and addressing any errors or 
violations of the law or the company’s articles; this last responsibility is particularly important as 
violations may harm stakeholders, especially should the company be passing through bad financial or 
administrative conditions, or suffering from heavy losses. The primary goal of such oversight would be 
to improve the level of protection for shareholders within listed companies. There should also be a role 
for governmental bodies to disseminate knowledge of shareholder’s rights within companies, through 
seminars, courses and advertising.  
 
 Recommendations on Shareholders General Meetings 
 
SCL 1965 should be included an explicit provisions for many GM’s issues. Such as the legal situation 
if the board of directors refuses shareholders application to request convening GM. Therefore, 
shareholders should have right and allowed them to initiate the GM by themselves, or by order of the 
court, and CL should be regulated this matter in order to protect minority shareholders from potential 
abuse by the board of directors.  
 
According to SCL 1965, the board of directors is obliged to call an EGM if the company losses reach 
three-quarters of its capital.  This measure is logical but needs modification; even if we assume that the 
company has lost half of its capital, according to the law, there is no need to call an EGM.  It is 
accordingly suggested that the Saudi legislature adopt the phrase ‘significant losses’ rather than ‘three-
quarters’ of the capital because losing such a proportion of the capital is considered serious and in need 
to being dealt with urgently; such losses touch everyone but the greatest impact will be on the minority 
shareholders.  
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Moreover, SCL1965 should be required all listed companies to use the modern technology in order to 
facilitate the participation of greater numbers of shareholders in GMs, through the use of the Internet, 
Telephone, and Fax.  However, it has been argued that distant voting and cumulative voting will 
enhance participation shareholders on making decisions inside corporations. As well, shareholders 
should have the right to make agreements among themselves to vote in a certain manner. 
 
In additional, every company must keep recorded minutes of all proceedings at the meetings of its 
shareholders and directors at least 10 years like to the CA 2006, however, such keeping will be helpful 
for evidence in any disputes. 
Furthermore, the SCL 1965 should amend Article 108, and clearly shows when directors and auditors must to 
answer the shareholder’s question arising during GMs. As well what are the cases that they are entitled to refuse 
to answers the questions if will damage the company’s interests.  
 
• Recommendations to Establish an Independent Association for Shareholders 
It is believed that shareholders should have their own independent associations that take care of their 
affairs and that defend their rights. The existence of such associations is necessary, especially for 
shareholders in KSA, because it ends to be the case that only a few shareholders own a major part of 
the company, and those major shareholders are usually the ones who manage the company. Many 
shareholders do not have sufficient knowledge of all their rights relating to ownership; for example, 
the term corporate governance is known only to a few and is only fully comprehended by professionals 
in the field. 
 
It is believed that such associations would contribute to providing the necessary means vis-à-vis the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights within the company; they would make them aware of their rights, and 
serve to disseminate investment culture among them. This could be achieved through training courses; 
shareholders could have their rights explained to them and be shown how to exercise them, and other 
important issues facing shareholders could be addressed, such as attending GMs, conducting 
discussions with company officials, voting on decisions, taking legal action should they uncover 
violations on the part of board, and other related subjects. 
 
This certainly will also contribute to improving the practice of rights by shareholders within the 
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company, and the legal defending of his interests; the more knowledge a shareholder has about his 
rights, the more effectively they are exercised, which will be positively reflected in an increase in the 
level of protection for the rights of shareholders. Then, the board of directors will take into account the 
existence of shareholders exercising their rights in practice, including taking control over the work of 
the board, and questioning them for any violations. The shareholders association concept is available 
in many legal systems around the world, an example of which is the shareholder associations of the 
UK. 
  Recommendations on the Members of the Company’s Board 
 One of the rights of shareholders is that the person(s) who run their company shall be highly qualified; 
the law must provide certain requirements of persons who wish to join the board of the company, and 
give the shareholders the right to choose the directors by inspecting the CV of each candidate for 
membership. Such information should be published on company’s websites.  
Guarantee shares are provided by the members of the board of directors currently estimated at ten 
thousand SAR; this is ineffective. The amount must be increased, or a certain number of shares must 
be stipulated because the currently stipulated amount is insufficient and does not achieve the desired 
goal of warranty shares. 
 
Furthermore, SCL 1965 does not require the presence of the directors at the GM with the necessary 
quorum needed as a condition for convening its meeting; however, the CL in certain countries does 
require the presence of directors at meetings, or at least some of them, as they manage the company, 
and are required to answer the shareholders’ questions or those of other relevant persons such as the 
auditor or the representative of the MOCI. 
 Recommendations on Auditors 
 
It could be argued that determining a legal duration of the duty for the auditor of longer than a year 
would serve to address this shortcoming, and give the auditor greater stability and independence; then 
the board’s influence over the auditor would be weakened.  The maximum duration for the 
appointment of the auditor could be three years (or more) during which he would not be re-elected.   
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 Recommendation on Shareholder’s Financial Rights 
 
The Policy of dividends distribution under SCL 1965 is not clear and should be regulated again to 
avoid any harm to shareholders and any abuse from company’s board.  
In this context, SCL 1965 does not specify any particular maximum percentages for deductions to 
Company’s Reserves, leaving this matter to the board of directors. At this point, it is important for the 
Saudi legislature to intervene and to determine a certain percentage for the reserves because not 
identifying such a percentage gives an excuse for the board to determine a percentage according to 
their wishes, which may leave no profits for shareholders at the end, or result in the distribution of 
dividends that do not meet their expectations.  
It is true that Article 136 of the SCL 1965 gives the shareholder the right of pre-emption, but this right is 
need reform, obviously, it is controlled by the board of directors, and consequently the board has the 
right to approve or cancel it. Actually, there is a defect in the above article where the Saudi legislature 
should have been more explicit in stating the rights of shareholders, and should not have added any 
legal subsidiary paragraphs that may allow cancelling, or contradicting the right referred to.  
 Recommendations on the Penalties 
As for sanctions against violating the provisions of the law, whether by members of the board, the 
auditors, or the employees of the company, they need to be reconsidered. The sanctions are very weak 
and do not achieve the required goal; they are not considered as a sufficient deterrent to potential 
offenders, and do not help protect the interests of shareholders. The punishment should be 
commensurate with the violation. 
 Recommendations on Shareholders Remedy 
All shareholders must be given the right to defend the company’s interests on its behalf, which is a fair 
means of redress, through which minority shareholders have the right to file a liability lawsuit against 
the aggressor when the GM has not fulfilled its duties in this regard. Obviously, this is considered an 
exceptional right, which is only enabled in particular circumstances; nevertheless, minority 
shareholders are entitled to file a suit when the company fails to defend their rights because of the 
intransigence of majority shareholders in ratifying the filing of a suit. Such a claim must be for the 
benefit of the company and not for the interests of shareholders; certainly, the Saudi courts should play 
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an important role in granting the shareholder the right to continue the action or to cease it. The courts 
should have discretion in accepting or rejecting the lawsuit, without the need to obtain permission from 
the company. However, it is believed that the derivative action must be organized in great detail. 
 
However, at the end of this research, the question still remains: for the minority shareholders in the 
current SCL 1965, is there adequate protection that preserves their rights from domination on the part 
of the controlling shareholders? In other words, do the minority shareholders in listed companies have 
sufficient and effective rights? 
  
It could be said that the minority shareholders, in the light of SCL 1965 and SCGRs, do not have a set 
of minimum of rights and safeguards to ensure that they can protect their interests in the company, and 
that deter members of the board of directors and major shareholders in the company from prejudicial 
acts.  
It has been believed that the position of minority shareholders against majority shareholders is very 
weak; the majority shareholders still control the company as it thinks right, regardless of the opinion of 
minority shareholders. It is hoped that the new law, prepared since 2007, will meet the aspirations of 
all shareholders, but particularly the minority ones, and will help to create a healthy environment for 
investment, thereby contributing to the generation of financial rewards for all. 
 
7.2 The Contributions of the Study: 
 
Generally, this study aims to improve the level of protection for shareholders in Saudi listed 
companies, and to emphasize the importance of shareholders having sufficient protection against any 
encroachment on their interests within the corporation; hence, it aims to recast the provisions relating 
to shareholders, however, the main contributions of this study are its assistance to fill the gap in the 
literature concerning current practices of minority shareholders rights in Saudi Arabia through the 
legal perspective.  In addition, to amend and reform the current Saudi company law to support the 
position of minority shareholders to bring into line with the international standards. The final 
contribution is to improve corporate governance practice within the listed companies in KSA. 
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